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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

CAN TRUST BE LEARNED IN HETEROGENEOUS ENVIRONMETNS? AN
INTEGRATIVE MODEL OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LEARNING THROUGH
DEMOCRACY

While the virtues of social capital in democracies are widely recognized, previous studies
have repeatedly shown that social capital is in short supply in heterogeneous communities
with ethnic minorities. Against the view that levels of social capital are culturally
predetermined, I argue that it is possible to generate social capital by carefully
formulating political institutions. Drawing from theories of institutional management of
ethnic conflict and theories of institutional learning, I construct an integrated theory of
social capital which hypothesizes that citizens learn to trust one another based on their
experiences with political institutions during an extended period of democratic rule. To
test this integrated model of social capital, I use a probit analysis to examine how
democratic longevity in different institutional settings (e.g., majoritarian vs. consensus)
influences social capital. To overcome the endogeneity problem that exists between
social capital and democratic longevity, I adopt an instrumental variables approach,
drawing on theories in international relations.
My analysis of World Values Survey data yields three main conclusions concerning the
institutional arrangements that foster social capital. First, I find that democratic longevity
fosters higher levels of trust in countries with consensus institutions containing powersharing arrangements through cabinets, executive-legislative balances, party systems, and
electoral systems—presumably because cooperation among different groups enhances
social capital. Second, a longer period of democratic rule in highly federal institutions
undermines trust, as the devolution of powers through territorial units is thought to
fragment the political system and society. Finally, consistent with the theoretical
expectations, I find that these two conclusions hold only among ethnic minorities.
Among ethnic majorities, the effect of democratic longevity disappears once we purge
the endogenous component (i.e., the effect of social capital on democratic longevity),
using an instrumental variables approach. Case studies of the Baltic States, the Canadian
province of Quebec, and Malaysia corroborated the findings from the statistical analyses.

By uncovering a mechanism through which social capital can be generated in multiethnic
states, this study makes an important contribution to the literature.
KEYWORDS: Social Capital, Community Heterogeneity, Political Institutions,
Democratic Longevity, Multiethnic Democracies

Satoshi Machida
Oct 1, 2006

CAN TRUST BE LEARNED IN HETEROGENEOUS ENVIRONMETNS? AN
INTEGRATIVE MODEL OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LEARNING THROUGH
DEMOCRACY
By
Satoshi Machida

Dr. Matthew Gabel
Co-Director of Dissertation
Dr. Mark Peffley
Co-Director of Dissertation
Dr. Donald Gross
Director of Graduate Studies
October 26, 2006

RULES FOR USE OF DISSERTATIONS

Unpublished dissertations submitted for the Doctor's degree and deposited in the
University of Kentucky Library are as a rule open for inspection, but are to be
used only with due regard to the rights of the authors. Bibliographical references
may be noted, but quotations or summaries of parts may be published only with
the permission of the author, and with the usual scholarly acknowledgments.
Extensive copying or publication of the dissertation in whole or in part also
requires the consent of the Dean of the Graduate School of the University of
Kentucky.
A library that borrows this dissertation for use by its patrons is expected to secure
the signature of each user.

Name

Date

__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

DISSERTATION

Satoshi Machida

The Graduate School
University of Kentucky
2006

CAN TRUST BE LEARNED IN HETEROGENEOUS ENVIRONMETNS?
AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LEARNING THROUGH
DEMOCRACY

DISSERTATION
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment for the
requirement degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
College of Arts and Sciences
at the University of Kentucky
By
Satoshi Machida
Lexington, Kentucky
Co-Director: Dr. Matthew Gabel, Associate Professor in the Department of
Political Science at the Washington University in St. Louis.
and Dr. Mark Peffley, Professor of Political Science
Lexington, Kentucky
2006
Copyright © Satoshi Machida 2006

DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my mother, Hiroko Machida, and to my father, Noriaki
Machida.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Looking back on my graduate study for about five years, I find myself indebted to so
many people. I attempt to thank them despite the risk that I may overlook someone.
I must thank my advisor and chair of my dissertation committee, Dr. Matthew
Gabel, for his consistent support on my research. Without his help, I could not have
achieved what I did. From him, I have learned what research in political science is all
about.
I would like to thank many people for providing useful advice and helping me to
develop professional skills. I owe special thanks to my committee members. Dr. Mark
Peffley, a co-chair in my committee, provided me the foundation from which I was able
to develop ideas for my dissertation. Dr. Charles Davis and Dr. Tom Janoski helped me
to improve my dissertation by offering constructive criticisms. I also thank Dr. Richard
Fording, Dr. Horace Bartilow, Dr. Steve Voss, and Dr. Stuart Kaufman, who warmly
supported my study throughout the program.
I would like to thank my colleagues in the Department of Political Science.
Ridvan Peshkopia, Rajan Kumar, Byungkyu Kim, and Dong-Hyuk Shin have been good
friends to me. I am thankful for the friendship. Tae-Hyung Kim, Young-Kwi Bae, and
Tom Ruby encouraged me to finish my dissertation with useful advice for my research. I
also wish to thank Karen Keogler. She has been a person who I can always talk to
whenever I feel sad or frustrated. Dr. Takashi Nomiyama has shown me how to face
difficulties through the art of kendo. Kristina Rutkute has always provided me with a
strong support and motivated me to be a better person. Without her support, my
experience in Kentucky would have been so different.

iii

Finally, I wish to thank my family. My parents have generously allowed me to
pursue what I like. I am always thankful for their support and love. Thank you.

iv

Table of Contents

List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………viii
List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………..x
Chapter 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………………1
Chapter 2: Literature Review………………………………………………………….....10
2-1: What is Social Capital?...............................................................................................11
2-2: Community Heterogeneity and Social Capital……………………………….……...14
2-3: Exogenous and Endogenous Approach of Social Capital……………….…………..19
2-4: Social Capital as Endogenous to Political Institutions…………………….……….. 26
2-5: Institutional Arrangements in Heterogeneous Communities………………………..30
2-6: Institutional Learning………………………………………………………………..38
2-7: Synthesizing the Stories……………………………………………………………..41
Chapter 3: Theory and Hypotheses……………………………………………………………….44
3-1: Community Heterogeneity and Social Capital……………………………………...45
3-2: Political Institutions and Social Capital……………………………………….........46
3-3: Integrative Model of Political and Social Learning…………………………………50
3-3-1: The Direct-Translation-Learning Hypothesis…………………………………….50
3-3-2: The Power-Sharing Learning Hypothesis………………………………………...52
3-3-3: The Dominant Learning Hypothesis……………………………………………...53
3-3-4: The Fragmentation Learning Hypothesis…………………………………………54
3-3-5: The Consolidation Learning Hypothesis………………………………………….56
Chapter 4: Measurement of Social Capital and Its Overall Dynamics…………………………...60
4-1: Conceptualizing Social Capital……………………………………………………..61
4-2: Measuring Social Capital…………………………………………………………...63
4-3: Data and Operationalization………………………………………………………...66

v

4-4: Overall Dynamics Surrounding Social Capital……………………………………..91
Chapter 5: Empirical Analysis 1………………………………………………………………...101
5-1: Probit Analysis…………………………………………………………………….102
5-2: Probit Analyses Separating Majorities and Minorities…………………………….112
5-3: Summary…………………………………………………………………………...122
Chapter 6: Empirical Analysis 2—Instrumental Variables Approach…………………………..125
6-1: Identifying Appropriate Instruments………………………………………………...126
6-2: Instrumental Variables 2SLS Estimate………………………………………………143
6-3: Summary……………………………………………………………………………..153
Chapter 7: Case Studies…………………………………………………………………………156
7-1: Conducting Case Studies…………………………………………………………….157
7-2: Case study 1—Baltic Countries……………………………………………………...162
7-2-1: Case Selection…………………………………………………………………...162
7-2-2: Background……………………………………………………………………...166
7-2-3: Citizenship Rules………………………………………………………………..169
7-2-4: The Case of Estonia……………………………………………………………..176
7-2-5: Summary (Estonia)………………………………………………………………182
7-2-6: The Case of Latvia…………………………………………………………….. .183
7-2-7: Summary (Latvia)………………………………………………….……………190
7-2-8: The Case of Lithuania…………………………………………………………...190
7-2-9: Summary (Lithuania)……………………………………………………………193
7-2-10: Democratic Longevity: After 15 years of Democracy…………………………193
7-2-11: Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...199
7-3: Case Study 2—Canada………………………………………………………………205
7-3-1: Case Selection…………………………………………………………………...205

vi

7-3-2: Background……………………………………………………………………...209
7-3-3: Federal Accommodation of Quebec prior to 1960s……………………………..214
Democratic Longevity…………………………………………………………..219
7-3-4: Democratic Longevity (1):
The Quiet Revolution and the Emergence of Democratic Force……………….220
7-3-5: Democratic Longevity (2)
The Emergence of Parti Québécois………………………………………..224

7-3-6: Democratic Longevity (3)
The PQ’s Struggle for Power through the Sovereignty Issue…………...226
7-3-7: Conclusion
Democratic Longevity in the Federal-Unitary Institutions in Canada….234
7-4: Case study 3—Malaysia……………………………………………………………..239
7-4-1: Case Selection…………………………………………………………………...239
7-4-2: Background……………………………………………………………………...242
7-4-3: Consociational System of Malaysia……………………………………………..246
7-4-4: The Breakdown of Consociational Accommodation……………………………251
7-4-5: Conclusion
Malaysia’s Consociational Learning…………………………………………….255
7-5: Conclusion (Case Studies)…………………………………………………………...260
Chapter 8: Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………...262
Appendices:
Appendix A: Expanding Lijphart Index of Democracies……………………………………….270
Appendix B: Hierarchical Non-Linear Model (HLM) Analyses………………………………. 306
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………….....309
Vita……………………………………………………………………………………………...336

vii

List of Tables
Table 3-1 Hypotheses of Political and Social Learning…………………………………58
Table 4-1 Countries Included in the Study and Year of Survey………………………...68
Table 4-2 Description of Dependent Variable…………………………………………..73
Table 4-3 Description of Independent Variables………………………………………..86
Table 4-4 Survey Questions used to Identify Majorities and Minorities………………..87
Table 4-5 Mean Scores of Interpersonal Trust in Each Country………………………..91
Table 4-6 Interpersonal Trust for Majorities and Minorities……………………………92
Table 4-7 Interpersonal Trust: Comparing Majority and Minority—T-test………….....99
Table 5-1 Probit Analysis (Majorities and Minorities)………………………………...104
Table 5-2 Difference in Predicted Probability on Interpersonal Trust………………...110
Table 5-3 Probit Analysis (Majorities)………………………………………………...113
Table 5-4 Probit Analysis (Minorities)………………………………………………...114
Table 6-1 First Stage OLS Analyses for Endogenous Variables (Majorities)…………135
Table 6-2 First Stage OLS Analyses for Endogenous Variables (Minorities)…………139
Table 6-3 Instrumental Variables 2SLS Analysis (Majorities)………………………...146
Table 6-4 Instrumental Variable 2SLS (Minorities)…………………………………...147
Table 7-1 Comparison of Languages in Russia and the Baltic Countries……………..201

Appendices:
Appendix A Expanding Lijphart Index
Table A-1 Effective Number of Parties (ENPV)………………………………………276
Table A-2 Percentage of Minimal-winning Cabinet and Single Party Cabinet………..281
Table A-3 Presidential Strength over the Legislative Branch…………………………286

viii

Table A-4 Disproportionality and Electoral Systems……………………………….....291
Table A-5 Federal System……………………………………………………………..295
Table A-6 Parliament and Congress…………………………………………………. .299
Table A-7 Rigidity of Constitutional Amendment Rule……………………….………302
Table A-8 Strength of Judicial Review………………………………………………...305
Appendix B: Hierarchical Non-Linear Model (HLM) Analyses
Table B-1 HLM Analysis: (Majorities and Minorities)……………………………….306
Table B-2 HLM Analysis (Majorities)………………………………………………...307
Table B-3 HLM Analyses (Minorities)………………………………………………..308

ix

List of Figures
Figure 4-1 Regime Types and Interpersonal Trust……………………………………..93
Figure 4-2 Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization and Interpersonal Trust………………..95
Figure 4-3 Economic Inequality and Interpersonal Trust……………………………....96
Figure 4-4 Executive-Parties Institutions and Interpersonal Trust……………………..97
Figure 4-5 Federal-Unitary Institutions and Interpersonal Trust……………………… 98
Figure 5-1 Marginal Effect of Democratic Longevity on Trust across Executive-Parties
Institutions (Majorities and Minorities)………………………………………………...106
Figure 5-2 Marginal Effect of Democratic Longevity on Trust across Federal-Unitary
Institutions (Majorities and Minorities)………………………………………………...108
Figure 5-3 Marginal Effect of Democratic Longevity on Trust across Executive-Parties
Institutions (Majorities)………………………………………………………………...115
Figure 5-4 Marginal Effect of Democratic Longevity on Trust across Executive-Parties
Institutions (Minorities)………………………………………………………………...116
Figure 5-5 Comparing Marginal Effect of Democratic Longevity on Trust across
Executive-Parties Institutions (Majorities and Minorities)……………………………..118
Figure 5-6 Marginal Effect of Democratic Longevity on Trust across Federal-Unitary
Institutions (Majorities)………………………………………………………………...119
Figure 5-7 Marginal Effect of Democratic Longevity on Trust across Federal-Unitary
Institutions (Minorities)………………………………………………………………...120
Figure 5-8 Comparing Marginal Effect of Democratic Longevity on Trust across
Federal-Unitary Institutions (Majorities and Minorities)………………………………121
Figure 6-1 Marginal Effect of US Influence Index across Executive-Parties Institutions
(Majorities)……………………………………………………………………………..136
Figure 6-2 Marginal Effect of US Influence Index across Federal-Unitary Institutions
(Majorities)……………………………………………………………………………..137
Figure 6-3 Marginal Effect of US Influence Index across Executive-Parties Institutions
(Minorities)……………………………………………………………………………..140

x

Figure 6-4 Marginal Effect of US Influence Index across Federal-Unitary Institutions
(Minorities)……………………………………………………………………………..141
Figure 6-5 Marginal Effect of Democratic Longevity on Trust across Executive-Parties
Institutions (Majorities—IV-2SLS Analysis)…………………………………………..148
Figure 6-6 Marginal Effect of Democratic Longevity on Trust across Executive-Parties
Institutions (Minorities—IV-2SLS Analysis)…………………………………………..149
Figure 6-7 Marginal Effect of Democratic Longevity on Trust across Federal-Unitary
Institutions (Majorities—IV-2SLS Analysis)…………………………………………..151
Figure 6-8 Marginal Effect of Democratic Longevity on Trust across Federal-Unitary
Institutions (Minorities—IV-2SLS Analysis)…………………………………………..152
Figure 7-1 Executive-Parties Institutions and Interpersonal Trust for Minority
Groups…………………………………………………………………………………. 174
Figure 7-2 Federal-Unitary Institutions and Interpersonal Trust for Minority
Groups…………………………………………………………………………………..207

Appendices
Figure A-1 Criteria for Presidential Power over the Legislative Branch………………284

xi

Chapter 1: Introduction

Since Putnam (1993) published his influential work, Making Democracy Work, the
concept of social capital has been widely introduced in the field of political science.
Praising the large applicability of his study, Latin (1995) calls Putnam’s work “a stunning
breakthrough in political culture research” (p. 171). Putnam’s study has had important
impacts not only on academia but on a number of international development agencies
such as the World Bank and the US Agency for International Development. According
to The Economist, Putnam (1993) is “a great work of social science, worthy to rank
alongside de Tocqueville, Pareto, and Weber” (The Economist 1993, p. 96). Thus, the
concept of social capital has received a significant amount of attention both within and
outside academia. Moreover, McLain (2003) notes, “political scientists have
characterized social capital as the crowning glory of a liberal society; it is also supposed
to be the engine that makes a society democratic as well as liberal” (p. 101). Scholars
have suggested that social capital is an essential component of liberal democracy.
Unfortunately, however, in those societies where the core tenets of liberal
democracy—protection of minority rights, protection of civil liberties, and political
tolerance—are most at risk, we tend to find very poor conditions for improving social
capital. Specifically, ethnically diverse or economically unequal societies tend to
demonstrate low social capital. Scholars have found that community heterogeneity
significantly decreases levels of social capital. Cross-national research has found that
trust in others seems to be lower in more diverse societies (Knack and Keefer 1997).
Research in the United States has also found that generalized trust is lower when local
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communities are more heterogeneous (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002). The same
relationship has also been found in other components of social capital. For instance,
studies have suggested that levels of civic engagement are significantly lower in more
heterogeneous communities (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003). As
these studies show, the negative relationship between community heterogeneity and
social capital seems to be well established. Consequently, these findings suggest that
countries that include diverse ethnic elements face difficulty in ensuring liberal
democratic norms, confirming the conventional knowledge that ethnic diversity is one of
the most serious impediments to liberal democracy (Dahl 1989).
Most scholars have tried to explain this negative relationship between community
heterogeneity and social capital by referring to the difference between “generalized trust”
and “particularized trust,” essentially the same difference that Putnam (2000) draws
between “bridging” and “bonding” social capital. Generalized trust tends to spread
widely in a society and encourages civic cooperation, reflecting individuals’ beliefs that
others in the society share fundamental values and belong to the same community
(Fukuyama 1995; Uslaner 2002). On the other hand, particularized trust entails deeper
ties among narrower circles such as family members, friends, and others with similar
backgrounds. According to Uslaner (2002), particularized trusters tend to be suspicious
of other people that they do not know. Furthermore, particularized trusters tend to be
more withdrawn from the larger society (Uslaner 2002; Uslaner and Conley 2003).
These studies suggest that community heterogeneity critically hinders the growth of
generalized trust. Put differently, “bridging” social capital (i.e., generalized trust) is not
likely to prosper in heterogeneous communities. But while the negative relationship
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between community heterogeneity and social capital has been firmly established, this is
by no means the end of the story. Rather, it is necessary to consider how different factors
influence the vicious circle between community heterogeneity and social capital to
determine whether it is possible to break the Gordian knot and locate conditions under
which the relationship is not invariant.
Therefore, the central question in this study is, “how is it possible to generate
social capital in heterogeneous environments?” This research question challenges the
conventional wisdom that social capital is largely immutable. In his seminal work in
Italy, Putnam (1993) conceptualized social capital as a cultural endowment that can be
found in some regions but not in others. According to this perspective, social capital is
not subject to change in the short term. Consequently, because it is impossible to
generate social capital over a short period of time, it follows that multiethnic countries
with lower levels of social capital would be destined to fail in their attempt to establish a
liberal democracy.
However, I disagree with this pessimistic view surrounding multiethnic countries.
Unlike the conventional wisdom, I will demonstrate that social capital is actually a
consequence of institutional factors, and that it is possible to generate social capital even
in heterogeneous environments. By showing that levels of social capital are not
necessarily fixed in each cultural setting, my goal is to present a more optimistic view for
the future of democratic development in multiethnic countries.
In this study, as one of the main factors that affect social capital, I examine the
influence of political institutions. Certainly, if social capital can be rephrased as a
peaceful relationship between ethnic groups, I am not the first to analyze how political
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institutions affect social capital. Numerous studies have explored how different political
institutions influence ethnic conflict or its management. Among them, one of the most
controversial issues in the literature is the different effects of majoritarian or consensus
types of institutions in multiethnic states. For instance, Lijphart (1999) analyzed the
effects of these types of institutions in the executive-parties and federal-unitary
dimensions and demonstrated that institutional arrangements do matter in managing
ethnic conflict. Yet, despite the fact that a heated debate exists regarding the effects of
majoritarian and consensus institutions, no systematic efforts have been made to apply
these concepts to the study of social capital, at least not at the individual level.
Furthermore, one of the most critical flaws in previous studies is that they lack a longterm perspective of institutional influence. Prior research may be able to capture a causal
dynamic at a certain time point, but it is incapable of explaining the long-term effect of
political institutions. As a consequence, existing studies fail to understand the full
dynamics surrounding political institutions and social capital in multiethnic states.
To overcome the shortcomings of previous studies, I adopt an integrative
approach. Specifically, by combining insights from the literatures of somewhat separate
fields, I present an integrative model of political and social learning explaining the longterm effects of political institutions on social capital in multiethnic states. The main
components of the model are twofold: political institutions and institutional learning.
Regarding the effects of political institutions on social capital, I rely on previous studies
of institutional management of ethnic conflict. As to the latter, to grasp the long term
effects of political institutions, I rely on institutional learning theory. By incorporating
these two perspectives into one model, I explore the dynamics of social capital in
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multiethnic states. The integrative model of political and social learning helps us to
understand the process through which social capital is generated. What is particularly
innovative about this model is that it can explain how citizens’ political experiences are
converted into social capital through political institutions. I test the model by relying on
both probit and an instrumental variables analyses. Furthermore, to complement the
statistical analyses, I conduct case studies on three regions: the Baltic countries, the
Canadian province of Quebec, and Malaysia.
The main findings are threefold. First, I find that democratic longevity fosters
higher levels of trust in countries with consensus institutions containing power-sharing
arrangements through cabinets, executive-legislative balances, party systems, and
electoral systems—presumably because cooperation among different groups enhances
social capital. Second, a longer period of democratic rule in highly federal institutions
undermines trust, as the devolution of powers through territorial units is thought to
fragment the political system and society. Finally, consistent with the theoretical
expectations, I find that these two conclusions hold only among ethnic minorities.
Among ethnic majorities, the effect of democratic longevity disappears once we purge
the endogenous component (i.e., the effect of social capital on democratic longevity),
using an instrumental variables approach. In this way, this study reveals novel
relationships between social capital, community heterogeneity, political institutions, and
democratic longevity. By dissecting the mechanisms through which social capital is
fostered in heterogeneous environments, this study makes an important contribution to
the literature. Furthermore, as this study addresses the relationship between liberal
democracy and society, my findings have important implications for the future of liberal
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democracies. If individuals can learn to trust others through their experiences with
political institutions, even countries that are poorly endowed with social capital have a
chance of establishing well functioning liberal democracy. By finding that social capital
is endogenous to institutional factors, I demonstrate that we can actually increase the
probability that democracy survives by carefully formulating political institutions. Hence,
this study offers important guidelines on how we can foster conditions conducive to a
sustainable democracy.
This study proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I review the literatures in related
fields. I consider what we have already learned in the fields of social capital, institutional
arrangements of ethnic conflict, and institutional learning. These studies provide a
number of important insights, and we can learn a great deal about the real world thanks to
the accumulated knowledge from these studies. At the same time, however, reviewing
studies in these fields makes us realize that these research programs have developed
separately with few applications outside each specific field. Recognizing this fact, I
suggest that it is important to integrate theoretical perspectives. Therefore, the main
purpose of this chapter is to specify the theoretical hole in the literature and suggest a
possible solution to fill this gap by linking separate research programs.
In Chapter 3, based on the literature review and the theoretical gap identified, I
present an integrative model of political and social learning. Specifically, I construct a
theoretical model by combining the insights from two separate fields: institutional
management of ethnic conflict and institutional learning. I argue that citizens can learn to
trust others through the mediating influence of political institutions. Furthermore, as an
innovation from previous studies, I further argue that the outcome of political and social
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capital learning depends on the age of the democratic regime. Relying on the integrative
model, I derive a series of testable hypotheses.
Chapter 4 describes the empirical research design. Starting from the discussion
about how we can conceptualize social capital, I explain my measurement strategy for the
dependent variable. I also discuss how I measure key independent variables as well as
control variables. Furthermore, based on these measures, I explore the overall dynamics
surrounding social capital at an aggregate level. By showing that overall dynamics
among variables are generally consistent with our hypotheses, this chapter lays the
groundwork for the multivariate statistical analyses of subsequent chapters.
In Chapter 5, I examine how citizens’ experiences with political institutions can
produce social capital among majorities and minorities. Using the World Values Survey
(WVS) covering 57 countries, I conduct probit analyses. The analyses find that
democratic longevity in consensus institutions in the executive-parties dimension has a
positive influence on trust both among majorities and minorities. In the federal-unitary
dimension, the analyses indicate that democratic longevity generates more trust in the
unitary institutions among both groups. Furthermore, among only the minorities,
longevity negatively affects social capital in highly decentralized institutions. The results
in the analyses clearly show that the effect of democratic longevity on trust varies
depending on the institutional settings and people’s status in society. The statistical
analyses in this chapter present evidence that the citizens’ trust of others is a function of
their experiences with political institutions over a period of the democratic rule.
Chapter 6 extends the statistical analyses in Chapter 5. Specifically, it deals with
the issue of endogeneity. While the statistical analyses conducted in Chapter 5 were
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consistent with several hypotheses, the research design suffers from a potential problem
of endogeneity between social capital and democratic longevity. Put differently,
although I have set social capital as the dependent variable and democratic longevity as
an independent variable, there is a possibility of reverse causation. It is possible to
hypothesize that the existence of social capital influences democratic longevity rather
than vice versa. Therefore, in this chapter, I address the endogeneity problem by
adopting an instrumental variables approach. Relying on insights from theories of
international relations, I have been able to obtain improved estimates of how the
interaction between democratic longevity and institutional variables influences social
capital. The instrumental variables approach reveals that hypothesized relationships only
hold among minority groups. Because the endogeneity problem is thought to be
especially serious among the majority sample, this finding is consistent with our
expectations. Once we purge the endogenous component of democratic longevity, the
effect of longevity on trust among the majority sample should become weaker or
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Consequently, the analyses in this chapter have
identified minorities as the most susceptible group among which trust is affected by
democratic longevity and political institutions.
In Chapter 7, I conduct case studies to further examine the validity of the theories
and hypotheses. While the statistical analyses, or large-N studies, are useful for
generalizing a causal relationship that is widely applicable, they are not the best approach
to tell the detailed story about the underlying causal process. Therefore, I apply my
integrative model of political and social learning to concrete political settings and
examine how variables specified in the model relate to each other. In analyzing the effect
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of democratic longevity in executive-parties institutions, I turn to the cases of the postindependence Baltic countries. In the analysis on the federal-unitary institutional
dimension, I investigate the Quebec separatist movement. Furthermore, to test the
validity of the integrated theory in a more complicated case, I apply the model to the case
of Malaysia during the consociational period. These case studies help us to better
understand and interpret the findings from the statistical analyses.
In Chapter 8, I summarize the findings from both statistical analyses and case
studies and discuss how these findings support the theory and hypotheses in this study.
Through the discussion, I speculate on how widely we can apply the model. Furthermore,
based on findings from this study, I discuss implications of the model both in the
literature of political science and in the real world. At the same time, I point out the
limitations and some of the potential criticisms of this study. Finally, recognizing issues
left unsolved in the analyses, I conclude this study by discussing directions for future
research.

Copyright © Satoshi Machida 2006
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Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

Over the past decade, scholars have widely praised the virtues of social capital in various
fields. They have argued that social capital makes it possible for people to cooperate, and
that it also improves democratic governance. In short, the more social capital one can
find in society, the better the political system or society tends to be. However, at the
same time, numerous studies have found a negative relationship between community
Heterogeneity and social capital. Put differently, they suggest that heterogeneous
elements in a community reduce social capital. Thus, ethnic heterogeneities or economic
inequality have been found to be detrimental to social capital. Recognizing this situation,
one of the most critical questions would be “how does it become possible to generate
social capital in heterogeneous environments?” If social capital provides a number of
beneficial consequences for society, it is necessary to consider how we can generate it
particularly where it is most likely in short supply.
Without engaging the social capital literature directly, a long tradition of
comparative politics research suggests an answer. Specifically, scholars have studied
how political institutions can mediate ethnic conflict so as to build trust and reduce social
tensions. As a result, we already know much about institutional management of ethnic
conflict. In this chapter, as a starting point of constructing a theoretical model, I will
review these studies. Starting from discussions about the nature of social capital, I look
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into previous studies that are relevant to understand how people can learn to trust others
through political institutions. As the main concern in this study is placed on the longterm process of political and social learning, I cover a wide range of studies including
theory of institutional learning. Finally, by pointing out a theoretical hole in the literature,
I suggest a strategy to improve our understanding of the process through which social
capital is generated. In this way, this chapter of literature review serves as a basis for the
theoretical model of political and social learning.

2-1: What is Social Capital?

As is widely known, Alexis de Tocqueville’ (1968) was the first scholar to explore the
notion of social capital in Jacksonian America. Tocqueville eloquently sought to explain
how the voluntary associations of early 19th century American township fostered the
kinds of cooperative norms and habits that made democracy work. Struck by America’s
flourishing civil society, Tocqueville (1968) suggested that voluntary associations were
the foundation of functioning democracy. According to Tocqueville, voluntary
associations were necessary to solve common problems because other possible providers
of public service were extremely weak in American society. Focusing on the problemsolving roles of society, he emphasized the importance of voluntary associations in
democracy.
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The idea of social capital was developed most clearly by James S. Coleman (1988,
1990) as part of his effort to develop a general, coherent theory of social relations. He
used the term in conjunction with the concepts of physical and human capital, drawing
explicit distinctions between them. Physical capital refers to investment in tools,
machinery, and other tangible equipment. Human capital refers to those less tangible
investments in the skills and knowledge of individuals (see e.g. Schultz 1961; Becker
1975). Compared with these forms of capitals, social capital is even less tangible because
it stems from changes in the relations among individuals that facilitate action. According
to Coleman, it takes on three forms:

Obligations and expectations, which depend on trustworthiness of the
social environment, information-flow capacity of the social structure, and
norms accompanied by sanctions. A property shared by most forms of
social capital that differentiates it from other forms of capital is its public
goods aspect (Coleman 1988, p. 119).

Noting that obligations or expectations can be categorized as social capital, Coleman
emphasized the collective goods nature of social capital. According to this definition,
social capital is something that should be shared and utilized by the members of the
community.
While the concept of social capital was not new, it was Putnam (1993) who
applied the concept in the discipline of political science and subsequently made it much
more popular in a variety of fields. According to him, social capital “refers to features of
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social organization such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of
society by facilitating coordinate action” (p. 67). With this definition, Putnam contends
that horizontal networks embodied in civic society, and the norms and values embodied
within these ties have important consequences both for the people in the networks and for
society at large, generating both private and public goods. Dense networks of people
among friends, colleagues, and neighbors are usually associated with norms of
generalized reciprocity with mutual obligations and responsibilities, so that social
networks foster conditions for mutual collaboration, coordination, and cooperation to
create collective goods. The shared understandings, explicit and implicit rules, shared
procedures, and generalized trust fostered by personal contact and the bonds of friends
and neighbors are expected to make it easier for people to work together for the mutual
gain to be obtained in the future. Putnam suggests that organizations in civic society such
as environmental groups, churches, youth organizations, or charity groups play a vital
role in bridging social cleavages and integrating people from diverse backgrounds and
values, consequently contributing to a vibrant social infrastructure.
Furthermore, Putnam (1993) suggests that social capital has important political
consequences. Based on his analysis of regional governments in Italy, he claims that
abundant and close networks of associational connections and civic societies encourage
effective governance. Networks of voluntary associations have the effect of installing
people with norms of civic cooperation and shared responsibilities. They also help
people to aggregate their interests in the political system. As a consequence, Putnam
argues, in democracies rich in social capital, citizens are more likely to keep their
government accountable, and political leaders are also more likely to believe that their
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actions are in check by citizens. Also, dense networks of civic associations are believed
to strengthen the link between citizens and the state by encouraging political discussion
and mobilizing electoral turnout. Putnam argues that social capital is a prerequisite for a
well-functioning democracy. According to his perspective, functional democracy would
be impossible to achieve without a stock of social capital within the society.
The benefits of social capital have also been demonstrated in other areas such as
in family connections (Boisjoly et al., 1995), economic development (Knack and Keefer
1997), management techniques of state government (Knack 2000), and desertions from
the Union Army (Costa and Kahn 2003). Accordingly, both academic and policy-making
communities have been vigorously stimulated by the concept of social capital. From the
World Bank to a local city hall, creating social capital has been considered as a solution
for a variety of social problems. In this way, the concept of social capital had emerged as
essential elements not only for a community but for development of democratic
governance. Extensive benefits of social capital have been widely praised in a number of
various fields.

2-2: Community Heterogeneity and Social Capital

While Putnam’s work (1993) has been extraordinarily influential, it has a critical
limitation. As his analyses were mainly conducted in Italy, a relatively homogeneous
environment, it does not have much to say about heterogeneous societies. However,
numerous studies suggest the importance of taking into account community
heterogeneities in the issue of social capital. Most studies examining the link between
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community heterogeneities and social capital have shown a negative relationship between
these two factors. Put differently, it seems to be the case that community heterogeneities
significantly decrease levels of social capital. For instance, in their analysis of trust and
social capital in Southern California’s Chinese Communities, Uslaner and Conley (2003)
found that the ethnic ties among the Chinese community actually decrease their civic
engagement in a larger society. They suggest that although group membership may
instill loyalty within the group, it does not go beyond the group boundary. Capturing the
essence of this argument, Stone (1998) notes,

Individuals accustomed to transacting business with one another can
develop habits of reciprocity and a high degree of interpersonal trust. Out
of accumulated experience, they may develop feelings of obligation to one
another. Yet, take these same individuals are put them in an inter-group
context, a context in which competitive group advantage is salient, and
interpersonal trust and reciprocity lose strength (p. 268, cited by Orr
(1999), p. 10).

This study has shown that levels of social trust and norms of reciprocity tend to be in
short-supply in an environment in which they are exposed to out-groups.
Furthermore, evidence indicating the negative relationship between community
heterogeneities and social capital is abundant in the context of the United States. Alesina
and La Ferrara (2000) demonstrate that levels of participation in social activities are
significantly low in more unequal and in more racially or ethnically heterogeneous
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localities. Similarly, Costa and Kahn (2003) show that community heterogeneities
negatively influence levels of civic engagement such as volunteering, associational
membership, and trust. A similar pattern has been found regarding the issue of income
redistribution. Luttmer (2001) finds that support for redistribution is higher when
recipients are from the same racial group. Other studies show a similar result in
education. Harris, Amy Rehder, William Evans, and Robert Schwab (2001) and Poterba
(1997) have discovered that the spending on education is significantly less in diverse
communities compared with in more homogeneous ones. Also, Alesina, Baqir, and
Easterly (1999) argue that the shares of spending on productive public goods—education,
roads, sewers and trash pickup—in U.S. cities are inversely related to the city’s ethnic
fragmentation.
Recently, these studies have also been expanded to developing countries. La
Ferrara (2002) shows that inequality at the village level in rural Tanzania has a negative
impact on civic engagement in the village. Also, adopting default rates on micro-finance
as a proxy of social capital, Karlan (2003) argues that cultural similarities within the
community of loan recipients lower the default rates. In a similar manner, Miguel and
Gugerty (2002) suggest that school funding tends to be lower in more ethnically diverse
settings—a finding that is similar in the U.S. context. There is also evidence showing
that income inequality lowers civic participation and community expenditure (La Ferrara
2002; Lindert 1996). Furthermore, cross-national research has discovered that levels of
interpersonal trust are lower in more diverse societies (Knack and Keefer 1997). The
bottom line of these studies is obvious: community heterogeneities reduce social capital.
In more heterogeneous communities, people are less likely to trust others, less likely to
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engage themselves in civic activities, less likely to vote, and less willing to take risks to
help others.
In this context, however, it is important to note that social capital is not a
monolithic concept; there are different kinds of social capital. What is particularly
important in the context of heterogeneous communities is the distinction between
“bridging” and “bonding” social capital. Putnam (2000) defines bridging social capital as
bonds of connectedness that are formed across diverse social groups. People that are
connected through bridging social capital tend to be exposed to different kinds of people
and ideas, and they consequently tend to benefit the community and larger society. In
contrast, bonding social capital only connects homogeneous groups. As a result, in a
society rich in bonding social capital, interactions between different kinds of people are
limited. Such closed networks tend to inhibit interactions with outside networks and
result in the atomization of small groups (Banfield 1958). These differences are also
described by similar terms such as “weak ties” versus “strong ties” (Granovetter 1973) or
“generalized trust” versus “particularized trust” (Uslaner 2002; Uslaner and Conley 2003).
While generalized trusters that are connected through weak ties tend to have interactions
with people with different backgrounds, particularized trusters tend to withdraw from the
larger society into their ethnic communities. Obviously, as previous studies report that
ethnic minorities tend to withdraw into their ethnic communities, what is especially in
short supply in heterogeneous communities is bridging versus bonding social capital.
The beneficial consequences of bridging social capital have been well
documented. Varshney (2001) argues that in a community in which people are engaged
in interaction across different ethnic groups, levels of ethnic tensions tend to be much

17

lower than in communities that lack interethnic associational engagement. Similarly, Orr
(1999) suggests desirable outcomes of interethnic engagement in the context of the
United States. These studies demonstrate the importance of bridging social capital in
heterogeneous communities. Unlike bridging social capital, however, bonding social
capital can be harmful for democratic governance. For instance, Varshney (2001) shows
that bonding social capital tends to increase ethnic conflict. Also, a closed network
within bonding social capital may act as organizations that lobby and act against the
interests of other groups (Beugelsdijk and Smulders 2003). Consequently, there is a
danger that bonding social capital may divide the state along ethnic lines. In this way, the
consequences derived from these two types of social capital are quite contrary.
These findings are consistent with the conventional knowledge that community
heterogeneities such as ethnicity or economic inequality significantly undermine liberal
democracy. John Stuart Mill argued that democracy was incompatible with the structure
of a multiethnic society, arguing “free institutions are next to impossible in a country
made up of different nationalities” (p. 230). Dahl (1971) notes that although democracy
in highly fragmented countries was not impossible, “pluralism often places a dangerous
strain on the tolerance and mutual security required for a system of public contestation”
(p. 109). Judging from the evidence presented in previous studies, countries with high
levels of community heterogeneities clearly face difficulty in maintaining a wellfunctioning democracy.
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2-3: Exogenous or Endogenous Approach of Social Capital

As we have seen, many studies have shown that heterogeneous elements in a community
tend to reduce levels of social capital. Furthermore, bridging social capital tends to be
scarce in heterogeneous communities while bonding social capital is more prevalent.
Having suggested a negative relationship between community heterogeneity and social
capital, a critical question is whether it is possible to change the relationship. Put
differently, we need to ask whether or not it is possible to produce bridging social capital
in heterogeneous environments.
To consider this question, it is essential to discuss how different studies
conceptualize the nature of social capital. While numerous studies on social capital have
been conducted, there are mainly two different perspectives regarding the nature of social
capital (see Jackman and Miller 1998). The first approach in this debate sees social
capital as part of political culture. For instance, Inglehart defines social capital as “a
culture of trust and tolerance” (1997, p. 188). In formulating the notion of social capital,
these scholars explicitly draw on Weber (1905), Banfield (1958), and Almond and Verba
(1963). Weber (1905) attempted to link the Protestantism and capitalism. In answering
the question of why Protestants thrived in capitalist economy, Weber identified two
factors that he believed fostered entrepreneurial skills. The first one is Protestants’
challenges to medieval discipline, and the second one is their distinctive values. Relying
on these cultural elements, Weber tried to answer the economic success of Protestants. In
a similar manner, Banfield (1958) attempted to explain the backwardness of a small
community in Italy. In his analysis, he argued that the backwardness of the community
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could be explained by the community’s persistent inability to organize. Noting high
levels of “amoral familism” in the community, he contended that the problem underlying
the poor developmental outcome is a lack of interpersonal trust.
Furthermore, Almond and Verba (1963) conducted extensive survey research in
Germany, Italy, Mexico, and the United Kingdom to identify social attributes that are
conducive to the development of democracy. They argued that citizens of the United
Kingdom and United States possessed “civic culture” suitable for effective democracy.
They attributed the differences of democratic performance to cultural factors found in the
country. Many of others studies conducted later can also be considered as a variant of the
political culture approach. For instance, in his analysis on the role of trust in economic
performance, Fukuyama (1995) argues that the key for the economic success can be
found in social capital. He emphasizes the importance of supporting culture of trust,
which he terms “spontaneous sociability.” The same theme has been suggested by
Harrison’s (1985, 1992, 1997) conclusion that the outcome of economic and political
development depends on such values as trust, ethical codes, and orientations to work and
taking risks. Furthermore, Putnam’s study (1993) traces the roots of civic cooperation as
far back as the Middle Ages. These studies are definitely congruent with the notion of
civic culture formulated by Almond and Verba (1963) in the following three points
(regarding this discussion, see Jackman and Miller 1998). First, these studies are
fundamentally concerned with the prevalence of values clustered within societies.
Although cultural patterns reflect individuals’ attitudes, these patterns are assumed to
take on political and social significance, as they are shared by individuals in societies. In
other words, those shared attitudes are an aggregate property of societies.
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Second, these studies of social capital emphasize the durability of cultural
syndromes. Even though those attitudinal attributes could be modified by short-term
forces, their effects are assumed to persist over a long period of time. Harrison (1985)
contends that values or certain perspectives that hinder economic and political
development in the third world have been driven by “the momentum of centuries” (p.
168). Similarly, Inglehart (1990) claim that “people live in the past much more than they
realize (p. 422, cited by Jackman and Miller 1998, p. 52). As can be represented by this
view, these studies contend that people’s behavior is affected by norms passed across
generations through early socialization (see also Verba 1965; Moore 1966). Thus,
durability of cultural power has been emphasized by these studies.
Third, the common feature of these cultural syndromes is that their significance
comes from their impact on other outcomes. In other words, these syndromes are treated
as exogenous or given. For instance, in Weber’s analyses on the effect of culture on
capitalism, he showed that values are not epiphenomenal. Values are almost completely
treated as given.
In sum, emphasizing the prevalent and durable nature of cultural factors, these
political culture accounts of social capital note that culture has significant impacts on
other outcomes. According to this perspective, social capital is something that has been
rooted in the cultural for centuries. Therefore, emphasizing the exogenous nature of
social capital, this perspective suggests that it is not possible to generate social capital by
some kind of means in a short term.
While these studies recognize that social capital is cultural predetermined,
implications from other studies contradict this exogenous view. Especially studies
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conducted in the 1980s more explicitly contend that cultural element can change over
time. For instance, Wuthnow (1989) argued that cultural values are broadly structured by
social and material conditions. According to him, therefore, where certain conditions do
not exist, certain culture would not emerge. Through examining three major periods of
European history—the Reformation (1919-59), the Enlightenment (1715-89), and the rise
of Marian socialism (1864-1914)—Wuthnow (1989) contended that economic
development and strong state structures were the necessary conditions for these cultural
elements. His pioneering work clearly suggests a more dynamic view of culture rather
than static (see Wuthnow 1987). The dynamic perspective of culture is consistent with
some strains of social capital studies. For instance, Coleman attempted to understand
social capital within the framework of rational-choice. According to Coleman (1990), a
decision to trust others are based on the calculation of potential gains and potential losses
depending on the risk involved in the situation. For him, there is not a fundamental
difference between trusting others and placing a bet because both of these actions can be
explained within the framework of rational choice. Based on the rational choice
perspective, Coleman argued that as long as there is a structural incentive to trust, people
will follow the incentive and choose to trust others. Denying that cultural values are
immutable, scholars in this strain emphasize the endogenous nature of social capital.
Along with the endogenous perspective of social capital, theorists of social capital
have speculated on the origin of social capital. If the origin of social capital cannot be
found in culture, social capital has to be generated somewhere else. Many scholars look
for the answer in the framework of rational choice theory. They recognize the origin of
social capital as an equilibrium concept. According to this concept, repeated cooperation
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increases the stock of social capital, and this in turn makes social cooperation sustainable.
The most commonly cited explanation for the origin of social capital points out the
findings of experimental research, where individuals tend to cooperate spontaneously
when they value future pay-offs and expect to interact with others again and again
indefinitely (Axelrod 1984). As long as the pattern of the interaction persists with no
foreseeable end, there is no incentive to defect from the cooperative relationship, and a
virtuous circle of social capital production begins to develop (see Boix and Posner 1998).
Accordingly, this approach suggests that social capital can be endogenous to
specific factors. For instance, scholars argue that certain types of organizations can
produce social capital when trust is treated as a by-product of organizational structures.
Coleman (1990) illustrated this process by referring to a group of parents whose children
attend the same school. According to him, when the parents form a PTA chapter, public
goods are provided and social capital is generated. Furthermore, Coleman (1990)
discovered that when public goods are formed by an organization, even nonparticipants
are benefited by the high standards promoted by an active PTA. In this situation,
individuals join organizations with the expectation that they will gain benefits. As long
as organizations provide people with expected benefits, the organizations earn a
reputation that they are trustworthy, consequently reinforcing trust as the feedback
mechanism.
Within the rational choice framework, the view that individuals join organizations
due to incentives is not new. In his classical study, Bernard (1938) argues that
cooperation through organizations occurs because individuals seek benefits that they
could get by joining the organization. Clark and Wilson (1961) similarly note “all viable
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organizations must provide tangible or intangible incentives to individuals in exchange
for contributions of individual activity to the organizations” (p. 130, cited by Jackman
and Miller 1998, p. 55). The incentives are not exclusively material benefits. They could
be friendship, prestige, respect, and other psychological objectives (Olson 1965).
Furthermore, other explanations of the origin of social capital build on the distinction
between private goods and public goods, arguing that voluntary associations that are
established mainly for private goods come to produce public goods after a certain period
of time.1 In other words, the process through which social capital is generated is
evolutionary, starting out with the interactions aimed at producing private goods. They
gradually turn into the social relations that are capable of generating public goods. Thus,
previous studies have shown that organizations can generate trust among people. These
studies support the argument that social capital is endogenous, not exogenous. According
to this perspective, therefore, it is even possible to generate social capital anew in a
relatively short period of time.
In sum, these two approaches suggest two different perspectives on the nature of
social capital, one supporting the view that social capital is relatively fixed and
exogenous, and the other view suggesting that social capital is the endogenous product of
certain factors. However, considering both arguments and evidence suggested so far, the
endogenous approach seems to have more validity than the exogenous perspective. For
one thing, Putnam or Inglehart’s approaches to social capital seem to be inconsistent. For
instance, although in his work Making Democracy Work, Putnam (1993) traces the
explanation of current democratic performance to the Middle Age, in Bowling Alone he
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For a further discussion on the capability of public and private goods-producing groups see Boix and
Posner (1996).
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argues that civic culture in the Untied States evaporated over the course of just two
decades (Putnam 1995). In a similar manner, while Inglehart (1997) suggests a value
shift hypothesis, noting that people’s orientations have gone through significant changes
over the past several decades, this proposition seems to be contradicted by his
formulation of social capital (see Jackman and Miller 1998). Therefore, considering
these inconsistencies in the exogenous approach of social capital, it seems to be
unreasonable to claim exclusively that social capital should be recognized as cultural
endowment. Naturally, I do not deny the fact that there are certain elements of culture
that are resistant to change in the short term. However, aspects of social capital such as
interpersonal trust or civic engagement seem to operate within the framework of rational
choice theory, and levels and kinds of social capital do seem to change over years
depending on the institutional context in which social interactions take place. Therefore,
judging from the overall evidence examined, the endogenous approach appears more
adept at accounting for the formation and change in levels of social capital. According to
this perspective, while levels of social capital would not change where incentives given in
the context are constant; levels of social capital rise or decline when incentives for actors
change.
In the following section, based on the endogenous perspective of social capital, I
explain potential factors that can affect social capital. More specifically, I will explain
how social capital can be recognized as endogenous to, or a consequence of, political
institutions. Subsequent account will make clear that social capital is actually dependent
on political institutions found in the context.
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2-4: Social Capital as Endogenous to Political Institutions

While numerous studies have been conducted on social capital, an important question has
not been adequately answered: is it possible to build social capital relatively rapidly even
in communities that are less well endowed with the asset of social capital? Although
Putnam (1993) originally regarded social capital as a relatively immutable endowment
inherited from history, recent analyses suggest that it is possible to generate social capital
even within a relatively short period of time. These structuralist scholars argue that
structures remain causally prior to social relations. For instance, Skocpol (1996) shows
that throughout American history, the U. S. government has been directly responsible for
the establishment of many types of voluntary organizations. Similarly, Edward and Foley
(1998) argue that political structure and political context are crucially important, and that
structures “can go a long way toward shaping both the kinds of organizations represented
in society and their impact on the behavior and attitudes of citizens” (p. 128).
Furthermore, Levi (1996) suggests,

Governments [are] a source of social capital…A large body of social
democratic theory claims an important role for the state in reducing the
narrow and often risky dependencies of people on each other. The new
economic institutionalism stresses the importance of the state in
establishing and enforcing the property rights that make trust possible.
Recent work by political economists and economic historians emphasizes
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the role of government institutions in establishing peaceful equilibria
among otherwise combative groups (p. 50-51, cited by Krishna (2002), p.
18).

As can be seen in these studies, social democratic theory, new economic
institutionalism, and other venerable traditions emphasize the role of political institutions
in generating social capital. Brehm and Rahn (1997) suggest that social capital is “as
much a consequence of confidence in institutions as the reverse” (p. 1018). They suggest
that institutions stand prior to social relations—a view expressed by the new economic
institutionalism. One of the foremost exponents of the new economic institutionalism
maintains, “institutions are the rules of the game…the humanly devised constraints that
shape human interaction…they structure incentives in human exchange, whether
political, social, or economic (North 1990, pp. 3-4).
Furthermore, supporting the view of new economic institutionalism, Knack and
Keefer (1997) suggest that trust and norms of civic cooperation are stronger in countries
with formal institutions that effectively protect property and contract rights. They argue,
“formal institutional rules that constrain the government from acting arbitrarily are
associated with the development of cooperative norms and trust” (p. 1284). Also,
examining the 18 richest market economies, Kenworthy (1997) concludes, “the principal
economically beneficial forms of cooperation tend to be products of institutional
incentives” (p. 645). Similarly, a number of studies suggest that where states permit
citizens to associate freely and where they support free enterprise and free association by
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institutional arrangements and legal systems, economic growth has been fastest (De Soto
2000; North and Thomas 1973; North 1981; Olson 1982).
Political scientists offer additional evidence to support the primacy of structures.
Schneider et al. (1997) argue that levels of social capital can be altered through induced
structural change. They note, “Design of public institutions affects the level of social
capital” (p. 82). Hall (1999) argues that levels of social capital in Britain are dependent
on actions of the government, noting, “The character of both educational policy and
social policy in Britain seems to have had profound consequences for social capital” (p.
28). Rothstein and Stolle (2003) also suggest that the character of bureaucracies and
welfare state institutions have significant effects on levels of social capital. Those
scholars who emphasize the importance of political institutions suggest that social capital
does not exist independently from the political institutions. According to them,
governments, public policies, and political institutions shape the levels of social capital
(Berman 1997; Foley and Edward 1998; Skocpol 1996).
Regarding the mechanism through which institutions produce generalized trust
among people, Offe (1999) offers a persuasive argument. According to him, there are
mainly two mechanisms through which institutions can facilitate trust. The first one is
the formative function of institutions. That is to say, he argues that citizens trust their
fellow citizens due to the fact that they share a “significant amount of institutional space
with a sufficiently strong meaning” (p. 71). More specifically, he argues that institutions
have to “make sense” to “me”, as well as, by extension and analogy, to others. People
have to know and recognize that values and the ways of life derived from the institutions
as valid. Those values and ideas have to make sufficient sense to a sufficient number of
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people to secure their support for the institutions and the compliance with the rules.
Therefore, following this logic, it can be said that people trust their fellow citizens due to
the fact that they share an understanding of the institutions under which they live and
they can expect that others will also follow the rules incorporated in the institutions.
Thus, when people living under the same institutions are cognitively familiar and
effectively inculcated with the normative ideas embodied in the institutions, institutions
can play a formative function, thus allowing people to extend trust to strangers.2
As the second mechanism through which institutions generate trust among
strangers, Offe (1999) suggests an institutions’ function of “lowering the risk of truster”
(p. 71). According to him, this function is similar to that of insurance companies in a
society. For instance, a person has a better reason to trust a bank if he/she knows that the
bank participates in an inter-bank security fund. The existence of the fund decreases the
risk of losing the deposit and guarantees the security. Similarly, statutory rules or legal
regulations play the same role in a society. The fact that tangible institutions exist behind
social relations reduce the risk of trusting others, thus making it easier for one to trust
others.
As these studies clearly show, political institutions play crucial roles in
determining levels and forms of social capital. While some political institutions ruin the
stock of social capital, others activate it and contribute to making a vibrant civil society.
Considering these points, it is reasonable to think that social capital is endogenous to
political institutions. Put differently, levels and forms of social capital depend on the
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Regarding the first mechanism through which institutions can generate trust, Offe (1999) further suggests
four institutional functions: truth-telling, promise-keeping, fairness or neutrality and the willingness to
compensate the differences. He argues that these functions are essential for institutions to generate trust
among strangers.
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institutional arrangements. The next sections turns to the issue of how different political
institutions fare well in producing social capital.

2-5: Institutional Arrangements in Heterogeneous
Communities

According to the endogenous approach, social capital that can be found in a community
is subject to change over time. One of the most important factors that can influence
levels and forms of social capital is political institutions. Numerous studies suggest that
political institutions are capable of producing social capital. Regarding this matter more
generally, since the advent of “new institutionalism,” it has been admitted that different
institutional arrangements produce different political outcomes (March and Olsen 1984).
More recently, the dramatic increase of democracies in the world following the “third
wave” has stimulated inquiry into the constitutional designs of democratic government
and its impact on democratic performance (Huntington 1991). For our purpose here, it is
critical to analyze how different political institutions affect social capital in communities
with heterogeneous elements.
There are a number of ways to organize democracy and a great variety of
democratic institutions. Earlier classifications were often based on cultural variables.
Almond (1956) classified democracies into Anglo-American and Continental European
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according to the criteria of political culture and role structure.3 Lijphart (1968)
distinguished four different types of democracies—centrifugal, centripetal,
consociational, and depoliticized—according to the interaction of two dimensions: elite
mobilization and mass political culture. Among these categorizations, the notion of
consociationalism has gathered significant amount of attention. Consociationalism refers
to a system in which different ethnic groups participate in the decision-making system,
maintaining its autonomy as a group. According to Lijphart (1977, 1985), consociational
democracy has four main attributes: (1) a grand coalition, (2) proportional representation,
(3) mutual veto, and (4) segmental authority. Lijphart suggests that these four elements
make it possible for multiethnic societies to maintain democratic stability despite their
social heterogeneity.
More recently, Lijphart (1984, 1994, and 1999) has argued that the institutional
characteristics of democracies tend to converge on mainly two types of democracy:
majoritarian and consensus democracies.4 The majoritarian principle emphasizes the rule
of majority-rule. Therefore, majoritarian democracies attempt to concentrate power in
the hands of the majority. As a consequence of this emphasis, majoritarian democracies
can create a sharp division between those who hold power and those who do not, and it
does not grant the opposition much influence over policy-making. The consensus
principle, on the other hand, is based on the idea that a political regime should not be
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Later, more elaborate typology claims the same distinction but encompasses no less than 16 different
categories (Almond and Powell 1966).
4
The distinction of these two types of democracy, majoritarian and consensus, is by no means a novel
invention in political science; Lijphart borrowed these two terms from Robert G. Dixon, Jr. (1968, p. 10).
Hans Hattenhauer and Werner Kaltefleiter (1986) also compare the “majority principle” with consensus,
and Jurg Steiner (1971) contrasts “the principles of majority and proportionality.” A similar comparisons
have been made by Robert A. Dahl (1956) –“populistic” versus “Madisonian” democracy; William H.
Riker (1982)—“adversary” versus “unitary” democracy; and S. E. Finer (1975)—“adversary politics”
versus centrist and coalitional politics.
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given unfettered power. Consensus democracies attempt to disperse power so that there
are multiple poles of decision making and multiple checks and balances, thus limiting the
power of the central government while providing a broader array of interests with
opportunities to be represented. In short, consensus types of democracies are concerned
with the separation of powers.
According to Lijphart (1999), there are at least ten points that distinguish
majoritarian from consensus democracies. According to Lijphart, the factor analysis
based on the principle-component reveals two institutional dimensions. The first
dimension, the executive-parties dimension, consists of the following five components:

(1) Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets versus
executive power-sharing in a broad multiparty coalition.
(2) Executive-legislative relationship in which the executive is dominant versus
executive-legislative balance of power.
(3) Two-party versus multiparty systems.
(4) Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems versus proportional
representation (PR).
(5) Pluralist interest group systems with free-for-all competition among groups versus
coordinated and “corporatist” interest group systems aimed at compromise and
concertation (p. 3).

As we can see from the term of the first dimension, these elements are mainly concerned
with executive and party politics. Restraint on majorities’ power or inclusion of
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minorities into the decision-making system takes place through party realignments or the
outcome of electoral politics. For instance, when minority groups gain a larger share in
election, it becomes possible for them to obtain more seats in the legislature, thus
imposing stronger restraint on majorities’ power.
The second federal-unitary dimension consists of the following five components:

(1) Unitary and centralized government versus federal and decentralized government.
(2) Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature versus division of
legislative power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses.
(3) Flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities versus rigid
constitutions that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities.
(4) Systems in which legislatures have the final word on the constitutionality of their
own legislation versus systems in which laws are subject to a judicial review of
their constitutionality by supreme or constitutional courts.
(5) Central banks that are dependent on the executive versus independent central
banks (p. 4).

These elements are mainly concerned with federal decentralization and the mechanisms
of constitutional constraints. Consequently, these variables determine whether the
political system would be categorized as a unitary or federal system. According to
Lijphart (1999), one plausible explanation of this two-dimensional pattern is offered by
theorists of federalism like Ivo D. Duchacek (1970), Daniel, J. Elazar (1968), Carl J.
Friedrich (1950, p. 189-221), and K. C. Wheare (1946). These scholars that can be

33

categorized as federalists suggest that above five variables are critical in guaranteeing
division of power between the central government and regional governments. Then
contend that the guarantee of a federal division of power can work only if “(1) both the
guarantee and the exact lines of the division of power are clearly stated in the constitution
and this guarantee cannot be changed unilaterally at either the central or regional level—
hence the need for a rigid constitution, (2) there is a neutral arbiter who can resolve
conflicts concerning the division of power between the two levels of government—hence
the need for judicial review, and (3) federal system is strongly represented by regions—
hence the need for strong bicameralism; moreover, (4) the main purpose of federalism is
to promote and protect a decentralized system of government” (Lijphart 1999, pp. 3-4).
Above five variables clearly represent the political dynamism found in the federal-unitary
dimension.
Analyzing the performance of these two types of democracy—majoritarian and
consensus democracies—Lijphart (1999) concludes that consensus democracies have
equal or slightly better records than majoritarian democracies in economic management
and in the control of violence. In addition, consensus democracies perform better at
promoting the representation of women, reducing inequalities, encouraging electoral
participation, promoting citizen satisfaction with democracy, protecting the environment,
providing social welfare, avoiding high crime rates, and encouraging generosity in
foreign aid. Because consensus institutions are designed to represent a variety of
interests in society, even minorities’ preferences tend to be reasonably reflected in policy
outcomes.
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Similarly, comparing the performance of majoritarian and proportional
institutions (consensus institutions), Powell (2000) demonstrates the relative merits of the
latter in terms of representing citizens’ preferences. The main reason for this claim is the
proximity of government policy to the median voter. According to the majoritarian view,
democratic government should have policy positions that reflect views of the median
voter. However, Powell finds that majoritarian systems have in many cases failed to
achieve this goal. Empirical results suggest that majority parties do not need to bargain
with smaller parties at or across the point of the median voter. On the other hand, Powell
finds that proportional systems are more successful in bringing governments close to the
median citizen. He suspects that the bargaining or negotiation required in proportional
systems gets governments closer to the median voter. Thus, Powell (2000) argues that
proportional systems are practically more favorable than majoritarian systems in terms of
democratic performance (see also Huber and Powell 1994).
While the evidence thus far has consistently suggested the superiority of the
consensus type of democracies, a critical issue in this context is the role of democratic
institutions in divided societies. Especially, the choice of electoral systems has been a
focus of the debate in multiethnic states. More specifically, scholars have analyzed how
majoritarian electoral systems or PR systems can mediate ethnic tensions. Most studies
conducted in the context of divided societies suggest that PR systems are more effective
in easing tensions among different ethnic groups (Reynolds 1995). Sisk and Reynolds
(1998) argued that PR systems are more effective in mitigating ethnic conflict in
culturally plural African states by facilitating the inclusion of minorities in parliament
and encouraging more ethnically balanced representation. By adopting pooled time-
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series data from the Minorities at Risk dataset, Saideman et al (2002) found that
proportional representation systems tend to reduce ethnic conflict. Lijphart (1999)
concludes, “in mostly deeply divided societies…majority rules spells dictatorship and
civil strife rather than democracy. What such societies need is a democratic regime that
emphasizes consensus instead of opposition, that includes rather than excludes” (p. 33).
However, some studies suggest that successful examples of PR systems are
contingent on multiple factors.5 While the notion of consociationalism has generated a
number of related research programs, it has received substantial criticism. For instance,
Horowitz (1985, 1991) argues that there is no reason why we can assume cooperative
intentions of elites in the power-sharing arrangements in consociational democracies.
Therefore, Horowitz suggests that it is necessary to provide political elites with
incentives to cooperate through electoral engineering. The approach that Horowitz
(1985, 1991) recommends is an attempt to advance nation-building by trying to eliminate
ethnic boundaries, thus supporting some majoritarian elements (see Sisk 1996).6
However, the empirical evidence on Horowitz’s idea of alternative voting is scant, and it
is impossible to precisely assess the validity. Also, there exists evidence against the
effectiveness of PR institutions. Tsebelis (1990) suggests that although PR systems are
useful in gaining agreement to a new constitution during the initial process of democratic
transition, they tend to exacerbate ethnic tensions by reinforcing and perpetuating rigid
segregation along narrow ethnic lines. In a similar manner, Taagepera (1998) warns of
the danger of PR systems causing extreme multipartyism and fragmentation in new
5

As factors that influence the performance of PR systems, Sisk and Reynolds (1988) point out the degree
to which ethnicity is polarized, the intensity of ethnic tensions, the stage of democratization in a country,
the territorial distribution and concentration of ethnic groups, and the adoption of positive action strategies
in electoral systems. Also see Reilly and Reynolds (1988).
6
About the effect of electoral system on ethnic heterogeneity, see also Ordeshook and Shvestsova (1994).
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democracies. However, because much of this work is based on country-specific case
studies, it is not yet clear how far we can generalize these findings.
As another important element of consensus types of institutions or
consociationalism, federal arrangements have attracted a great deal of attention as an
instrument to mediate ethnic tensions. There are mainly three different views. One is
that federal arrangements reduce levels of nationalist conflict by providing minorities
with more generous government-provided goods (Brass 1991; Gurr 2000; Hechter 2000).
A second view is that federalism exacerbates ethnic conflict by providing minority elites
with resources they could use for mobilizing secessionist movements against the central
government (Roeder 1991; Bunce 1999). The third view claims that federalism has no
real influence on nationalism and ethnic relations because it is subject to a number of
noninstitutional elements (Kuran 1998). However, the empirical record for these
propositions is inconclusive.
In sum, regarding the effects of electoral systems, the overall findings from
previous studies seem to favor PR systems better than majoritarian ones. While some
studies suggest that PR system could have a disturbing effect in divided societies, the
evidence is still case-specific and therefore the degree to which we can generalize these
findings remains uncertain. Regarding the federal system, the empirical record is
ambivalent. Although federal arrangements can be effective in incorporating ethnic
minorities into the political system, the division of powers may eventually fragment the
regime.
Irrespective of these findings, the most common claim of all these studies is the
expectation that institutions influence elite and mass behaviors, particularly inter-group
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conflict in society. This is the critical point for my argument regarding the perspective of
endogenous social capital. These institutionalist claims presuppose a change in
individual attributes and behaviors particularly among minority groups due to their
experience with specific political institutions. In the following section, I develop an
argument about how this institutional experience leads to social capital formation.

2-6: Institutional Learning

A variety of studies have argued that the adoption of specific institutions can reduce
social tensions. The mechanism by which this happens, however, is largely left
unexplained. My argument is that at least part of the institutional effect of ameliorating
social tensions is due to a change in the levels of trust among social groups. Institutions
mediate social tensions and are expected to foster social capital. In other words, social
capital is endogenous to the political institutions that citizens experience.
My basic argument is that institutions have long-term effects on social capital.
Citizens gain experience with institutions over time as they observe social conflict. This
kind of “institutional learning” is a gradual process. We would therefore not expect to
see clear effects of political institutions on social conflict in the immediate aftermath of
institutional change. This may account for the mixed empirical record regarding the
influence of PR and federal systems on social conflict. If my story is correct, time is an
important conditioning factor, as institutions should affect citizens’ attitudes after
institutional learning takes place. Below, I further develop my conception of institutional
learning.
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The basic assumption of political learning is that citizens learn certain values
through their experience with political institutions. Rohrschneider (1994, 1996, 1999), in
his analysis of unified Germany, argues that socialist experiences in East Germany
prevented people from learning how to apply the principle of political tolerance in
specific cases. Similarly, other scholars also suggest that socialist experiences will be a
great impediment to fostering support for democratic institutions (Fuchs, Roller, and
Wessels 1997; Fuchs 1999; Roller 1994; Weil 1996). Anderson and Guillory (1997)
contend that institutional arrangements and citizens’ status as winners or losers have
significant effects on their satisfaction with democracy (see also Anderson and Tverdova
2001). These studies emphasize the essential role of political institutions in inculcating
certain values in the people’s value system by suggesting that the political values that
people learn depend on the political institutions they are exposed to. If people are
exposed to democratic institutions, they tend to adopt democratic values. Thus,
according to the notion of institutional learning, citizens’ experiences with political
institutions are keys in determining their value systems.
As another important dimension of institutional learning, scholars argue that a
prolonged period of exposure to political institutions is critical. They contend that people
need to be exposed to political institutions for a certain amount of time before they can
learn the values. To explore this hypothesis, scholars have operationalized a period of
continuous exposure to political institutions and examined the learning effect. Peffley
and Rohrschneider (2003) found that regime longevity is an important predictor of the
levels of people’s political tolerance. The longer people are exposed to a democratic
political system, the more tolerant they tend to be. Similarly, Finkel, Humphries, and
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Opp (2001) demonstrate a reinforcing effect of experience. They suggest that as people
in unified Germany experience more and more democratic rule, they tend to support more
democratic values while their support for socialist values weakens as time passes.
Similar findings have been reported in research on attitudes among the Russian mass
public (Denisovsky, Kozyreva, and Maskovsky 1993; Finifer 1996; see also Evans and
Whitefield 1993). Furthermore, Rose (1992) argues that both mass publics and elites go
through a period of trial and error. Finally, in the analysis of a transitional society,
Anderson and O’Connor (2000) suggest that as people accumulate more experience with
a new system, they tend to have more accurate perceptions of the new economic system.
These studies argue that there exists a positive relationship between the length of
exposure and the level of learning. The longer people are exposed to political
institutions, the more they take on the inherent value systems associated with those
institutions.
In this way, the theory of institutional learning is a useful tool in analyzing the
relationship between political institutions and citizens’ values or perceptions. Previous
studies have demonstrated that people learn certain values or perceptions through a
process of continuous socialization with the political institutions. Therefore, the notion
of institutional learning plays an important role in the theoretical model to account for the
long-term effect of institutional arrangements on social capital. Thus, we should only
expect institutional influences on social capital to vary as a function of the length of time
during which citizens have been socialized by these institutions.
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2-7: Synthesizing the Stories

As we have seen, the issue of social capital has received a significant amount of attention
over the years, and it has developed as an essential research program in political science.
As one of the most important applications of the concept, scholars have attempted to
understand the relationship between social capital and democracy, inspiring a large
number of related studies on this issue. Besides the linkage between social capital and
democracy, the concept of social capital has also been applied to a variety of issues such
as economic growth, development, crime, and corruption. A wide range of application of
the concept has made the issue of social capital all the more important.
Separate from the social capital literature, along with the rise of new
institutionalism, effects of political institutions on ethnic conflict have been widely
studied due to the need to understand the issue of ethnic conflict management. These
studies have mainly focused on how different institutional arrangements can manage
ethnic tensions, including violence between different ethnic groups. Among these
studies, one of the most heated debates has been focused on the institutional choice in
divided societies between majoritarian and consensus types of institutions. In the face of
ethnic violence, scholars have explored what types of institutions are more desirable in
managing ethnic tensions. Surprisingly, however, no systematic attempt has been made
to connect the issue of ethnic conflict management with that of social capital. In
particular, very few studies have looked at how the exclusive or inclusive nature of
political institutions affects social capital in multiethnic states. Given that the levels of
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bridging social capital have a substantial effect on the level of inter-group conflict, this
omission is puzzling.
As another shortcoming in the literature of institutional management, most studies
lack a long-term perspective. Put differently, analyses in most studies only focus on a
particular time period and do not consider the long-term effects of political institutions on
ethnic conflict. As a result, we still do not know how institutions affect social relations in
a long term. If we wish to understand the effects of political institutions and we believe
at least part of their impact is through institutional learning, it is necessary to take into
account a long-term perspective in the analyses. Studies of institutional learning have
shown that when people are exposed to certain institutional settings for significant
amount of time, they tend to learn the values that the institutions intend to realize in the
political system and society. However, the research program of institutional learning has
developed fairly separate from that of institutional management of ethnic conflict or that
of social capital. Consequently, a long-term perspective has been rarely incorporated in
the studies of institutional arrangements or social capital. Consequently, our
understanding of these issues remains incomplete.
This study addresses the theoretical gap in the literature. I argue that it is essential
to integrate these separate research traditions into a single theoretical model. More
specifically, to analyze the process through which social capital is generated by political
institutions, I suggest that it is critical to consider the insights both from studies of
institutional management of ethnic conflict and those from institutional learning. After
all, every institutional arrangement involves some kind of learning effects, and
institutional learning would not occur without the existence of institutions. Therefore,
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lacking either one of these perspectives, we would not be able to understand the full
dynamics between political institutions and social capital. Therefore, I create an
integrative model of political and social learning by tying these perspectives together in
one model. Only by combining them can we get a more comprehensive picture of how
political institutions generate social capital in heterogeneous environments.

Copyright © Satoshi Machida 2006
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Chapter 3: Theory and Hypotheses

Introduction

In Chapter 2, I reviewed previous studies that are related with the issues of social capital,
community heterogeneities, political institutions, and institutional learning. While each
of these issues is critically important to understand the dynamics surrounding social
capital in heterogeneous environments, the weakness of the literature is that these
different approaches exist separately with little application to each other. Specifically,
most studies on institutional management of ethnic conflict lack a long-term perspective
and explicit model of mass attitudinal change. As a consequence, we fail to understand
the complete dynamics surrounding social capital. Considering the potential applicability
of these two theories, the lack of studies combining these two perspectives is a critical
gap in the literature.
Therefore, having identified the theoretical gap in the literature, the main goal of
this chapter is to present a model that integrates different elements into one larger
framework. More specifically, the model I present consists of two main components.
The first one focuses on institutional management of ethnic conflict based on majoritarian
or consensus principles, and the second one considers the learning effect through political
institutions. With these two components combined, the integrative model reveals a more
accurate and more comprehensive dynamics through which social capital is generated in
heterogeneous environments.
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I begin this chapter by stating hypotheses regarding the relationship between
community heterogeneities and social capital. Then I will show how the integrative
model of political and social learning is constituted. As the first component of the model,
I will explain the expected effects of political institutions and related hypotheses. Then, I
will add the second component of the model, institutional learning, to the first one and
establish the integrative model. Consequently, as testable hypotheses, I will present a
series of possible scenarios that can be deducted from the model. Among them, the first
set of hypotheses is concerned with the issue of power distribution in the political system.
Specifically, regarding this issue, I suggest three testable hypotheses: the directtranslation-learning hypothesis; the power-sharing-learning hypothesis; and the
dominant-learning hypothesis. Furthermore, the second set of the hypotheses is
formulated focusing on the relationship between political institutions and social
cleavages. Regarding this issue, I spell out the fragmentation-learning hypothesis and the
consolidation-learning hypothesis. These testable hypotheses generated from the
integrative model represent possible scenarios of how political institutions and
democratic longevity affect social capital among majorities and minorities. Thus, this
chapter prepares for empirical analyses by clarifying the theoretical foundation of the
integrative model of political and social learning.

3-1: Community Heterogeneity and Social Capital

As the purpose of this study is to explore how continuous learning under different
political institutions affects social capital in the context of multiethnic states, it is
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important to hypothesize the relationship between community heterogeneities and social
capital as the initial step. Previous studies have examined this relationship and suggested
that heterogeneous elements in a community will reduce social capital. This proposition
has already been tested in the context of the United States and in several of developing
countries. Therefore, it is likely that this proposition will hold across countries in an
expanded sample. Furthermore, considering the characteristics of ethnically divided
societies, it can be hypothesized that levels of bridging social capital tend to be especially
lower in multiethnic states. As a consequence, the first hypothesis to be tested specifies
the negative relationship between community heterogeneities and social capital.

H1: Heterogeneous elements in a community will reduce levels of social capital. More
specifically, levels of bridging social capital (interpersonal trust) tend to be lower in
more heterogeneous communities.

3-2: Political Institutions and Social Capital

The main goal in this study is to identify mechanisms through which social capital is
generated. Specifically, I integrate the model of institutional management of ethnic
conflict and institutional learning to deduce hypotheses about social capital formation.
Consequently, this integrative model reveals a novel picture of how social capital is
produced by various institutional arrangements in the context of multiethnic states.
First, we consider the effects of political institutions on social capital. This study
focuses on the differences between majoritarian and consensus types of institutions.
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These two types of institutions as ideal types are established based on different principles.
According to Lijphart (1999), majoritarian institutions tend to favor majority groups
within the society as its principle focuses on the concentration of power.7 Because
majoritarian institutions attempts to grant power only to majorities, minorities groups
tend to be excluded from the decision-making process. As a consequence, minority
rights are less likely to be guaranteed. Therefore, in majoritarian institutions, minorities
tend to feel that political institutions discriminate against them, and consequently they are
less likely to be satisfied with the political system.
On the other hand, according to Lijphart (1999), consensus institutions tend to
operate based on the principle of separation of powers. Minority groups tend to be
included in the decision-making process and their rights are more extensively guaranteed.
Therefore, perceiving the political institutions as fair and equal, minority groups are more
likely to feel secure about being part of the political system. Consequently, minority
groups are expected to develop satisfaction with the political system. In this way,
institutional arrangements can mediate people’s attitudes toward the political system.
What we need to take into account in the context of multiethnic states is that rules
of the game tend to be zero-sum between majorities and minorities. As majorities and
minorities tend to perceive their interests within the political system differently,
advantages for majorities groups in many cases mean disadvantages for minority groups,
and vice versa. As a consequence, minority attitudes toward the political system can be
the exact opposite of those of the majority. As Anderson and Guillory (1997)
7

Lijphart (1999) confines his analyses only to democratic countries that have existed for a certain period.
However, as one of the main purposes of this study is to examine the effect of democratic longevity, I also
include new democracies and authoritarian states as well to obtain a more variations. Therefore, I adopt
terms such as majoritarian institutions or consensus institutions rather than majoritarian types of
democracies or consensus types of democracies as Lijphart does.

47

demonstrated, it is likely that while minorities are satisfied with the way democracy
works under consensus institutions, majorities are not with the performance of the same
institutions. For majorities, power-sharing with minority groups means that their
interests as majority groups are weakened in the society, consequently leaving majorities
unsatisfied. On the other hand, in majoritarian institutions, minorities tend to be less
satisfied with the way democracy works as they are not well represented in the system,
while majorities tend to be satisfied as they are favored by the system. In this way,
majoritarian and consensus types of institutions have opposite effects on satisfaction with
democracy for majorities and minorities.
Based on these insights, it is possible to expand the mechanism to the production
of social capital. More specifically, I hypothesize that satisfaction with democracy
generated by political institutions will be translated into social relations in the society.
For instance, minority groups excluded from the political system under majoritarian
institutions have good reason to distrust the majority because the majority is the one who
dominates the political system. This is especially the case in multiethnic states with deep
ethnic divisions. In such situations, political issues tend to be framed in ethnic terms, and
winners and losers of the political competitions are likely to be determined along ethnic
lines. Therefore, a gain for one ethnic group directly means a loss for another. As ethnic
minorities are always the one who lose in majoritarian institutions, they perceive the
majority as their enemies and consequently distrust members of the majority group, thus
undermining social capital among the minority groups. On the other hand, however, in
consensus institutions, as minorities are granted power and guarantees within the political
system, minorities do not tend to see the majority as their political enemies that threaten
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their identity. In this case, minority groups are expected to retain relatively higher levels
of social capital.
As in the case of satisfaction with democracy, similar pattern can be expected for
majority groups. In majoritarian systems, majority groups are advantaged and given
significant amount of power in the political system. In this case, majorities do not
consider the existence of minority groups as a serious threat for their interests, thus
keeping social capital among majorities intact. However, in consensus types of
institutions, as minority groups also gain some share of power in the political system,
majorities’ power tend to be limited. Therefore, in consensus institutions, majorities
develop distrust toward minority groups that restrain the majorities’ power.

H2: Majoritarian institutions increase levels of social capital among majorities.

H3: Majoritarian institutions decrease levels of social capital among minorities.

H4: Consensus institutions increase levels of social capital among minorities.

H5: Consensus institutions decrease levels of social capital among majorities.

Based on the proposition suggested by Anderson and Guillory (1997), these hypotheses
suggest that satisfaction with democracy for majorities and minorities will be directly
translated into social capital.
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3-3: The Integrative Model of Political and Social Learning

3-3-1: The Direct-Translation-Learning Hypothesis

While analyzing the effects of institutional arrangements on social capital is an important
part of the story, this would not capture the whole dynamics through which social capital
is generated. Studies focusing on institutional learning suggest that political institutions
can inculcate certain values to the people in the political system. Citizens learn certain
values through the socialization process with political institutions over a certain period of
time. Furthermore, previous studies suggest that continuous exposure to the political
institutions involves a reinforcing effect on citizens’ values and behaviors. The longer
people are exposed to certain institutions, the stronger they tend to shown the values. If
generating social capital through political institutions is a similar process as learning
democratic values, it is essential to consider learning and reinforcing effects of political
institutions. Failure to do so misses an important dynamics of what happens between
political institutions and social capital. For these reasons, I incorporate democratic
longevity into the model to capture the learning and reinforcing aspect of the mechanism
through which social capital is generated.8 The component regarding the learning effect
is an essential part of the integrative model in this study. In this way, applying the theory
8

I adopt years of continuous democracy since 1945 as an indicator of democratic longevity, and did not
consider the period of non-democratic rule in each country. One of the potential criticisms against this
strategy is that authoritarian rule could also have a learning effect. However, in authoritarian regimes,
institutional arrangements in many cases do not matter determining the political outcome as rules or
restraints embedded in the institutions tend to be disregarded. Therefore, the learning effect under
majoritarian or consensus institutions is really meaningful only in democracy. For this reason, I have
chosen to adopt years of continuous democracy as an indicator of institutional learning.
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of institutional learning, I hypothesize that democratic longevity reinforces the
institutional effects. More specifically, continuous exposure to political institutions
amplifies the relationships between political institutions and social capital.
Consequently, I suggest the following hypotheses:

H6: Democratic longevity under majoritarian institutions increases social capital among
majorities.

H7: Democratic longevity under majoritarian institutions reduces social capital among
minorities.

H8: Democratic longevity under consensus institutions reduces social capital among
majorities.

H9: Democratic longevity under consensus institutions increases social capital among
minorities.

These hypotheses summarize two points. First, political institutions directly translate
satisfaction with democracy into social capital. Second, the effect is learned and
reinforced by democratic longevity. As these hypotheses emphasize the aspect of direct
translation and learning, I name them the direct-translation- learning hypotheses.
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3-3-2: The Power-Sharing-Learning Hypothesis

The direct-translation-learning hypothesis assumes the gain for the majority is the loss for
the minority and vice versa. However, there are situations in which the rules of the game
are not zero-sum between majorities and minorities. It is also possible that majorities and
minorities develop similar attitudes under certain institutional arrangements. For
instance, with some exceptions, the literature of ethnic conflict management
overwhelmingly suggests that consensus types of institutions are highly effective in
mediating ethnic tensions. Previous studies also argue that consensus institutions are
better at incorporating ethnic minorities into the political system and society, and
therefore they are more successful in stabilizing the ethnic tensions. If consensus
institutions are more adept at making peace in society, both majorities and minorities
should develop interpersonal trust simultaneously. Therefore, based on the existing
evidence, I hypothesize that consensus institutions increase social capital both among
majorities and minorities.

H10: Consensus institutions increase social capital both among majorities and minorities
by rendering society more harmonious.

Furthermore, based on the theory of institutional learning, this relationship between
political institutions and social capital is supposed to be reinforced by democratic
longevity. Therefore, this hypothesis is termed as the power-sharing-learning
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hypothesis, meaning that both majorities and minorities learn to cooperate and trust each
other under power-sharing arrangements.

H11: Democratic longevity in consensus institutions increases social capital both among
majorities and minorities by reinforcing social harmony.

3-3-3: The Dominant-Learning Hypothesis

While the power-sharing-learning hypothesis suggests that both majorities and minorities
simultaneously develop trust under consensus institutions, it is unrealistic to hypothesize
the same effects in majoritarian systems. It is highly unlikely that minorities develop
interpersonal trust in situations where they are dominated by majorities. Previous studies
have suggested that fears of losing ethnic identity are one of the most powerful predictors
for ethnic violence (Horowitz 1985; Kaufman 2001). When ethnic minorities feel that
their ethnic identity is being threatened, they tend to take protest actions or voice their
dissatisfaction with the political system, thus disturbing social harmony. In a situation
like this, it becomes extremely difficult for majorities to trust minorities, and
consequently levels of interpersonal trust in the society tend to be lower. Hence, the
logical outcome is that both majorities and minorities lose interpersonal trust in
majoritarian institutions.
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H12: Majoritarian institutions reduce social capital both among majorities and
minorities by causing more tensions between them.

Also, the negative relationship between majoritarian institutions and social capital tends
to be reinforced by the effect of institutional learning. Because this hypothesis focuses
on the dominant force of majorities and on the resultant reactions of minorities, this
hypothesis can be termed as the dominant-learning hypothesis.

H13: Democratic longevity in majoritarian institutions reduces social capital both
among majorities and minorities by reinforcing social tensions.

These hypotheses focus on how power is distributed in the political system between
majorities and minorities. Depending on the share of power in the system, these
hypotheses states, people develop different attitudes toward others.

3-3-4: The Fragmentation-Learning Hypothesis

Besides the distributive issue of power in a society, it is important to consider the effects
of political institutions on the ethnic and social cleavages issue. While some institutions
mediate the tensions of existing cleavages in society, others aggravate them. For
instance, while numerous studies suggest the benefits of consensus institutions in
managing conflict behavior of ethnic minorities, there are some criticisms against the
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claim. One of the most important criticisms is that power-sharing types of institutions
that are envisaged by consensus democracies have danger of institutionalizing ethnic
differences rather than mediate them. Scholars have suggested that institutional
mechanisms aiming to protect minority rights or granting minority quota in the system
consequently further deepens the ethnic and social divisions. This problem is especially
acute in federal arrangements. Previous studies suggest that high levels of
decentralization can lead to the consolidation of ethnic identity. Eventually, federalist
arrangements can even encourage separatist movements by ethnic minorities (Roeder
1991; Bunce 1999). Considering these dangers of consensus types of institutions, it is
reasonable to consider different hypotheses regarding the effect of consensus types of
political institutions on trust. More specifically, I hypothesize that consensus types of
institutions reduce social capital by further institutionalizing existing cleavages.

H14: Consensus institutions reduce social capital both among majorities and minorities
(or either one of the groups) by fragmenting the political system and society.

Also, I hypothesize that the fragmentation force is further learned and reinforced during
the period of democratic rule. Therefore, a democratic rule under consensus institutions
tends to have a negative effect on trust both among majorities and minorities (or either
one of them). As this hypothesis represents the situation in which society is further
fragmented by consensus institutions and democratic longevity, I name this as the
fragmentation-learning hypothesis.
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H15: Democratic longevity in consensus institutions reduces social capital both among
majorities and minorities (or either one of the groups) by further fragmenting the
political system and society.

3-3-5: The Consolidation-Learning Hypothesis

Unlike the situation hypothesized by the fragmentation-learning hypothesis, because
majoritarian institutions are not intended for power-sharing, majoritarian democracies are
basically freed from the problem of fragmentation. Instead, majoritarian institutions may
integrate a society in certain direction. Put differently, majoritarian institutions generate
a drive for state consolidation. Therefore, I hypothesize that a trend toward centralized
state consequently creates a polity with less clear-cut ethnic divisions. Because sources
of ethnic tensions are lower in situations where ethnic cleavages are not well-defined, I
hypothesize that levels of social capital tend to be high.

H16: Majoritarian institutions increase social capital both among majorities and
minorities (or either one of the groups) by consolidating the political system and society.

The long-term effect of democratic rule is to reinforce this relationship. Therefore, the
hypothesis incorporating democratic longevity is that democratic longevity, combined
with majoritarian institutions, produces social capital both majorities and minorities (or
either one of the groups). As this hypothesis focuses on the long-term consolidating
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effect of democratic longevity under majoritarian institution, I name this hypothesis as
the consolidation- learning hypothesis.

H17: Democratic longevity in majoritarian institutions increases social capital both
majorities and minorities (or either one of the groups) by further consolidating the
political system and society.

57

Table 3-1 Hypotheses of Political and Social Learning
Theory
A. Power Distributional
Issue
1. Direct-translationlearning hypotheses

•

Satisfaction with
democracy is directly
translated to
interpersonal trust
The rule of the game
becomes zero-sum
between majorities and
minorities
Power-sharing
arrangements create
peaceful societies in
which people can trust
each other
Majorities’ dominance
in society by
majoritarian institutions
disrupt a social relations

•

Majorities and
minorities develop
opposite attitudes in
majoritarian (or
consensus) institutions

•

Both majorities and
minorities develop
interpersonal trust in
consensus institutions

•

Both majorities and
minorities lose
interpersonal trust in
majoritarian institutions

•

Consensus institutions
fragment the political
system and society

•

•

Majoritarian institutions
help the political system
and society to
consolidate

•

Both majorities and
minorities (or either one
of the groups) lose
interpersonal trust in
consensus institutions
Both majorities and
minorities (or either one
of the groups) develop
interpersonal trust in
majoritarian institutions

•

2. Power-sharing-learning
hypothesis

•

3. Dominant-learning
hypothesis

•

B. Cleavages Issue
4. Fragmentation-learning
hypothesis

5. Consolidation-learning
hypothesis

Relationship between
majorities and minorities

In sum, I have presented five conceivable scenarios regarding how democratic
longevity under certain political institutions affects social capital among majorities and
minorities (see Table 3-1). The first three types of hypotheses focus on the issue of
power distribution within the political system. The direct-translation-learning hypotheses
suggest that satisfaction with democracy is directly translated into social attitudes, and
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that democratic longevity reinforces the attitudes in a long term. Unlike the directtranslation-learning hypotheses, the power-sharing-learning hypothesis describes the
effects of democratic longevity and institutional arrangements focusing on the relation of
the two groups. It argues that power-sharing arrangements have a peace-making effect in
the long run, and that the harmonious relationship under power-sharing arrangements
between different groups of people leads to more social capital both among majorities
and minorities. Conversely, the dominant-learning hypothesis suggests that dominant
institutions that favor only majorities eventually disturb social relations in a society and
consequently reduce social capital both among majorities and minorities.
Finally, the last two hypotheses focus on the cleavages issue in the political
system and society. The fragmentation learning hypothesis and consolidation learning
hypothesis pay particular attention to the integrating or dividing force of political
institutions. While the fragmentation learning hypothesis suggests that consensus
institutions fragment the political system and society in a long term thus reducing
interpersonal trust, the consolidation hypothesis suggests that majoritarian institutions
help the political system and society to consolidate consequently increasing trust among
people. In this way, these five hypotheses suggest different scenarios regarding the
effects of political institutions and democratic longevity on social capital. In the
following chapters, I will turn to examine them empirically.

Copyright © Satoshi Machida 2006
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Chapter 4: Measurement of Social Capital and Its Overall
Dynamics

Introduction

Having suggested a series of theories and testable hypotheses, we are now in a position to
discuss conceptualization and measurement issues. To estimate the relationships between
social capital, political institutions, and democratic longevity, it is essential that we obtain
accurate measures of these variables. Put differently, it is extremely important to make
sure that our measurement strategies grasp the core concept of the variables. This chapter
describes my measurement strategy. First, I discuss the conceptualization and the
measurement issues of social capital. Second, I also discuss the way I measure key
independent variables and other control variables. Based on these measures, I explore the
overall dynamics surrounding social capital and other variables of interest.
Consequently, this chapter serves as the basis of the multivariable empirical analyses to
be conducted in the next chapter.
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4-1: Conceptualizing Social Capital

The goal of this study is to explore the effects of democratic longevity and political
institutions on social capital. Therefore, the dependent variable in this study is social
capital. Despite the fact that the concept of social capital has been widely discussed, little
consensus exists regarding how social capital should be measured. As the concept of
social capital itself covers a wide range of notions and social and cultural activities,
different studies focus on different aspects of social capital. Considering this situation,
the purpose of this chapter is to clearly define the meaning of social capital and how it
should be measured.
In his book Making Democracy Work, Putnam (1993) defines the notion of social
capital in a rather abstract manner. He defines social capital as “features of social
organizations, such as trust, norms, and social networks” (Putnam 1993, p. 167). Putnam
contends that these social attributes promote community cooperation and enhance the
governance of the political system. While Putnam equally discusses trust, norms, and
social networks, he explicitly suggests that trust should be considered as an outcome of
social networks and norms of reciprocity (Putnam 2000). According to this definition,
social networks and generalized reciprocity must come prior to interpersonal trust. As a
consequence, it follows that interpersonal trust would not be enhanced without social
networks or reciprocal norms.
Furthermore, the work by Fukuyama (1995) makes a major contribution in the
literature of social trust. Arguing that interpersonal trust is a prerequisite for a wide range
of social cooperation, he notes that mutual trust reduces transaction costs and therefore
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promotes social cooperation. For Fukuyama, social capital refers to qualities in social
relations that enhance the capacity of the people and consequently help them to achieve
their ends in the society. These important qualities are interpersonal trust, shared norms,
and understanding. As does Putnam, he notes that interpersonal trust and generalized
reciprocity are closely related. According to Putnam (1993), “generalized reciprocity
refers to a continuing relationship of exchange that is at any given time unrequited or
imbalanced, but that involves mutual expectations that a benefit granted now should be
repaid in the future” (p. 172). One takes certain actions with an expectation that others
will somehow repay him/her in the future. In this situation, people need not to be
rewarded immediately for what they did for others, because they have an expectation that
they will be rewarded eventually. It follows that generalized reciprocity is based on
mutual trust, and continuous experiences of generalized reciprocity will reinforce existing
trust in the society. In this sense, Fukuyama suggests that trust and generalized
reciprocity are closely interrelated.
Besides trust and reciprocal norms, the social networks are a critical component
of social capital. The social capital thesis developed by Putnam suggests that the deeper
people are involved in a web of social networks, the easier it becomes to develop
interpersonal trust and reciprocal norms in society. In other words, Putnam argues that
social networks produce trust and reciprocal norms. Using a more economic term,
Boisjoly et al. (1995) note that social relations can be considered as individual assets that
individuals can accumulate and extract when they need to achieve their goals (Boisjoly et
al., 1995). Furthermore, Portes (1998) suggests that “the consensus is growing in the
literature that social capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of
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membership in social networks or other social structures” (p. 6). According to this
perspective, social networks represented by membership in voluntary associations can be
considered as one of the most important prerequisites for generating social capital.
However, it is misleading to assume that the causal arrow only goes from social networks
to trust or to generalized reciprocity. While noting that trust is an outcome of social
networks and reciprocal norms, Putnam (1993) also suggests trust is necessary to get
people involved in social interactions. Therefore, one should understand that
interpersonal trust, reciprocal norms, and social networks are closely interrelated and
jointly constitute the notion of social capital.
Thus, there is little agreement as to how exactly social capital should be
conceptualized or how these different components of social capital interact. Different
studies focus on different aspects of social capital, thus complicating the
conceptualization of social capital. Yet, despite the lack of consensus, it is clear that each
component of social capital plays important roles, simultaneously affecting others.

4-2: Measuring Social Capital

The discussion of the previous section suggests that the definition of social capital is not
uniform, and each study focuses on different aspects of social capital. This diversity of
definitions presents analysts with measurement problems. Among different indicators of
social capital, one of the most common approaches is to measure social capital in
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structural terms. This approach measures social capital by touching on formal
associational membership rather than more informal and intangible social bonds. For
instance, historical-institutional studies replicating Bowling Alone have mainly relied on
the official records of membership in voluntary associations, because longitudinal survey
studies measuring membership in voluntary associations do not exist prior to the 1960s
and 1970s in most countries. However, this method suffers from several problems (see
Baumgarner and Walker 1988; Fukuyama 1995).
The first problem is the accuracy and reliability of historical records (see Norris
and Inglehart 2002). Records of members may be intentionally exaggerated. Also,
changes in legal restrictions over the years may affect the way the members are counted.
As a consequence, official records may not represent the real picture of the society.9 Even
if the historical records are reliable, systematic bias may be involved. In measuring
organizational membership, there is always a tendency to measure the rolls of older, more
bureaucratic organizations such as labor unions and community groups that have duepaying members. Typically, labor unions, professional associations, and church-related
groups have a bureaucratic form of organization featured with legal recognition, written
constitutions, independent funds, and hierarchical and bureaucratic structures (see
Warren 2001). It is relatively easy to keep records of these forms of organizations. In
contrast, however, it is far more difficult to capture the dynamics of more informal
organizations. Informal organizations tend to have higher membership mobility than
formal organizations, which makes it harder to keep their records. Also, it is sometimes
difficult to define “membership” (see Norris and Inglehart 2002). One of the most active
9

Also, Putnam (2000) suggests that most studies that rely on the number of voluntary associations as a
measure of social capital only count “birth rate” of those organizations while ignoring the “death rates.”
He warns that the exclusive focus on the birth rates could significantly distort the analyses.
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movements in the world is organized around the slogan of anti-globalization. These
organizations are loosely-knit and connected through decentralized communication with
minimal levels of organizational structures. Yet, they attracted thousands of protestors
around the world and seem to maintain their momentum (see Dalton and Kuechler 1990;
Keck and Sikkink 1998). Considering the discrepancy between the informal structures of
these anti-globalization organizations and the large number of participants in occasional
moments, it is questionable how accurate official records can grasp the dynamics
surrounding membership in voluntary associations.
Even if we overcome these problems associated with official records, there still
exists a further problem. While a number of studies adopt the form of associational
membership as a proxy indicator both for the structural features of social capital (social
networks) and for the cultural norms (trust and reciprocal norms), it is not clear how well
the proxy indicator represents both dimensions. It is possible that associational
membership represents the structural dimension of social capital but not the cultural
dimension (see Norris and Inglehart 2003). For instance, the effects of voluntary
organizations of generating trust and norms are different depending on the forms of
organizations. It may be true that organizations with bureaucratic structures generate
certain levels of trust, but it may also be true that more informal types of organizations
characterized with family ties or informal networks can be more effective in generating
trust and cultural norms. Thus, the measure of formal associational membership involves
several critical difficulties. Simply counting the number of voluntary associations is not
necessarily a reliable measure for social capital.
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Considering these measurement problems, this study focuses on interpersonal
trust as a measure of social capital. As the previous discussion on the nature of social
capital shows, two components of social capital, interpersonal trust and social networks
are closely interrelated. While voluntary associations produce interpersonal trust, trust is
also necessary to maintain the social relationship. Therefore, measuring levels of
interpersonal trust will capture an essential component of social capital found in society.
As interpersonal trust is a core concept of social capital, a number of studies have
adopted trust as the most important component of social capital (see for instance Knack
and Keefer 1997; Alesina and La Ferarra 2002). As a result, I adopt levels of
interpersonal trust as an indicator of social capital.10

4-3: Data and Operationalization

As the main purpose of this study is to explore the effects of democratic longevity and
political institutions on social capital, it is necessary to adopt a dataset that includes
cross-national variations in these variables. The dataset must include a sufficient number
of countries and also contain survey questions regarding social capital. Fortunately, there

10

While it is important to pay attention to the network aspect of social capital, it is extremely difficult to
operationalize social networks across ethnic groups. Most survey studies do not allow us to distinguish
networks within ethnic groups and across them. For instance, the WVS asks respondents what voluntary
associations they belong to. However, no matter how many voluntary organizations people belong to, it is
still possible that the networks are confined to the boundary of the same ethnic group.

66

are a number of surveys available that attempt to capture one or several dimensions of
social capital.11 Some of them can be quite useful for the purpose of this study.
In this study, I relied on data from the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS
has been conducted with the purpose of investigating worldwide socio-cultural and
political change. The first WVS was built on the European Values Surveys, which was
carried out in 1981. A second wave that was designed for global investigations was
compiled from 1990 to 1991. A third wave was carried out from 1995 to 1998. It is
problematic to use data from every survey because of large time gaps between surveys.
There is more than a 15 year gap between the first wave and the third wave, and a
number of events both at domestic and international levels took place during the period.
It is reasonable to think that these events significantly affected respondents’ attitudes.
For instance, the first wave was conducted around the period when the possibility of
extensive war constantly existed due to the Cold War. In such a situation represented
with intense threat, it was difficult to trust others. However, once the immediate threat of
war disappeared following the end of the Cold War, the probability of citizens trusting
others is expected to rise dramatically. To avoid this kind of systematic bias that could
be introduced by large time gaps between surveys, I exclusively rely on the second and
third waves of surveys covering the period from 1990 to 1998. In cases in which a
country is investigated in more than one survey, I use the most recent one. Consequently,
11

For instance, the World Bank has been trying to develop an integrated measure of social capital in the
context of poverty reduction and sustainable development in developing countries. For information on the
World Bank social capital initiative project, see http://www.worldbank.org poverty/scapital/index.htm.
Furthermore, as different sources of social capital data, European Household Community Panel Survey
(EHCP) conducted in the EU countries, Adult Literacy and Lifeskills Survey, sponsored by Statistics
Canada, the National Centre for Education Statistics (US) and OECD, Eurobarometer
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/eb.html), IEA Civic Education Study (http://www.wam.umd.edu/~iea/),
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) (http://www.pisa.oecd.org), International Social
Survey Programme (http://www.issp.org), or Citizenship, Involvement Democracy Network
(http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekte/cid/). For details of these datasets, see Healy (2002).
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a total of 57 countries (49 democracies and 8 authoritarian states) are included in the
analyses. The list of countries and the year of the survey taken are shown in Table 4-1.12

Table 4-1 Countries Included in the Study and Year of Survey
Country
(democracies)
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Brazil
Britain
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Denmark
Dominican Rep.
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Hungary
Iceland
India
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithuania

Year

Country

Year

1995
1995
1991
1996
1990
1997
1998
1997
1990
1997
1997,98
1990
1996
1997
1990
1990
1996
1990
1990
1995,96
1990
1990
1995
1996
1996

Macedonia
Mexico
Moldova
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Turkey
Ukraine
Uruguay
USA
Venezuela

1997
1995,96
1996
1990
1996
1997
1996
1996
1997
1990
1993
1995
1995
1996
1996
1995
1996
1996
1994,95
1997
1996
1996
1995
1996

Country
(authoritarian)
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
China
Croatia
Ghana
Yugoslavia
Nigeria

Year
1997
1996
1996
1995
1995
1995
1996
1995

Note: Yugoslavia signifies Serbia and Montenegro.

12

Rohrschneider (1994, 1996, 1999) documents that different experiences with democracy in East
Germany and West Germany caused a significant divergence in people’s political orientations. Therefore,
countries in which democratic longevity cannot be properly operationalized are excluded from the sample.
Germany and Czechoslovakia have been excluded from the analyses as due to the history of disintegration.
Also, Puerto Rico was not included in the analyses as it cannot be considered as an independent country in
a real sense. Bosnia-Herzegovina has been excluded due to a number of missing values in the countrylevel variables.
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As we can see, countries included in my analyses are fairly diverse. The diversity
of countries in the WVS allows us to conduct a variety of analyses. The WVS is an
appropriate source of data for the following reasons. First, the WVS includes countries
with ample variation in democratic longevity, an important concept in this study. The
sample has a number of mature democracies such as the United States, Great Britain, and
France, as well as most other established democracies in Western Europe. Furthermore,
surveys were conducted in new democracies in Eastern Europe and other regions such as
the Baltic countries, Ukraine, and South Africa. Also, the sample includes several
authoritarian states that were not yet democratized at the time of the survey, such as
Azerbaijan and Nigeria. The cross-national variance in democratic longevity makes it
possible to conduct meaningful statistical inference concerning the concept of
institutional learning.
Second, the sample of countries in the WVS also includes a great deal of variation
in political institutions, another key variable in this study. For instance, while
Switzerland, Finland, and Italy adopt highly consensus institutions along what is termed
the executive-parties dimension, countries such as the Great Britain, Mexico, and
Argentina adopt majoritarian institutions. Similarly, along the federal-unitary dimension,
while the United States, Australia, and Mexico adopt highly decentralized institutions,
countries such as Sweden, Denmark, and the Great Britain are unitary states.
A third critical strength of the WVS sample is that it includes countries with
significant proportions of ethnic minorities. As theories in this study envisage different
behaviors between majorities and minorities, it is essential that we have countries in the
sample that include significant numbers of ethnic minorities. Fortunately, the WVS
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includes countries with high degrees of ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity, such as India,
the Philippines, and South Africa, as well as countries that are homogeneous, such as
Japan and South Korea. These multiethnic countries in the sample provide an important
setting in which we can effectively examine very different attitudinal responses of ethnic
majorities and minorities.
The WVS also allows us to effectively measure a variety of individual-level
attributes. Most importantly, the WVS has a question assessing an individual’s level of
interpersonal trust. Furthermore, various questions included in the WVS make it possible
for us to control for a number of potentially confounding factors. In this way, both in
terms of country-level and individual level variables, the WVS effectively serves the
purpose of this study.
However, one of the limitations of the WVS is that questions in the survey cannot
take into account a specific context. For instance, following Coleman’s
conceptualization, Edward and Foley (1998) argue that social capital is contextually
specific. They contend that social relations and social norms can be found only within
specific groups, and that they cannot be transferred to other contexts. Similarly, Coleman
notes that norms found among diamond merchants in New York cannot be extended
beyond that group. Also, Healey (2003) raises the issue of question wording in surveys,
which he argues can mean very different things in different cultures. For instance, the
phrase “most people,” found in questions used to measure interpersonal trust, can be
interpreted differently in different cultures. No matter how carefully survey questions are
formulated, it is almost impossible to design items with identical translations across all
countries. Similarly, one of the most common problems with cross-national survey
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studies is that respondents may interpret identical questions in different ways. For
instance, people in industrialized countries and those in developing countries tend to have
quite different understandings of what constitutes “good health,” thus resulting in
systematic measurement bias. The problem of incomparability is especially acute when
surveys address complicated concepts such “political efficacy” or “political freedom.”
Traditionally, although researchers have dealt with this problem by trying to make survey
questions as concrete as possible by referring to certain examples, this method has not
been successful (Suchman and Jordan 1990). Therefore, King et al (2004) attempt to
solve this problem by adopting vignettes. They try to correct the problem of
incomparability by comparing responses of the vignettes. Although this method is useful
for correcting cross-cultural incomparability of survey studies, it requires that one
reformulate survey questions. Unfortunately, this is not a viable option in this study.
Nevertheless, one needs to be aware of these limitations of the international surveys.
Another problem with the WVS and mass surveys in general is the significant
number of respondents with missing data. On average, as many as half the respondents
typically do not answer at least one or more questions in survey studies of political
attitudes. Facing this issue, many analysts rely on educated guesses to fill in missing
values (for instance, coding “don’t know” as “independent” in a party identification
question). More analysts simply delete observations with missing values.13 However,
despite the fact that they are widely used in political science, such imputation methods
are potentially problematic for statistical inference (see King et al 2001). Even if
educated guesses for non-responses are right, on average, this procedure overestimates

13

According to King et al (2001), approximately 94 % of studies in articles in major political science
journals use listwise deletion, which means that analysts lose about one-third of the entire observations.
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the certainty with which we know the answers, thus underestimating the standard errors
of the estimates. In a similar manner, listwise deletion of cases with missing values tends
to discard too much information by eliminating as much as one third of the entire sample.
Consequently, at best, listwise deletion causes a loss of valuable information, and at
worst, potentially creates severe selection bias (King et al 2001). Therefore, these
conventional methods for dealing with missing values can significantly distort the results
of statistical inference.
Considering these problems regarding the conventional method, I rely on the
strategy of multiple imputation. The software called Amelia provides a relatively easy
way to compute missing values (King et al 2001). Amelia imputes m values for each of
the missing cells in the data matrix by the method of multiple imputation and,
consequently, creates several completed data sets depending on the setting. The observed
values are the same across these completed datasets, but the missing values are filled with
different values that reflect uncertainty about the missing data. As the method of
multiple imputation does not cause bias in the standard errors or a significant loss of
information, it allows us to conduct more accurate statistical inferences.14 Specifically,
with missing values multiply imputed, results from statistical analyses become more
consistent (King et al., 2001). Therefore, considering the advantages of multiple
imputation, I chose to fill in missing values by relying on the statistical software of
Amelia.
14

Multiple imputations in most cases produce impossible values for variables in the process of imputations.
General advice regarding these impossible values is that we should keep these values as they are. These
impossible values reflect degrees of uncertainty of the multiple imputations, and in that sense, they are
reasonable. Therefore, I have calculated missing values so that variables can take impossible values except
dummy variables. For a confirmatory purpose, I have also calculated missing values so that multiple
imputations reflect the original scale of each variable and have conducted exactly the same analyses. These
two different datasets produce substantially identical results.
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Dependent Variable: Interpersonal Trust

Table 4-2 Description of Dependent Variable
Dependent Variable
Interpersonal Trust
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be
too careful in dealing with people?” Most can be trusted=1, and Can’t be too careful15=0.
Source: WVS

The question in the WVS to assess the level of trust in a society is: “Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing
with people?” Against this question, respondents answer with either one of two choices:
(1) most people can be trusted, (0) you can’t be too careful. This dummy variable
measures how willing people are to trust others in the society (Table 4-1). The answer
for this question taps respondents’ levels of trust, which reflects social capital found in
the community. This is exactly the same measure used by Knack and Keefer (1997) and
other studies (see Zak and Knack 2001; Hall 1999; and for nearly the same measure used
in the United States, see Putnam 2000).

15

The translation of this question is “have to be very careful.”
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Independent Variables

Community Heterogeneities: Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization
(ELF) and Gini Index

Previous studies have found that heterogeneous elements in a community reduce social
capital. Heterogeneity can be measured in several ways, including race, ethnicity,
language, income, educational or work experiences, or religions. In this study, I focus on
fractionalization of ethnicity, linguistic difference, religion, and income. So far, a
number of studies have relied on these measures as variables showing community
heterogeneities. Traditionally, ethnic and linguistic differences were previously lumped
together as part of an “ethnolinguistic” fractionalization variable (ELF). This
fractionalization index, originally computed from the Atlas Narodv Mira (ANM) and
reprinted in Taylor and Hudson (1972), has become a standard in political science
research. It is the variable used to measure a country’s ethnic fractionalization by nearly
every study interested in the cross-national effects of ethnic diversity. The ELF varies
between 0 and 1, and denotes the probability that two randomly chosen individuals are of
the same ethnic group. The value 0 indicates total homogeneity, and a higher value
signifies a more ethnic and linguistic heterogeneous elements within a society.16

16

The ELF index has been taken from Philip Roeder's website: http//:weber.ucsd.edu\~proeder\elf.htm.
Alesina et al (2003) have presented an alternative to the ELF index. They have created a new dataset by
separately coding ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization. I have estimated the same models as
below using these measures fractionalization. While ethnic and linguistic fractionalization does not show
statistically significant effects on trust, religious fractionalization is found to have a positive effect on trust.
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As in the case of ethnic heterogeneities, previous studies have shown that
economic inequality also reduce social capita. Therefore, it is necessary to take into
account a measure of economic inequality. For that measure, I adopt the Gini index for
each country. The Gini coefficient measures the extent of departure from a perfectly
even distribution of income, with a Gini of 0 indicating equality and a Gini of 100
signifying perfect inequality.17

Political Institutions: Majoritarian and Consensus Institutions

To examine the effects of political institutions, it is necessary to adopt valid indicators to
capture the characteristics of political institutions. I adopt the Lijphart index of
consensus and majoritarian democracies. The Lijphart index signifies the degrees to
which political power is concentrated or dispersed within a political system. Put
differently, the Lijphart index indicates the degrees of power that minorities can enjoy
vis-à-vis the majority. According to the exclusive or inclusive principles of the political
institutions, Lijphart (1999) argues that types of democracies can be largely divided into
two types: majoritarian or consensus institutions. As elements that distinguish these
types of democracies, Lijphart (1999) identifies five elements in each institutional
dimension. In the executive-parties dimension, the following five points are critical in
categorizing a political system: (1) cabinet system, (2) executive-legislative relations, (3)
party systems, (4) electoral systems, and (5) interest groups systems. In the federalOne possible speculation is that higher degrees of religious fractionalization may indicate religious
tolerance. We can assume that religious tolerance and interpersonal trust are positively correlated.
17
The Gini index for each country has been taken from the World Development Indicator. For Iceland, I
substituted the mean value of all countries in the sample.
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unitary dimension, the following five points are important: (1) federal system, (2)
legislative system (unicameral or bicameral), (3) constitutional rigidity, (4) judicial
review, and (5) central bank independence. The distinction between majoritarian and
consensus democracies is especially important in the context of multiethnic states, as
these elements determine the fate of majorities and minorities in the political system.
In constructing the index, Lijphart (1999) systematically analyzed 36 states that
were democratic in the middle of 1996 and that had been continuously democratic since
1977 or earlier. Each democracy is analyzed from its first democratic election in or after
1945 until June 30, 1996; as a result, the time span for the thirty six democracies varies
from fifty-one years (1945-96) to nineteen years (1977-96). Lijphart (1999) compiled an
index for those countries to determine their location on the continuum of the consensusmajoritarian scale. As the goals in this study is to examine the effects of democratic
longevity and its interaction with political institutions, it is necessary to construct an
index for new democracies and authoritarian states as well. For that purpose, I have
expanded the Lijphart index so that it covers new democracies and authoritarian states in
the WVS. Consequently, the new dataset allows us to analyze the effects of political
institution interacted with democratic longevity.18

Democratic Longevity

To capture the learning effect through political institutions, it is necessary to
operationalize the years of experience with democracy. As an indicator of democratic
18

For details regarding the expanded Lijphart index, see Appendix A.
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longevity, I adopt the years of democratic rule in each country since 1945. Certainly,
although it is true that democratic countries existed prior to 1945, the experience of
World War II interrupted the process of democratic learning. During the war time, with
political agendas dominated by issues related to war, the minority issue was largely
marginalized and considered as a secondary issue. Therefore, if we wish to capture the
effects of institutional learning on ethnic relations at the domestic level, it is important to
operationalize the experience with democracy during the post-World War II era.
As the criterion of democratic regime, I turn to the Polity IV dataset, which was
originally developed by the Ted Robert Gurr.19 The Polity IV dataset annually assigns
each country with polity scores, which signifies the general openness of the political
regime. The score ranges from the score of -10, which indicates the most authoritarian,
to the score of 10, which indicates the most democratic. The polity score is one of the
most popular indicators of democracy among scholars. In this study, if a country receives
a score of at least 1, I consider the country democratic. Consequently, it follows that the
value of each country in longevity is the years of continuous democracy since 1945. For
cases that had been authoritarian systems and became democracies after 1945, I measured
the number of years since they had become democracy. For instance, according to the
Polity IV dataset, Mexico became democratic in 1993, obtaining the score of at least 1 in
the Polity score. Because the WVS survey in Mexico was conducted in the 1995, the
regime longevity in Mexico is counted as 2 years. For countries that were authoritarian
states at the time of survey, I assign a value of 0. In this way, I operationalize
respondents’ learning effects as the function of the continuous experience with
democratic rule in each country since 1945.
19

The Polity IV dataset can be downloaded at: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/
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Control Variables

To estimate the effects of key independent variables, it is necessary to control for
potentially confounding factors. The criteria for including control variables are twofold.
First, the variable is thought to be correlated with both the dependent variable and
independent variables. Second, the control variable has to be causally prior to the
independent variable. Variables that are thought to meet these two criteria are included
in the analyses as control variables.

Level of Economic Development

I adopt the level of economic development as a control variable. Scholars have
demonstrated an empirically robust association between frequency of democracy and
level of economic development (Lipset 1959; Jackman 1973; Bollen 1979; Burkhart and
Lewis-Beck 1994; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000). They argue
that the higher the level of economic development, the more conducive the situation tends
to be for the sustainability of democracy. However, while the claim that levels of
economic development have a causal effect on democracy is widely demonstrated,
Robinson (2005) suggests that this may not be the case. He contends that the positive
relationship between economic development and democracy is due to an omitted variable,
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which he suspects is economic institutions. Yet, more studies are needed to clarify the
issue. Considering the vast literature suggesting the positive relationship between
economic development and the sustainability of democracy, it is safe to control for levels
of economic development.
Also, many scholars suggest that economic development results in shift in
individual attributes. For instance, Inglehart (1997) suggests that economic development
results in “cultural shift,” transforming people’s value systems. He argues that economic
growth lads to a series of social changes such as occupational specialization, urbanization,
and higher levels of educational attainment, and that these social transformations
subsequently lead to the shift in individual political attitudes. Hence, it is likely that
levels of economic development affects people’s tendency to trust others.
Considering these points, it is reasonable to control for levels of economic
development. In this study, I adopt GDP per capita as an indicator of the relative wealth
of a country. Unlike GDP, the variable GDP per capital distinguishes between small
countries that are quite wealthy and larger countries (e.g., Singapore vs. China).20

Ethnic Civil War

Scholars have suggested that the experience of political violence, especially ethnic
conflict, will have significant effects on people’s attitudes toward others. Chaim
Kaufman (1996) suggests that violence between different ethnic groups hardens their

20

The data of GDP per capita (PPP, current international dollars) are available in the World Development
Indicator.
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ethnic identity, which will make conflict management extremely difficult. Also, scholars
studying ethnic conflict point out the important roles that a history of war plays. Stuart
Kaufman (2001) notes that fears of group extinction generated from a history of violence
can make symbolic mobilization by political elites much easier. In addition, the history
of ethnic violence helps to escalate the ethnic security dilemma (Posen 1993). Fear of
extinction among ethnic groups amplifies with the history of ethnic violence (Horowitz
1985). Consequently, the history of ethnic violence is expected to have a significantly
negative effect on social capital, and ethnic violence will destroy social capital in the
society.21 Even if higher levels of social capital existed among different ethnic groups
before ethnic war, violence between them can result in the total collapse of social capital.
It will become much more difficult for people to trust each other and have ties with
different ethnic groups. History of ethnic violence is also thought to be correlated with
different types of institutional arrangements. As numerous studies have shown,
institutional arrangements have been proven highly effective in mediating ethnic conflict.
For instance, PR electoral systems or federal arrangements can be pointed out as widely
used instruments to deal with ethnic conflict.
Considering these points, it is necessary to control for the history of political
violence in each state. As an indicator of political violence, I rely on the rebelling index
in the Minorities at Risk dataset (MAR).22 The MAR dataset codes rebellion activities of
ethnic minorities in each country. The coding is as follows: (0) none reported; (1)
political banditry, sporadic terrorism; (2) campaigns of terrorism; (3) local rebellions; (4)
small-scale guerrilla activity; (5) intermediate guerrilla activity; (6) large-scale guerrilla
21
22

Regarding the destruction of social capital due to violence, see Colletta and Cullen (2000)
The Minorities at Risk dataset can be downloaded at: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/
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activity; and (7) protracted civil war. As what is important in this context is the history of
violent activities between ethnic groups, I coded the maximum levels of rebellion activity
from the period of 1945-1998. While other datasets also code incidents of civil war, they
also include minor levels of conflicts such as coup attempts other than ethnic violence.
The MAR dataset is more appropriate for the purpose of this study.

Political Interest

I control for the respondent’s levels political interest. I hypothesize that political interest
and social capital are positively correlated. Put differently, those who take great interest
in politics tend to trust others. Also, people’s political interest is thought to affect
democratic longevity. Almond and Verba (1963) demonstrated that people’s interest in
politics is related with their political efficacy and political support. Therefore, in
countries in which people have higher levels of political interest are thought to promote
the consolidation of democracy. Therefore, political interest should be controlled for in
the analyses. The WVS asks respondents whether they are (1) very interested; (2)
somewhat interested; (3) not very interested; and (4) not at all interested in politics. I
recoded answers in the WVS so that higher values show stronger interest in politics.
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Institutional Confidence

For political institutions to work effectively, the public has to maintain certain degrees of
confidence in them. Even though political institutions are well designed so as to foster
bridging social capital, they would not achieve their goals if they would not maintain
popular legitimacy. As a consequence, institutional confidence is expected to affect the
government’s ability to foster social capital in their society. If the public does not trust
public institutions, any efforts by the governments would be less effective. Therefore, it
is important to control for confidence in public institutions.
The WVS asks respondents whether and how much confidence they have in
various institutions. Because what we need to measure here is confidence in public
institutions, I focused on the following institutions: (v136) the armed forces; (v137) the
legal system; (v141) the police; (v142) the government in (capital); (v143) the political
parities; (v144) the parliament; (v145) the civil service. I added each response in these
questions and created an institutional confidence index.23

Political Ideology

I also control for the respondents’ political ideology. Studies have shown that people’s
left-right political ideology is related to a variety of individual attitudes toward the
23

The public confidence index is created considering each variable with equal weight. For a confirmatory
purpose, I have created factor score generated from those variables that touch people’s institutional
confidence. The factor analysis has revealed a single dimension. The eigenvalue of the first factor is 3.55
and explains about 51% of the variance. I conducted analyses using the factor score, but the result is
essentially the same as the public confidence index with each variable weighted equally.
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government and other aspects of political life. Downs (1957) suggested that party
competition takes place on the left-right dimension based on positions over the scope of
government intervention in the economy. However, Inglehart and Klingemann (1976)
argue that the size of the government is not necessarily the only factor defining the
meaning of left and right. Inglehart (1971, 1997) contends that postmaterialists who are
characterized with distrust toward the government usually identify themselves with leftist
ideology. Thus, because political ideology is found to be related to a variety of aspects in
political life, respondents’ ideology may significantly affect their levels of trust.
Besides the relationship between ideology and trust, there is a possibility that
people’s left-right ideology may have a strong impact on the form of the government.
Huber and Inglehart (1995) found that the main axe of political contention is democracies
versus authoritarian in authoritarian states or newly established democracies.
Furthermore, Huber and Inglehart (1995) identified that the left-right ideology in some
countries is mainly concerned with the issue of centralization of power—such as
separatism, federalism, and reunification. Consequently, as we can expect that
respondents’ left-right ideology affects the types of the political regime and political
institutions, it is necessary to control for political ideology. In the WVS, respondents are
asked to place themselves on the political scale with 1 representing left and 10 showing
right in political ideology. As a consequence, while a lower number indicates more leftist
ideology, a higher one more right.24

24

While the results of my analyses consistently show that people’s political ideology has a significant
effect on trust, there is a room for debate as to whether or not political ideology is causally prior to
interpersonal trust. Therefore, I ran analyses excluding the political ideology variable. The results are
essentially the same without the ideology variable.
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Demographic Variables

Finally, I also control for the usual sociodemographic variables: education, income, sex,
and age.25 Education is expected to have a positive effect on social capital. Because
studies have consistently shown that education boosts the levels of political participation,
I hypothesize that education and social capital is positively correlated. In a similar
manner, income will have the same effects on social capital. A higher income will
increase the levels of education, thus contributing to more social capital in a society. In
addition, different studies have shown that income and political participation is positively
correlated. Hence, higher levels of income are expected to have a positive effect on
social capital.
We need to control for respondents’ gender in this study. Previous studies on
political behavior demonstrated that gender is one of the most important variables
explaining activism in voluntary associations and community group as well as in political
participation (Almond and Verba 1963). More recently, Inglehart and Norris (2005)
show that gender makes significant differences in the levels of social capital. Therefore,
gender can be considered as an important variable. I coded male respondents as 0 and
female 1.
Finally, it is necessary to control for age. The link between age and participation
has been investigated, and the source of the relationship has sparked intense debates
(Miller and Shanks 1996; Teixeira 1992; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Also,
Inglehart (1990, 1997) argues that intergenerational changes are an important aspect of

25

See Abramson (1983) and Kanter and Mirvis (1989).
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cultural shift, which consequently affects individuals’ attitudes toward the government or
traditional authority. Therefore, respondents’ age can be thought to affect the levels of
their trust.
As we can see, these demographic variables are closely related to both social
capital and individuals’ attitudes toward the government and democracy. Therefore, it is
necessary to control for these demographic variables. Details of these independent
variables are shown in Table 4-3.
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Table 4-3 Description of Independent Variables
State-Level Variables
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization:
Degrees of ethno-linguistic fractionalization in
each country.
Source: Roeder (2001)26

Gini Index:
Degrees of economic inequality.
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI)

Types of Political Institutions27:
Standardized indices of four items for each
dimension (executive-parties and federal-unitary)
showing the degrees of power-sharing.
Source: Lijphart (1999)

Individual Level Variables
Political Interest:
“How interested would you say you are in
politics?” very interested=4, somewhat
interested=3, not very interested=2, and not at all
interested=1.
Source: WVS
Confidence in Institutions:
“Could you tell me how much confidence you
have in (the name of the institution). A great
deal=4, quite a lot=3, not very much=2, and not at
all=1. This variable is the aggregate index of the
confidence in following public institutions: armed
force, the legal system, the police, the government
(in capital), the political parties, the parliament,
and the civil service.
Source: WVS
Ideology:
Respondents’ self-placement ideology
1 signifying the left and 10 showing right
Source: WVS

Democratic Longevity:
Years of continuous democracy since 1945 (at
least a value of 1 in the Polity IV).
Source: Polity IV

Sex:
Respondents’ sex
Male=0, female=1
Source: WVS

GDP per capita:
Levels of economic development (PPP, current
international dollars)
Source: WDI

Age:
Respondents’ age
Source: WVS

Ethnic Civil War:
Highest level of ethnic conflict in each state.
Source: Minorities at Risk (MAR).

Education:
Respondents’ levels of education
Source: WVS
Income:
Respondents’ levels of income in each country
Source: WVS

26

Roeder, Philip, 2001.
The variable of interest group pluralism in the executive-party dimension in Lijphart index has been
excluded in this study. It is extremely difficult to find reliable data for interest groups in developing
countries. Therefore, excluding this item from the index makes more sense than assigning new
democracies with rough estimated numbers. See Lijphart (1999). Also, the measure of central bank
independence in the federal-unitary dimension has been excluded as the variable is theoretically irrelevant
for this study. Furthermore, many constitutions do not include the provision of central bank independence.

27
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Disaggregating Ethnicity into Majorities and Minorities

Table 4-4 Survey Questions used to Identify Majorities and Minorities
Country
(democracies)
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Brazil
Britain
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Denmark
Dominican Rep.
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Hungary
Iceland
India
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithuania

Question

Country

Question

Religion
Ethnic
Homogeneous
Ethnic
Region
Ethnic
Ethnic
Language
Interview
Ethnic
Self-ethnic
Homogeneous
Ethnic
Language
Language
Religion
Language
Religion
Homogeneous
Religion
Religion
Religion
Homogeneous
Ethnic
Language

Macedonia
Mexico
Moldova
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Turkey
Ukraine
Uruguay
USA
Venezuela

Ethnic
Ethnic
Language
Religion
Homogeneous
Religion
Ethnic
Religion
Homogeneous
Religion
Religion
Language
Language
Ethnic
Homogeneous
Self-ethnic
Religion
Religion
Ethnic
Self-ethnic
Language
Ethnic
Ethnic
Ethnic

Country
(authoritarian)
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
China
Croatia
Ghana
Yugoslavia
Nigeria

Question
Ethnic
Ethnic
Ethnic
Homogeneous
Self-ethnic
Minority
Self-ethnic
Minority

Note: Questions used to identify majority and minority status from the World Values
Survey
“Ethnic”—(v233), “Language”—(v209), “Religion”—(v179),
“Self-Ethnic Identification”—(v208), “Interview”—(v235), and “Region”—(v234)
“Homogeneous” means that almost all the population is homogeneous or there is no data
that allows us to distinguish majorities from minorities. “Minority” indicates that no
ethnic groups consist of more than half of the population within the country.
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To explore how political institutions and social capital interact with ethnonational groups,
it is necessary to disaggregate ethnic groups into majorities and minorities. One plausible
approach to disaggregate ethnicity into different groups was due to Silver and Dowley
(2000). Relying on the WVS, Silver and Dowley (2000) used data of racial/ethnic
background, religious denomination, language of interview, and in some cases region.
Using these variables regarding ethnic/racial characteristics, they tried to construct ethnic
divisions in each country.
However, as they also admit, this method is not perfect. For some countries,
Silver and Dowley (2000) were able to devise only imperfect surrogate for ethnicity.
Furthermore, according to Silver and Dowley (2005), the lack of standard way of
defining ethnicity poses a serious obstacle. While race is an important factor defining
ethnicity in some countries, language or religion can be more crucial in other countries.
Ethnicity is a complex notion, and the complexity makes it difficult for survey
researchers to analyze data according to ethnic groups.
Recognizing the difficulty and ambiguity of reconstructing ethnicity in each
country, I focus on the distinction between majorities and minorities, rather than trying to
construct specific categories of ethnic groups. Ultimately, what matters essentially in this
study is the distinction between majorities and minorities, and we do not have to
necessarily know the names of specific ethnic groups to which people belong. Put
differently, for the purpose of this study, we only need to know whether respondents in
the survey belong to a majority group or a minority group in the society. Therefore, I
have tried to select out minority groups within a society relying on available survey
questions. For instance, in France we can assume those whose religion is Islam or
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Buddhism are minorities in the society. Therefore, I coded those respondents as
minorities. In a similar manner, with available information from several questions, I have
tried to distinguish whether the status of respondents can be considered as majorities or
minorities in the society referring to the background knowledge of each country. The
questions used to identify their majority/minority status are shown in Table 4-4.
Certainly, it is not easy to determine which individuals’ attribute is the most politically
salient in identifying their status in the society. Therefore, when it is possible to utilize
more than one individuals’ attribute for the categorization, I relied on the attribute that
allows me to identify the ethnic group in the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset. For
instance, in the case of Lithuania, data on several individuals’ attributes are available to
distinguish minorities from majorities. Among them, I chose to rely on the language data
because they are the most convenient to identify the Poles and Russians in Lithuania
following the distinctions in the MAR dataset. As a consequence, minorities I have
identified in my study are in most cases close to minorities in the MAR dataset. Also,
there are cases in which most of the population can be considered as homogeneous or
available information does not allow us to identify minorities in the population. In that
case, I coded all respondents in the country as members of the majority. Countries in
which the whole population is coded as the majority are as follows: Austria, Denmark,
Iceland, Japan, Norway, Poland, South Korea, and China. In a similar manner, in cases
where no ethnic group consists of more than half of the population, I coded all
respondents in the country as minorities. Accordingly, whole samples of respondents in
Ghana and Nigeria are coded as minorities.
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Consequently, I have been able to identify each respondent’s status in each
country. Admittedly, strictly speaking, this method is not partially consistent because of
the limitation of the survey studies. For some countries, religion is the only question
available, and for others, racial background is the only available information.28 However,
in terms of identifying minority groups within society, this method is the best available.
Furthermore, the measurement strategy is transparent and replicable. Making the best of
available information from survey studies, I have been able to identify each respondent’s
status in society. Finally, I am hastened to add that most of these distinctions are in a
large part congruent with the ethnic distinctions made by Silver and Dowley (2000), thus
indicating that minorities selected by this method are not off the target.

28

For a confirmatory purpose, I have created a different dataset in which minorities are defined more
strictly. For those countries in which available information from the WVS is limited to identify ethnic
minorities, I have coded every respondent as majorities. For instance, as it is not clear how important
religions could be to identify minorities in the case of Argentina, I coded all respondents as belonging to
the majority. In a similar manner, in the case of Latin American countries, as it could be questionable
whether race could be a critical factor distinguishing majorities from minorities, all respondents are coded
as majorities. Countries in which all respondents are coded as majorities in a newly created dataset include:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Sweden, and Finland. The analyses using the
new dataset with the restricted definition of minorities produce essentially identical results using the dataset
with a broader definition of minorities. The only difference that can be found is the significance of the
executive-parties institutions (corresponding to Model 1 in Table 5-2 and Table 5-3). In the analyses of
majorities using a new dataset, a significant effect of executive-parties institutions disappears, while the
same variable indicates positive and significant effects among minorities. One of the possible reasons for
these differences is that people who are newly coded as majorities in the new dataset are indeed minorities.
That is why these respondents nullify the positive effect of the executive-parties institutions among the
minority sample. However, the new dataset produces essentially the same results as the original one in
other analyses, including analyses with interaction terms. These results provide additional evidence for the
validity of the coding method of disaggregating majorities and minorities in the initial dataset.
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4-4: Overall Dynamics Surrounding Social Capital

Table 4-5 Mean Scores of Interpersonal Trust (yes=1, no=0).
Country
(democracies)
Norway
Sweden
Denmark
Canada
Netherlands
Finland
Ireland
Iceland
Japan
Taiwan
Australia
Switzerland
India
USA
Italy
Belgium
Austria
Britain
Spain
Ukraine
South Korea
Bulgaria
Mexico
Dominican Rep.
Hungary

Trust

Country

Trust

0.652
0.593
0.567
0.53
0.523
0.485
0.473
0.432
0.423
0.417
0.401
0.381
0.369
0.359
0.355
0.346
0.328
0.325
0.311
0.311
0.303
0.294
0.282
0.271
0.249

Latvia
France
Georgia
Russia
Lithuania
Moldova
Portugal
Uruguay
Estonia
Chile
Bangladesh
Pakistan
Poland
Argentina
Romania
South Africa
Slovenia
Venezuela
Colombia
Macedonia
Philippines
Peru
Turkey
Brazil

0.248
0.246
0.241
0.236
0.224
0.223
0.22
0.22
0.217
0.215
0.213
0.19
0.183
0.18
0.165
0.162
0.156
0.141
0.109
0.094
0.058
0.056
0.056
0.031
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Country
(authoritarian)
China
Yugoslavia
Croatia
Ghana
Armenia
Belarus
Azerbaijan
Nigeria

Trust
0.516
0.302
0.26
0.25
0.247
0.247
0.209
0.203

Table 4-6 Interpersonal Trust (Majorities and Minorities)
Country
Norway
Sweden
Denmark
Canada
Netherlands
China
Finland
Ireland
Iceland
Japan
Taiwan
Australia
Switzerland
India
USA
Italy
Belgium
Austria
Britain
Spain
Ukraine
South Korea
Yugoslavia
Bulgaria
Mexico
Dominican Rep
Croatia
Ghana
Hungary

Majority
0.652
0.592
0.567
0.585
0.528
0.516
0.489
0.469
0.432
0.423
0.416
0.416
0.366
0.387
0.389
0.355
0.357
0.328
0.324
0.283
0.311
0.303
0.297
0.288
0.276
0.242
0.257
0.241

Minority
0.596
0.344
0.521
0.375
0.522

0.417
0.288
0.440
0.304
0.256
0.354
0.293
0.381
0.318
0.311
0.323
0.336
0.308
0.314
0.539
0.25
0.272

Country
Latvia
Belarus
Armenia
France
Georgia
Russia
Lithuania
Moldova
Portugal
Uruguay
Estonia
Chile
Bangladesh
Azerbaijan
Nigeria
Pakistan
Poland
Argentina
Romania
South Africa
Slovenia
Venezuela
Colombia
Macedonia
Philippines
Turkey
Peru
Brazil

Majority
0.293
0.253
0.244
0.237
0.244
0.231
0.227
0.234
0.216
0.218
0.214
0.222
0.205
0.208
0.203
0.187
0.163
0.160
0.193
0.157
0.139
0.108
0.057
0.057
0.055
0.052
0.034

Minority
0.190
0.228
0.444
0.257
0.230
0.328
0.203
0.191
0.236
0.267
0.223
0.141
0.307
0.215
0.203
0.128
0.238
0.20
0.122
0.139
0.143
0.110
0.188
0.066
0.063
0.068
0.026

Source: World Values Survey, 1990-1998.

Having addressed the measurement issues and the ways variables are operationalized, we
are now in a position to examine the relationships between these variables. We begin
with some general descriptive analyses. Table 4-5 shows the mean scores of
interpersonal trust in each country. The range of the mean score in trust is from 0.031
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(Brazil) to 0.652 (Norway), with higher values signifying the higher probability of people
trusting others. As these statistics indicate, the probability of one trusting others varies
significantly from country to country. Furthermore, Table 4-6 shows levels of
interpersonal trust majorities and minorities separately. Against our expectation, it is not
necessarily true that all majorities show higher levels of interpersonal trust than
minorities. Among 47 countries that have both majorities and minorities, majorities show
higher trust than minorities in 20 countries (42.5%). Although a simple comparison is
not always possible due to a smaller number of observations among the minority sample,
minorities actually show higher trust than majorities in 27 countries (57.5%).

Figure 4-1

Regime Type and Interpersonal Trust

Interpersonal Trust
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To explore the source of these cross-national variations, I first examine the
relationship between regime types and social capital. For that purpose, I have drawn
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figures showing the relationship between these two variables. Figure 4-1 describes the
relationship between regime types and levels of trust. The categorization of regime types
has been made based on the score of the Polity IV dataset. If a country has not received
at least a score of 1 in the Polity score, the country has been categorized as an
authoritarian state. New democracies are the countries whose polity scores are at least 1
but years of continuous democracy is less than 10 years old. Finally, countries that have
been democratic for 10 years or more have been categorized as mature democracies.
As Figure 4-1 indicates, levels of social capital are the highest in mature
democracies. These results are consistent with the previous studies suggesting that
democratic rule encourages more social capital. However, what is critical in the figure is
that the authoritarian states produce more social capital than do new democracies.
Although the number of authoritarian states that are included in the sample is small, their
average score on social capital is higher than that of new democracies. One of the
possible explanations for this is that social stresses or pressures during the process of
regime transition may erode social capital. Previous studies have noted that massive
changes that transitional processes involve may consequently intensify the social tensions
(Linz and Stepan 1996). Consistent with their analyses, the relationship between regime
types and interpersonal trust indicate that democratic rule does not automatically lead to
higher levels of social capital. At least at the aggregate level, the relationship between
democratic longevity and social capital does not seem to be straightforward.
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Figure 4-2

Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization and Interpersonal Trust
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Figure 4-3

Economic Inequality and Interpersonal Trust
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Furthermore, I have examined the relationships between interpersonal trust and
other state-level variables. Figure 4-2 is a scatterplot showing the relationship between
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) and interpersonal trust. As the figure shows, as
levels of fractionalization become higher, average levels of interpersonal trust decrease.
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Put differently, there is a negative relationship between ELF and trust, and as countries
become more heterogeneous, the average levels of trust tend to be lower. The same
relationship can be found in the case of economic inequality. Figure 4-3 plots the
relationship between economic inequality and levels of trust. The figure clearly shows
that, on average, people are less likely to trust others in countries with high levels of
economic inequality. On the other hand, people tend to trust others in more equal
societies. In sum, at the aggregate level, we can find a negative relationship between
social heterogeneities and social capital.

Figure 4-4

Executive-Parties Institutions and Interpersonal Trust
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Figure 4-5

Federal-Unitary Institutions and Interpersonal Trust
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Furthermore, as one of the main purposes of this study is to examine the
relationship between political institutions and social capital, it is important to look at the
relationship between types of political institutions and social capital. Figure 4-4 shows
the relationship between trust and executive-parties political institutions, and Figure 4-5
represents the relationship between trust and federal-unitary institutions. As has been
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discussed, the executive-parties dimension is mainly concerned with the degrees of
power-concentration or power-sharing in the executive and party politics. Figure 4-4
shows that levels of trust are lower as institutions become more majoritarian in the
executive-parties dimension. This in turn suggests beneficial effects of power-sharing
institutions on trust in the executive-parties dimension. However, this trend turns
opposite in the federal-unitary dimension. The federal-unitary dimension refers to the
system of power-constraints through political decentralization. As we can see in Figure
4-5, in the federal-unitary dimension, levels of trust tend to be higher as institutions
become more unitary. These figures in two different dimensions suggest that the
relationship between political institutions and social capital is not straightforward.

Table 4-7 Interpersonal Trust: Comparing Majority and Minority—T-test
Group
Minority
Majority
Difference

N
24458
66068

Mean
0.2543
0.2834
-0.0291

Standard Error
0.0027
0.0018
0.0033

Standard Deviation
0.4355
0.4507

Confidence Interval
(95%)
0.2489
0.2598
0.2800
0.2869
-0.0357 -0.0226

Note: p-value for t-test (two-tails) between these two groups is less than 0.0000

Furthermore, I will examine whether these values vary depending on the status of
the respondent within a society. Table 4-7 shows the result of t-test in interpersonal trust
by group status. The mean value for the minority group is 0.254, while that for the
minority group is 0.283, suggesting that the majority groups tend to have higher trust than
minority groups. As the p-value for the t-test is less than 0.000, the difference in levels of
trust between these groups is statistically significant.
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This brief survey of the relationships between interpersonal trust and other statelevel variables shows that there are significant cross-national variations. Also, the
analyses indicate that the relationships among these variables are generally consistent
with the hypotheses suggested in Chapter 3. In the next chapter, to further explore the
dynamics surrounding social capital, I turn to multivariate analyses.

Copyright © Satoshi Machida 2006
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Chapter 5: Empirical Analysis 1

Introduction

In previous chapters, I have already specified theories and hypotheses regarding the
effect of democratic longevity on social capital. I have also explained the strategy of
measuring variables of interest. Bivariate analyses based on these measures have
suggested that relationships among these variables are fairly consistent with the
hypotheses. In this chapter, I conduct statistical analyses that estimate the hypothesized
relationship in a more rigorous manner. Specifically, relying on survey data, I implement
multivariate analyses. The main purpose of this chapter is to statistically test the
hypotheses suggested in Chapter 3. By so doing, I demonstrate that democratic longevity
does matter in determining levels of social capital, and that the effect varies depending on
the institutional context.
I begin this chapter by showing the specification of each model. Next, relying on
the probit model, I test the hypotheses and further dissect the results focusing on the
effect of democratic longevity across institutional dimensions. Then I estimate the same
equations separating the sample into majorities and minorities. These separate analyses
help to specify the differential effects of democratic longevity on trust among majorities
and minorities. Finally, I briefly summarize the findings and discuss the implications.
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5-1: Probit Analysis

The dependent variable of this study is interpersonal trust, operationalized by the
dichotomous measure described earlier (non-trust=0, trust=1). As the dependent variable
is dichotomous, a probit model is appropriate. Probit models estimate the change of
probability of trusting others given a unit increase in independent variables. The basic
specification of the additive model to be estimated is as follows:29

Model 1
Interpersonal Trust (Y) = β0 + β1(sex) + β2(age) + β3(education) + β4(income) +
β5(political interest) + β6(institutional confidence) + β7(ideology) + β8(majority) +
β9(GDP per capita) + β10(Gini) + β11(ELF) + β12(Ethnic civil war) + β13(executiveparties institutions) + β14(federal-unitary institutions) + β15 (democratic longevity) + ε

Model 2 includes the appropriate multiplicative terms capturing the interaction of
institutional variables and democratic longevity:

29

The data for analyses take place at two-levels—individuals and country levels. Scholars have suggested
that ignoring the multilevel nature of the data could cause significant bias, such as underestimating the
standard errors of the coefficients of the country-level variables. To overcome this problem, the
Hierarchical Linear and non-linear Model (HLM) can be used. HLM allows us to analyze a single,
comprehensive model isolating the independent effects of both individual and country-level variables. For
confirmatory purposes, I estimated all the probit models presented below with HLM. The results are
substantially identical with those from probit analyses estimated by the STATA (for results of the HLM
analyses, see Appendix B). Only a few variables show different effects from those generated by the probit
analyses. Regarding the details of the HLM, see Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) and Kreft and de Leeuw
(1998). For a recent discussion of its application to political science, see Steenbergen and Jones (2002).
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Model 2
Interpersonal Trust (Y) = β0 + β1(sex) + β2(age) + β3(education) + β4(income) +
β5(political interest) + β6(institutional confidence) + β7(ideology) + β8(majority) +
β9(GDP per capita) + β10(Gini) + β11(ELF) + β12(Ethnic civil war) + β13(executiveparties institutions) + β14(federal-unitary institutions) + β15 (democratic longevity) +
β16 (executive institutions*democratic longevity) + β17(federal-unitary
institutions*democratic longevity) + ε
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Table 5-1 Probit Analysis (Majority and Minority),
Dependent Variable: Trust
Regressor
Sex
Age
Education
Income
Political Interest
Institutional Confidence
Ideology
Majority
GDP per capita
Gini
ELF
Ethnic Civil War
Executive-parties Institutions
Federal-unitary Institutions
Democratic Longevity
Executive-parties*Longevity
Federal-Unitary*Longevity
Constant
N
R-squared

Model1
Coefficient (SE)
0.028 (0.014)*
0.001 (0.001)
0.028 (0.008)***
0.035 (0.006)***
0.087 (0.012)***
0.022 (0.003)***
-0.016 (0.003)***
-0.044 (0.041)
0.00005 (0.000007)
-0.022 (0.004)***
-0.144 (0.195)
-0.002 (0.019)
0.190 (0.094)*
-0.408 (0.763)
0.007 (0.003)*

-0.796 (0.178)***
90526
0.06

Model2
Coefficient (SE)
0.033 (0.014)*
0.002 (0.001)*
0.037 (0.008)***
0.03 (0.006)***
0.09 (0.012)***
0.022 (0.003)***
-0.015 (0.003)***
-0.015 (0.038)
0.000002 (0.000007)
-0.028 (0.005)***
0.060 (0.18)
-0.013 (0.02)
0.546 (0.147)***
-2.469 (0.95)**
0.018 (0.005)***
-0.012 (0.004)**
0.068 (0.021)**
-1.020 (0.18)***
90526
0.067

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table 5-1 presents the results of the basic probit estimates for the pooled sample
including both majorities and minorities. Among state-level variables, the Gini index is
associated with reduced levels of trust, while the effect of ethno-linguistic
fractionalization (ELF) is not significant. As a consequence, we cannot confirm the
finding from previous studies suggesting a negative relationship between ethnic
heterogeneity and social capital. Regarding the influence of the institutional variables,
consistent with expectations, the coefficient for executive-parties institutions is negative
and significant, which suggests that more consensus types of political institutions
generate more trust. Also consistent with expectations, democratic longevity has a
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positive and significant effect on trust, indicating that a longer period of democratic rule
produces higher levels of trust. However, the effects of GDP per capita and experience
of civil war are not statistically significant.
In addition, some of individual-level variables indicate significant effects on trust.
Among demographic variables, sex, education and income have significant effects on
trust. Being female and having higher levels of income and education increase the
probability of trusting others. Political interest and institutional confidence have been
shown to have positive effects on trust, meaning that stronger interest in politics or higher
levels of institutional confidence cause more trust among people. The effect of political
ideology is negative and significant, meaning that a trend toward right reduces trust.
However, against the expectation, what is most noteworthy in this analysis is that being a
member of an ethnic majority or minority does not matter for determining levels of trust.

105

Figure 5-1
Marginal Effect of Longevity on Trust across Executive-Parties Institutions
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Model 2 includes the interaction terms between democratic longevity and the
institutional variables. Almost all variables show the same effects as model 1. What is of
particular interest here is the interaction terms included in the model. More specifically,
two of the interaction terms between institutional variables and democratic longevity
have been included to evaluate the learning effects of political institutions, executiveparties* longevity and federal-unitary*longevity. To properly interpret the interaction
terms, it is necessary to plot the marginal effect of longevity on trust across the
institutional dimensions (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). As the analyses here are
probit, we need to run simulations to obtain the marginal effect of democratic longevity
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across institutional dimensions.30 For that purpose, I simulate the effect of a one year
increase of longevity from its mean on trust. Figure 5-1 indicates the marginal effect of
democratic longevity across executive-parties institutions. Basically, this figure tells us
what happens to interpersonal trust when democracy becomes older by one year from its
mean value along the institutional dimension. Specifically, what the solid line represents
is the marginal effect of longevity when the democracy which is 19.96 years old (mean
value) turns one year older. For instance, at the left end of the institutional dimension,
the solid line indicates a positive effect on trust. More specifically, a one year increase of
democratic longevity at the left end of the institutional continuum increases the
probability of respondents trusting others by approximately 0.8%.31 Because the left end
of the institutional dimension signifies the most consensus institutions, the figure
indicates that democratic longevity has a positive effect on trust in institutions with high
degrees of power-sharing arrangements. Also, as this is the marginal effect of a one year
increase, when democracy becomes 10 years older, the positive effect also amplifies by
10 times. Accordingly, when a democratic regime of 19.96 years old sustains itself for
another 10 years under highly consensus institutions, the expected probability of trusting
others will increase by approximately 8%. This positive relationship between longevity
and trust holds across most of the executive-parties institutions. However, as the
institutions become more majoritarian, the marginal effect of democratic longevity on
trust gets smaller, and the effect of longevity becomes indistinguishable from 0 around
the institutional point of 0.5. What this suggests is that in countries with more
30

Marginal effects of democratic longevity across two institutional dimensions are computed by
simulations keeping the values of the other variables at their mean. According to convention, values of
dichotomous variables are set at their mode. Specifically, I set the sex variables as female and the
respondent’s status as the majority.
31
As the value of the marginal effect is 0.008 in the figure, the predicted probability is 0.8%.
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majoritarian institutions that are located beyond the point of 0.5 on the executive-parties
institutional continuum, we cannot detect a statistically significant effect of democratic
longevity on trust. In other words, under majoritarian institutions in the executive-parties
dimension, the age of democracy does not matter in determining levels of interpersonal
trust. Consequently, the analysis suggests the superiority of consensus institutions in the
executive-parties dimension in generating trust over the long term.

Figure 5-2
Marginal Effect of Longevity on Trust across Federal-Unitary Institutions
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The analysis of the interaction term between democratic longevity and federalunitary institutions shows a rather different picture. Figure 5-2 represents the marginal
effect of democratic longevity on trust across federal-unitary institutions. The
interpretation of this figure is similar to that of Figure 5-1. The solid line indicates the
marginal effect of longevity when the democracy becomes one year older than its mean
value. For instance, at the left end of the institutional continuum, the marginal effect of
democratic longevity is indistinguishable from 0, indicating that longevity has no effect
on trust. In other words, in federal institutions with high degrees of decentralization, the
experience with democracy does not affect trust. However, as institutions become more
unitary, we observe a statistically significant effect of longevity on trust. At the point
around -0.2 in the federal-unitary institutional continuum, the effect of longevity turns
into significant with a positive effect of 0.002, meaning that a one year increase of
democratic longevity boosts the probability of respondents trusting others by
approximately 0.2%. As a consequence, it follows that 10 years of democratic rule under
the same institutions increases the probability of trusting others by about 2%.
Furthermore, the positive effect on trust becomes even stronger as institutional context
become more unitary. At the right end of the institutional continuum, the marginal effect
of democratic longevity on trust reaches close to 0.005 or 0.5%, thus demonstrating
favorable effects of unitary institutions interacting with democratic longevity. In this
way, Figure 5-2 reveals that unitary institutions are better at generating trust than federal
institutions in the long term.
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Table 5-2 Difference in Predicted Probability on Interpersonal Trust
Variable32
Sex
Age
Education
Income
Political Interest
Institutional Confidence
Ideology
Gini

Difference in predicted probability
(one standard deviation increase in each
independent variable33)
0.011 (0.005)
0.01 (0.005)
0.03 (0.007)
0.027 (0.005)
0.03 (0.004)
0.032 (0.004)
-0.011 (0.003)
-0.087 (0.013)

Democratic Longevity (interacted
with executive-parties institutions)34
Democratic Longevity (interacted
with federal-unitary institutions)35

0.185 (0.036)
0.09 (0.026)

Note: These values are calculated by the software “Clarify.” See King et al (2000).

Having confirmed that the effect of democratic longevity varies depending on the
type of political institutions, it is necessary to compare the relative strength of the effects
with other variables. For this purpose, I have calculated differences in the predicted
probability of trusting others when the value of each independent variable increases by
one standard deviation. Table 5-2 summarizes the differences of the predicted
probability for each independent variable. For instance, when the value of political
interest increases by one standard deviation, there is a 3% increase in the predicted
probability of trusting others. Other variables should be interpreted in the same manner.
32

Only variables that are shown to have significant effects on trust in the previous analyses have been
included in this table.
33
Values of other variables are set as their mean, while those of dichotomous variables are at their modes.
As the sex variable is dichotomous, I have calculated the change in the predicted probability when the
variable moves from male to female.
34
The value of executive-parties institutions is set at -0.863 in which the marginal effect of democratic
longevity on trust becomes the largest.
35
The value of federal-unitary institutions is set at -0.061 in which the marginal effect of democratic
longevity on trust becomes the largest.
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Judging from the table, we can tell that sex, age, education, income, political interest, and
institutional confidence have positive effects of similar magnitudes. Among variables
that have a negative effect on trust, the Gini index is shown to have a strong negative
effect on interpersonal trust.
In this table, the variables of particular interest are the effects of democratic
longevity interacted with institutional dimensions. For a comparative purpose, I have set
the institutional value at the point where the effect of democratic longevity on trust
becomes the largest, and I have calculated the differences of the predicted probability
when the longevity variable increases by one standard deviation. As the table shows,
when longevity increases by one standard deviation interacted with executive-parties
institutions, the predicted probability of trusting others increases by approximately
18.5%. Compared with the effect of other variables, the effect of longevity interacted
with executive-parties institutions is especially strong. In a similar manner, in federalunitary institutions, the difference in the predicted probability is approximately 9%.
Although these effects of longevity interacted with institutional variables are the
maximum effects that can be envisaged by simulations, we can confirm strong effects of
longevity on interpersonal trust compared with those of other variables. Consequently,
we can conclude that the effects of democratic longevity interacted with institutional
variables are fairly important in predicting levels of trust.
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5-2: Probit Analyses Separating Majorities and Minorities

The main question in this study is how democratic longevity interacted with political
institutions can generate trust in the context of heterogeneous environments. It is
therefore important to directly address the question of how majorities and minorities in
society may differentially foster trust toward others. As majorities and minorities tend to
perceive interest in the political system and society differently, it is essential that we
conduct analyses taking into account people’s status in society. For this purpose, I divide
the sample into majorities and minorities and run the same models separately.36

36

Because the sample has been divided into majorities and minorities, the dummy variable representing
people’s status in society (majority) has been excluded from the models.
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Table 5-3 Probit Analysis (Majority Sample)
Dependent Variable: Trust
Regressor
Sex
Age
Education
Income
Political Interest
Institutional Confidence
Ideology
GDP per capita
Gini
ELF
Ethnic Civil War
Executive-parties Institutions
Federal-unitary Institutions
Democratic Longevity
Executive-parties*Longevity
Federal-Unitary*Longevity
Constant
N
R-squared

Model1
Coefficient (SE)
0.029 (0.015)*
0.002 (0.001)
0.031 (0.008)***
0.037 (0.007)***
0.078 (0.012)***
0.024 (0.003)***
-0.015 (0.004)***
0.000004 (0.000008)
-0.023 (0.005)***
-0.186 (0.214)
0.001 (0.02)
0.215 (0.107)*
-0.448 (0.781)
0.009 (0.003)**

-0.884 (0.213)***
66084
0.067

Model2
Coefficient (SE)
0.034 (0.014)*
0.002 (0.001)*
0.039 (0.009)***
0.033 (0.007)***
0.081 (0.012)***
0.024 (0.003)***
-0.014 (0.004)***
0.000002 (0.000008)
-0.028 (0.006)***
0.042 (0.219)
-0.011 (0.021)
0.547 (0.168)**
-2.266 (1.067)*
0.018 (0.006)**
-0.012 (0.005)*
0.059 (0.025)*
-1.076 (0.211)***
66084
0.072

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors are clustered by country.
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Table 5-4 Probit Analysis (Minority Sample)
Regressor
Sex
Age
Education
Income
Political Interest
Institutional Confidence
Ideology
GDP per capita
Gini
ELF
Ethnic Civil War
Executive-parties Institutions
Federal-unitary Institutions
Democratic Longevity
Executive-parties*Longevity
Federal-Unitary*Longevity
Constant
N
R-squared

Model1
Coefficient (SE)
0.023 (0.027)
0.0003 (0.002)
0.022 (0.014)
0.029 (0.008)***
0.108 (0.021)***
0.016 (0.005)***
-0.019 (0.006)**
0.000006 (0.000007)
-0.02 (0.005)***
-0.189 (0.216)
-0.007 (0.019)
0.103 (0.12)
-0.643 (1.035)
0.003 (0.002)

-0.682 (0.21)**
24442
0.045

Model2
Coefficient (SE)
0.027 (0.027)
0.001 (0.002)
0.031 (0.012)*
0.025 (0.007)***
0.108 (0.02)***
-0.016 (0.004)***
-0.018 (0.006)**
-0.000002 (0.000006)
-0.029 (0.004)***
-0.075 (0.131)
-0.016 (0.017)
0.551 (0.117)***
-3.26 (0.871)***
0.021 (0.006)***
-0.016 (0.004)***
0.100 (0.024)***
-0.853 (0.182)***
24442
0.055

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table 5-3 shows the result of the probit analysis among the majority sample, and Table 54 is the result among the minorities. As expected, the result of the majority sample is
very similar to that of the whole sample. In model 1 in the majority sample, the variable
of executive-parties institutions is positive and significant, showing that a trend toward
majoritarian institutions has a positive effect on trust among majorities. Also, the effect
of democratic longevity is positive and significant (Table 5-3). In the minority sample,
however, neither institutional variables nor democratic longevity show a statistically
significant result (Table 5-4). What this means is that institutional arrangements or
democratic longevity do not appear to have any effect on interpersonal trust among the
minority sample.
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Figure 5-3
Marginal Effect of Longevity on Trust across Executive-Parties Institutions
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Descriptive statistics for executive-parties institutions (majority)
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Max: 0.598
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Figure 5-4
Marginal Effect of Longevity on Trust across Executive-Parties Institutions
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Descriptive statistics for executive-parties institutions (minority)
Mean: -0.1
Standard deviation: 0.293
Min: -0.863
Max: 0.612

Regarding the interaction terms in Table 5-3 (majority) and Table 5-4 (minority),
I have computed marginal effects of democratic longevity across two institutional
dimensions to interpret these interaction terms for majorities and minorities separately.
Figure 5-3 is the figure that represents the marginal effect of democratic longevity across
executive-parties institutions among the majority sample. Specifically, the solid line
indicates the marginal effect of democratic longevity when the democracy of 20.81 years
old (the mean value of longevity among the majority sample) becomes one year older.
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The figure shows that while democratic longevity has a positive effect in consensus types
of institutions, the effect gradually becomes lower as the institutional setting becomes
more majoritarian. Then, the effect eventually disappears in highly majoritarian
institutions. In the case of the minority sample, while institutional variables and
democratic longevity without interaction term fail to show statistically significant results,
the interaction terms between them are shown to have significant effects. As in the case
of the majority sample, I have plotted the marginal effect of democratic longevity across
the executive-parities institutional dimension. Figure 5-4 is the marginal effect of
democratic longevity across executive-parties institutions among the minority sample.
Specifically, it shows the marginal effect of longevity when the democracy of 17.66 years
old (the mean value of democratic longevity among the minority sample) becomes one
year older. The shape of the marginal effect is very similar to that of the majority
sample. Democratic longevity has a positive effect on trust in consensus institutions but
the effect also disappears as the institutions become more majoritarian.
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Figure 5-5
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To compare the marginal effects of democratic longevity between the majority
and minority samples, I have drawn Figure 5-5. In the figure, the upper line represents
the marginal effect among the minority sample and the lower one represents the effect
among the majority sample. As we can see, the positive effect of democratic longevity is
stronger for minority groups under consensus institutions. However, the effect
disappears both for majorities and minorities beyond the point of 0.53 in the executiveparties dimension. In this way, although minorities are more favorably affected, Figure
5-5 suggests that democratic longevity has a more beneficial effect on trust under
consensus institutions both for majorities and minorities.
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Figure 5-6
Marginal Effect of Longevity on Trust across Federal-Unitary Institutions
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Descriptive statistics for federal-unitary institutions (majority)
Mean: -0.173
Standard deviation: 0.064
Min: -0.294
Max: -0.061
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Figure 5-7
Marginal Effect of Longevity on Trust across Federal-Unitary Institutions
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Descriptive statistics for federal-unitary institutions (minority)
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Figure 5-8
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Similarly, I show the marginal effect of democratic longevity across the federalunitary institutions in Figure 5-6 (majority) and Figure 5-7 (minority).

Among the

majority sample, the marginal effect of democratic longevity is positive under unitary
institutions, suggesting that that longevity fosters interpersonal trust in unitary institutions
for majorities. The same trend can be found among the minority sample. Figure 5-7
indicates that longevity has a positive effect under unitary institutions in the federalunitary dimension. However, unlike in the majority sample, among the minority sample,
democratic longevity has a negative effect under highly federal institutions. This result
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suggests that federal institutions that have gone through a long period of democratic rule
can hinder interpersonal trust for minorities. To compare the results between majorities
and minorities, I have drawn Figure 5-8. While longevity has a positive effect under
unitary institutions for both groups, the effect is stronger for majorities. Also, although
the effect of longevity disappears around the middle point of the institutional continuum
both for majorities and minorities, it has a negative effect under highly federal institutions
for minorities. In this way, analyses have shown that the effect of democratic longevity
varies depending on the institutional dimensions (executive-parties or federal-unitary), on
the locus of the dimensions, or on people’s status in society.

5-3: Summary

As the analyses have confirmed that political institutions and democratic longevity have
significant effects on interpersonal trust, the main findings can be summarized as follows.
First, in the executive-parties dimension, democratic longevity has a positive effect in
consensus institutions both for majorities and minorities. Among the hypotheses
suggested in the previous chapter, this result supports the power-sharing-learning
hypothesis. Because both majorities and minorities develop interpersonal trust in
consensus institutions, we can confirm that consensus institutions have a beneficial effect
of making peaceful relations in society, increasing interpersonal trust. Furthermore, what
is noteworthy in the analyses is that the positive effect of democratic longevity under
consensus institutions is significantly higher among minorities than majorities. In the
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sense that consensus institutions offer special political protections to minorities, the
results lend partial support to the direct-translation-learning hypothesis.
Second, in the federal-unitary dimension, the results have shown that democratic
longevity has a positive effect in more unitary institutions both among majorities and
minorities. Because levels of trust increase under unitary institutions both among
majorities and minorities as democracies get older, this should be interpreted as a sign
indicating the consolidation of the political system and society. Therefore, evidence in
the analyses lends support for the consolidation-learning hypothesis. Also, the results
from the analyses indicate that the positive effect of longevity under majoritarian
institutions is higher among the majority sample than the minority one. As majorities
foster more trust than minorities under unitary institutions, the analyses partially support
the direct-translation-learning hypothesis.
Third, the analyses in the federal-unitary institutions suggest that democratic
longevity has a negative effect among the minority sample in highly decentralized
institutions. This finding suggests that longevity in highly decentralized federal systems
tends to fragment the political system and society, thus hurting interpersonal trust among
minorities. Therefore, the analyses support the proposition of the fragmentation-learning
hypothesis. What is noteworthy is that the same effect is lacking among the majority
sample. One of the possible explanations of the negative relationship between high
degrees of decentralization and trust among minorities could be attributed to the
institutionalization of ethnic minorities’ identity. Some of previous studies have
suggested that federal arrangements can strengthen ethnic minorities’ identity and
therefore exacerbate ethnic tensions. There is a possibility that federal arrangements can
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lead to a separatist movement by ethnic minorities. Consequently, it follows that simply
granting high degrees of autonomy to minority groups does not necessarily foster
interpersonal trust among minorities.
To sum up, in the executive-parties dimension, the analyses support the powersharing-leaning hypothesis. This finding suggests that the underlying key dynamics in
the executive-parties institutions is how the issue of power-distribution in society. In
other words, what determines levels of social capital in this dimension is how majorities
monopolizes or share power with minorities in the political system. Regarding this point,
the analyses clearly indicate that power-sharing arrangements generate better outcome
both for majorities and minorities in a long term. In the federal-unitary dimension, the
findings support both the consolidation-learning hypothesis and the fragmentationlearning hypothesis. What these results suggest is that the key dynamics in the federalunitary dimension is the issue surrounding social cleavages. Depending on how
decentralization or constitutional restraints in the federal-unitary dimension are
formulated, the learning outcome tends to vary. Furthermore, the findings lend partial
support the direct-translation-learning hypotheses, showing that minorities develop more
trust under consensus institutions while the opposite applies under unitary institutions. In
this way, we can conclude that more beneficial political and social learning takes place in
more mature democracies. In this way, the statistical analyses have successfully
dissected a complicated relationship between democratic longevity, political institutions,
and social capital.

Copyright © Satoshi Machida 2006
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Chapter 6: Empirical Analysis 2—An Instrumental Variable
Approach

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to address a potential problem of the statistical analyses
conducted in Chapter 5. Specifically, the main concern in this chapter is whether we can
obtain correct estimates of the hypothesized relationships without the endogeneity
problem. In Chapter 5, I confirmed several hypotheses by conducting probit analyses. In
the executive-parties institutions, I have demonstrated the validity of the power-sharinglearning hypothesis. In the federal-unitary dimension, the analyses supported the
fragmentation-learning and consolidation-learning hypotheses. Also, results from the
probit analyses partially support the direct-translation hypothesis. However, there is a
possibility that these findings are significantly biased. The source of potential bias comes
from the problem of endogeneity between democratic longevity and social capital. While
it is correct to think that democratic longevity affects social capital, it is also reasonable
to assume that the existence of social capital affects democratic longevity. In this way,
due to the problem of endogeneity, it is possible that the influence of longevity on social
capital is misestimated in the analyses in Chapter 5.
In this chapter, therefore, I address the issue of endogeneity. Specifically, by
adopting instrumental variables based on theory from international relations, I correctly
estimate the effect of democratic longevity on social capital. Consequently, analyses in
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this chapter show more accurate dynamics surrounding social capital, political
institutions, and democratic longevity. I first explain the strategy to identify valid
instruments. Then, adopting these instruments, I conduct instrumental variables 2 stageleast squared analyses (IV-2SLS). Finally, I discuss the implications from the analyses
and reconsider the validity of our hypotheses.

6-1: Identifying Appropriate Instruments

In the previous chapter, we found that democratic longevity and its interactions with
political institutions have significant effects on social capital. The analyses confirmed
that the influence of democratic longevity on social capital depend on the institutional
context in which political and social learning takes place. The impacts of democratic
experience on social capital vary by the type of character of the executive-parties
institutions and the centralization of political authority within the political system.
However, the estimated relationships between democratic longevity and social
capital are potentially misleading due to endogeneity. Although democratic longevity is
considered an independent variable in previous analyses, we could also imagine the
reverse causal relationship: social capital contributes to democratic longevity. The social
capital thesis originally formulated by Putnam (1993) suggests that the causal direction
goes from social capital to democratic governance, noting that the existence of social
capital makes democracy effective and sustainable. According to Putnam’s view, it is
conceivable that high levels of social capital make democracy last longer. This concern
should be particularly relevant to the estimation for the majority respondents. Where the

126

bulk of the population exhibits high social capital, we would expect democracy to endure
more easily than when the majority group lacks trust in their fellow citizens and other
attributes of social capital. Consequently, there is a possibility that the research design in
the previous analyses suffers from the endogeneity problem, particularly in the models
estimated with the majority sample.
Estimating the relationships while ignoring the endogeneity problem can cause
biased estimates of all the coefficients in the model, particularly the key variables
regarding democratic longevity and its interaction terms. Therefore, to correctly estimate
the effect of democratic longevity on social capital, we need to re-estimate the
hypothesized relationships correcting for the potential reverse causality.
In this chapter, I address the endogeneity problem by adopting the 2 stage-least
square method with instrumental variables (IV-2SLS). To conduct the IV-2SLS method,
I need to identify valid instruments for democratic longevity that are correlated with
democratic longevity and its interactions but otherwise uncorrelated with the dependent
variable. More specifically, the instruments must have a significant partial correlation
with Democratic Longevity and Democratic Longevity*Political Institutions controlling
for all the other exogenous determinants of interpersonal trust. Furthermore, the
instruments must only relate to the dependent variable (social capital) through their
impact on the endogenous regressors (democratic longevity and its interaction terms). By
identifying these instruments, it becomes possible to estimate the model without bias.
As a strategy to identify instruments for democratic longevity and its interactions
with political institutions, I rely on theory from international relations. Specifically, I
turn to the theory of democratic peace and democracy promotion by the United States in
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the world. Liberal theories of international relations argue that regime types are
important factors predicting state behaviors in international relations. Among them, the
so-called “democratic peace” theory has emerged as one of the most popular theories in
international relations. Democratic peace theory centers on the empirical finding that no
two democracies have fought each other in the modern era (Small and Singer 1976). A
large number of studies have verified this claim especially in democratic dyads (Bremer
1992, 1993; Chan 1984; Levy 1988; Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999; Ray 1993; Russett
1993; Weede 1984, 1992).
Furthermore, other scholars have suggested that democratic regimes diffuse
across countries. For instance, Przeworski et al. (1996) argued that the presence of
democracies both regionally and globally predicts the survival of democracies better than
domestic factors such as wealth and institutions. Furthermore, Gleditsch and Ward
(2002) have developed a theory of democratic diffusion based on peaceful norms and
collective security. According to them, the presence of democracies in the region can
lead to the emergence of democracy in a different state, making a conquest by an
aggressive autocratic power highly unlikely. The main contention of the democratic
diffusion literature is that democracies form and endure with the aid of neighboring
democracies. In a similar manner, Huntington (1984) notes, “External influences may be
of decisive importance in influencing whether a society moves in a democratic or nondemocratic direction (pp. 205-206). Thus, previous studies emphasize the importance of
external forces as one of critical factors for successful democratization.
These external influences can come from diverse sources from diverse agents.
International organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, or the Amnesty
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International can exert enormous influence on regime transition in a country. Also, a
hegemon in the international system such as the United States can be an extremely
powerful actor influencing the chance of democratization. As evidence, in no small part
due to its economic and military strength, the United States has been the leader of the
liberal democracy camp in the post-WWII world (Owen 2001). As a leader of the liberal
camp, one of the goals of the United States’ foreign policy has been the spread of
democracies in the world. For instance, when the threat of the former Soviet Union had
begun to emerge following the end of World War II, George Kennan called for the
application of “counter force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political
points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy” (Kennan 1950). This
idea quickly developed into the much broader policy of containment against the Soviet
Union. The US has continued to play the same role even after the end of the Cold War.
Regarding the role of the United States, Huntington (1981) notes:

The nature of the U.S. has left it little or no choice but to stand out among
nations as the proponent of liberty and democracy. Clearly, the impact of
no other country in the world affairs has been as heavily as weighted in
favor of liberty and democracy as has that of the United States (p. 255,
cited by Zarate 1994).

As can be represented by this view, scholars have recognized the powerful role of the
United States as the strongest contender for democracy. In the international system, as
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the leader of the liberal camp, the United States has vigorously pursued its goal of
promoting democratization and also sustaining them.
This stance of spreading and protecting democracies and liberal values in the
world still dominate US foreign policy. In his speech in the 1992 presidential campaign,
then-Governor Bill Clinton called for a US foreign policy of engagement for democracy.
Since he became the president, Clinton continued to pursue the goal of democracy
promotion in the world. President Clinton’s administration referred to a variety of policy
issues such as economic security, international engagement in multilateralism and “new
global issues” (Carothers 2004, p. 23). Yet, democracy promotion is the issue that
Clinton repeatedly emphasized in his speeches on foreign policy issues. Anthony Lake,
the president’s national security advisor, noted in 1993 that “the successor to a doctrine
of containment must be a strategy of enlargement—enlargement of the world’s free
community of market democracies.”37 For the Clinton administration, democracy
promotion was a comprehensive policy framework in foreign issues. Furthermore, as can
be seen in the cases of Afghanistan or Iraq, the priority of democracy promotion in the
world has been taken over by the Bush administration, and there is no sign that the goal
would shift in the near future.
Based on these insights from the democratic peace theory and the practice of
democracy promotion by the United States, I argue that countries that have benefited
from economic and military ties with the United States should enjoy more stable
democratic regime than those that have not enjoyed its support.38 One of the good

37

Lake Anthony, 1993, “From Containment to Enlargement,” speech delivered at Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C., December 12, 1991, cited by Carothers (2004), p. 23.
38
Not all scholars agree that the democracy promotion has always been the most important goal in US
foreign policy. Reflecting the complicated natures of the international system, it is necessary for US
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examples in which the US foreign policy has had a decisive effect on the prospect of
democratization is Japan during the post-World War II period. Following the end of the
World War II, the United States had implemented a series of policies aiming at
democratizing the country. The basic motivation for this policy was to transform Japan
into a country that would belong to the liberal camp and would not threat the United
States. Based on this idea, the United States thoroughly democratized Japan. Also, the
United Sates offered a significant amount of economic aids to Japan. From 1945 to 1948,
the United States channeled $ 750 million for direct economic assistance for Japan. By
the end of the occupation period, which took place in 1952, the economic aid given to
Japan amounted to $ 2 billion.39 Even after Japan regained independence 1951, Japan and
the United States had maintained a close tie both in terms of economic and military
issues. Japan had received a tremendous amount of benefits from the close alliance with
the United States throughout the period of the Cold War. Due to the security alliance
with the United States, Japan did not have to direct its scarce resource for military
purposes, thus making it possible for Japan to achieve high levels of economic growth
during the Cold War.40 Consequently, along with high levels of economic growth, Japan
has successfully consolidated its democratic institutions. The case of West Germany
after World War II is a very similar case to Japan. In both cases, the United States
imposed a democratic political system and secured the development of the democratic
regime.

policy-makers to pay attentions to a variety of issues. Yet, the issue of democracy promotion has been
doubtlessly one of the most important policy objectives that are deeply concerned with national interest for
the United States.
39
See Dunn (1963).
40
Regarding the economic effects of the US-Japan alliance, see Okimoto (1982).
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Furthermore, evidence showing that the US foreign policy was critical in
promoting and sustaining democracy in the world is ample. Studies have shown that, as
powerful hegeomon with overwhelming economic and military power, the United States
has shaped the trajectories of regime transition in other countries. In the context of
Central America, Zarate (1994) has clearly demonstrated that the United States critically
influenced the direction and sustainability of democratic transition by relying on such
strategies as diplomatic recognition, economic sanction, election supports or military
force. Consequently, these studies suggest that countries that have been under the strong
influence of US foreign policy tend to enjoy long prosperity of their democracy. In this
way, these points suggest that the degrees of US influence can be used as good
instruments for democratic longevity. In other words, valid instruments for democratic
longevity must touch on the degrees of US commitment in promoting and securing
democracies in the world. It follows that while countries with deep ties with the United
States tend to have experienced a long period of democratic rule, countries that only have
weak ties with the Untied States has not experienced a long period of democratic rule.
To capture a country’s relationship with the United States, I have created a US
influence index. This index is composed of two components. The first one is concerned
with whether a country was a beneficiary of the Marshall Plan or not. After World War
II, to support the reconstruction of Europe, the United States provided a large amount of
financial aid to mainly Western European countries. Besides concerns for the economic
situations in Europe, motivations for the Marshall Plan clearly included the military
dimension (Milward 1984). Although the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries
were also invited to join the Marshall Plan, Stalin viewed it as a threat and did not allow
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countries under his influence to join the Marshall Plan.41 Consequently, the Marshall Plan
contributed to divide Europe into the Western and Eastern blocks led by the Untied States
and the Soviet Union respectively. Importantly, the Marshall Plan successfully helped
Western European countries to recover from the debris of war. As a short term benefit,
the Marshall Plan helped Western European countries quickly recover from the damages
from war. For instance, by 1949, French industrial and agricultural production both
exceeded the levels of 1938 for the first time. In a similar manner, other western
European countries also achieved significant economic recovery.42 Also, due to the
provision of dollar credits, the Marshall Plan significantly alleviated the problems of the
fuel shortages, food shortages, cotton shortages, and other commodity shortages.43
Furthermore, according to Judt (2005), the long-term effect of the Marshall Plan was that
the program motivated Western European countries to cooperate after World War II.
Reacting to Marshall’s invitations, European states that were mutually suspicious sat
together and tried to coordinate their responses together with other actions. Ultimately,
scholars have argued that the Marshall Plan directly and indirectly contributed to the
future process of the European integration (Milward 1984). In this way, the Marshall
Plan not only solved the harsh economic problems following the end of World War II, it
also established the foundation for the European liberal camp. As we can see in the later
development of the process of the European integration, countries that received the
benefits of the Marshall Plan have been quite successful in sustaining their democratic
regimes as well as keeping peace with neighboring democracies.

41

See Judt (2005).
See Judt (2005)
43
See Judt (2005)
42
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As the second component of the US influence index, I adopt the variable that
measures the number of foreign visits made by US presidents.44 With no doubt, US
presidents are the most powerful figures in the world, and their trips to foreign countries
always have significant impacts in the political landscape in the international arena. One
of the most important goals of foreign visits is to construct a secure relationship with the
country, and if the country is a US ally, the visit can be an important occasion to secure
the existing alliance pact. For instance, US presidents have often visited the United
Kingdom, the most important ally in Europe, and have repeatedly emphasized the
importance of the traditional Anglo-American tie. Furthermore, the importance of their
foreign visits can become more salient in times of crises. For instance, in June of 1963,
the US President John F. Kennedy visited five Western European countries to
demonstrate the unity among the American allies to the other parts of the world. His
famous speech made in Berlin eloquently shows his commitment to freedom and
democracy, thus consolidating the unity of the Western block at that time. In this way,
this measure can be theoretically used as a proxy of the democratic alliance led by the
United States. Consequently, these two components make up the US influence index.45
To examine whether the US influence index is significantly correlated with
Democratic Longevity and its interactions (Longevity*Executive-Parties Institutions and
Longevity*Federal-Unitary Institutions), I estimated separate OLS regressions for each
of these variables. The independent variables include the exogenous variables used in the
models for social capital in Chapter 5 and the US influence index in place of the
endogenous regressors. Note that the interaction terms that are endogenous are replaced

44
45

This data has been taken from the homepage of the Department of the State: (http://www.state.gov/)
To construct an index, I standardize these variables and add them up.
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by the interaction of the US influence index and the institutional component (e.g.
executive-parties and federal-unitary institutions). These regressors are the dependent
variables in the first-stage in the IV-2SLS. If appropriate, they will generate instrumental
variables used to substitute for democratic longevity and its interaction terms in the
second-stage interactions where the dependent variable will be social capital (as in
Chapter 5).

Table 6-1 First Stage OLS Analyses for Endogenous Variables (Majority Sample)
Dependent Variable: Democratic Longevity

Regressor
US Influence
US Influence*Executive-Parties
US Influence*Federal-Unitary
Executive-Parties
Federal-Unitary
GDP
Gini
ELF
Ethnic Civil War
Political Interest
Institutional Confidence
Ideology
Sex
Age
Education
Income
Constant
F-statistics of excluded elements
F p-value
Partial R-squared
N

Endogenous
Variable 1:

Endogenous
Variable 2:

Endogenous
Variable 3:

Democratic
Longevity
Coefficient (SE)
6.303 (2.72)
-3.41 (1.294)
25.642 (15.983)
-0.816 (3.972)
12.103 (38.581)
0.002 (0.0002)
0.053 (0.333)
25.167 (8.92)
-0.77 (0.704)
0.262 (0.251)
0.012 (0.106)
0.67 (0.183)
-0.765 (0.309)
-0.079 (0.031)
-0.463 (0.335)
-0.942 (0.379)
0.308 (9.774)
4.74 (3, 54)
0.0052
0.1198
66068

Longevity*
Executive-Parties
Coefficient (SE)
1.958 (1.452)
8.107 (1.293)
8.978 (8.941)
18.665 (2.453)
-24.407 (16.543)
-0.0003 (0.0001)
-0.104 (0.078)
2.001 (4.555)
-0.486 (0.226)
-0.042 (0.087)
-0.013 (0.02)
-0.071 (0.045)
0.256 (0.095)
0.031 (0.012)
0.357 (0.152)
-0.059 (0.078)
-0.668 (2.994)
30.12 (3, 54)
0.0000
0.6005
66068

Longevity*
Federal-Unitary
Coefficient (SE)
-0.372 (0.653)
0.952 (0.337)
-0.322 (4.522)
-1.011 (0.978)
22.73 (9.805)
-0.0003 (0.00006)
0.052 (0.071)
-6.46 (2.116)
0.181 (0.149)
-0.049 (0.056)
0.002 (0.023)
-0.133 (0.039)
0.125 (0.065)
0.012 (0.007)
0.038 (0.083)
0.208 (0.084)
2.196 (2.201)
7.07 (3, 54)
0.0004
0.0938
66068

Note: Standard errors are clustered by country.
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Figure 6-1
Marginal Effect of US Influence Index across Executive-Parties Institutions
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Figure 6-2
Marginal Effect of US Influence Index across Federal-Unitary Institutions
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The result among the majority sample is presented in Table 6-1. The key issue is
whether the instruments are significantly correlated with the Democratic Longevity in the
expected direction after controlling for the included exogenous variables. For that
purpose, the F-test adjusted for clustering is relevant. In the majority sample, the value of
F (3, 54) equals to 4.74, which is significant at the 0.005 level. Also, the F-scores
generated from OLS analyses on the interaction terms with political institutions also
remain significant at the level of less than 0.001 (Table 6-1). Judging from the
relationship between democratic longevity and instrument variables (the first column of
Table 6-1), the US influence index has a positive and significant effect on democratic
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longevity, showing that the United States contributes to the survival of democracies. In
addition, to interpret the interaction terms between the US influence index and
institutional variables (executive-parties and federal-unitary), I have plotted the marginal
effect of the US influence index on longevity across institutional dimensions. Figure 6-1
shows the marginal effect of US influence across the executive-parties dimension. As
expected, the figure clearly suggests that US influence has a positive and significant
effect on democratic longevity at most values of institutional dimension. In a similar
manner, Figure 6-2 represents the marginal effect of the US influence index across the
federal-unitary dimension. While the marginal effect of US influence is not significant in
federal institutions, it becomes positive and significant under more unitary institutions.
This result suggests that interaction terms between the US influence index and
institutional dimension have an expected effect on democratic longevity. In addition,
exogenous variables including instruments jointly explain other endogenous variables
(longevity*executive-parties institutions, longevity*federal-unitary institutions), with the
F-score for longevity*executive-parties institutions of 30.12 and that for
longevity*federal-unitary institutions of 7.07. Thus, these results indicate the instruments
perform reasonably well although only one of the F-scores exceeds 10, which is the
benchmark for a strong instrument.
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Table 6-2 First Stage OLS Analyses for Endogenous Variables (Minority Sample)
Dependent Variable: Democratic Longevity

Regressor
US Influence
US Influence*Executive-Parties
US Influence*Federal-Unitary
Executive-Parties
Federal-Unitary
GDP
Gini
ELF
Ethnic Civil War
Political Interest
Institutional Confidence
Ideology
Sex
Age
Education
Income
Constant
F-statistics of excluded elements
F p-value
Partial R-squared
N

Endogenous
Variable 1:

Endogenous
Variable 2:

Endogenous
Variable 3:

Democratic
Longevity
Coefficient (SE)
4.197 (4.254)
-3.226 (2.175)
-4.978 (23.16)
-3.775 (6.988)
26.274 (63.225)
0.001 (0.0005)
0.333 (0.497)
10.088 (12.165)
-0.6 (1.047)
-0.004 (0.372)
0.032 (0.057)
0.692 (0.215)
-0.523 (0.382)
-0.047 (0.03)
-0.238 (0.292)
-0.98 (0.384)
-1.231 (13.375)
4.97 (3, 48)
0.0044
0.1857
24458

Longevity*
Executive-Parties
Coefficient (SE)
0.198 (1.362)
9.449 (1.1)
4.991 (7.711)
17.506 (1.635)
-19.374 (17.166)
-0.0001 (0.0001)
-0.097 (0.068)
-2.994 (4.859)
-0.326 (0.194)
-0.107 (0.099)
-0.001 (0.011)
-0.059 (0.044)
-0.03 (0.102)
0.012 (0.005)
0.13 (0.05)
0.047 (0.059)
1.943 (2.886)
36.34 (3, 48)
0.0000
0.7352
24458

Longevity*
Federal-Unitary
Coefficient (SE)
0.595 (0.954)
0.674 (0.487)
8.222 (5.584)
0.424 (1.522)
15.349 (15.139)
-0.0002 (0.0001)
-0.023 (0.106)
-2.456 (3.198)
0.097 (0.239)
0.0007 (0.086)
-0.012 (0.014)
-0.154 (0.049)
0.128 (0.082)
0.008 (0.006)
0.023 (0.065)
0.212 (0.084)
2.804 (2.799)
3.27 (3, 48)
0.0292
0.1764
24458

Note: Standard errors are clustered by country.
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Figure 6-3
Marginal Effect of US Influence Index across Executive-Parties Institutions
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Figure 6-4
Marginal Effect of US Influence Index across Federal-Unitary Institutions
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In a similar manner, I conducted the OLS analyses for endogenous variables for
the minority sample (Table 6-2). The F-score for democratic longevity is 4.97 and it is
significant at less than the p-value of 0.01. Furthermore, to confirm the validity of
instruments for the interaction terms, I have plotted marginal effect of the US influence
index on longevity across institutional dimensions. Figure 6-3 indicates the marginal
effect of longevity in the executive-parties dimension, and Figure 6-4 shows the marginal
effect in the federal-unitary dimension. In Figure 6-3, although the US influence index
does not have any significant effect on democratic longevity, the effect of US influence is
positive throughout the institutional dimension. In a similar manner, Figure 6-4 indicates
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that the effect of the US influence index is constantly positive across the federal-unitary
dimension. These figures demonstrate that the US influence index conforms to the
theoretical expectation. F-scores for other two endogenous variables are 36.34
(longevity*executive-parties institutions, p<0.0000) and 3.27 (longevity*federal-unitary
institutions, p<0.05). Although two of the F-scores for endogenous variables fail to
achieve a level of 10, all of them are significant at less than the p-value of 0.05.
Another requirement for valid instruments is that the US influence index has to be
exogenous in the first stage equation. Put differently, the US influence index should not
directly affect social capital, or be caused by it, and the only relationship with social
capital should be through democratic longevity. The US influence index meets these
conditions in a systematic way. I am not aware of any evidence that the receipt of
Marshall Plan money or Presidential visits directly affect social capital in these countries.
Factors that influence social capital are primarily domestic, and international factors
should be recognized as marginal with this regard. Therefore, the US influence index can
be considered as exogenous in the first stage equation. Also, I have no reason to believe
that the level of social capital in a country directly influences US foreign and economic
relations with the country.
In sum, my strategy for identifying valid instruments for democratic longevity
appears valid based on the empirical analysis. Before estimating the second stage
regressions, it is important to recall that the endogeneity issue should be most relevant in
the majority sample analyses. That means that we would expect that any bias due to
endogeneity in the analysis in Chapter 5 to be most pronounced in the majority sample.
And, since we would expect a longer democratic longevity to cause an increase social
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capital, this means that the endogeneity bias should lead to an over-estimation of the
effect of democratic longevity on social capital in Chapter 5, particularly for the majority
sample. As a result, purging democratic longevity of its endogenous component should
result in a weaker relationship between longevity and social capital and we would expect
that to be more consequential to the results for the majority sample.

6-2: Instrumental Variables 2SLS Estimate

Having identified instruments for democratic longevity, I now turn to the actual analyses.
To deal with the problem of endogeneity, democratic longevity and its interaction with
institutional variables are the dependent variables in the first stage:

(First Stage)

Democratic Longevity (Y1) = β0 + β1(sex) + β2(age) + β3(education) + β4(income) +
β5(political interest) + β6(institutional confidence) + β7(ideology) + β8(GDP per
capita) + β9(Gini) + β10(ELF) + β11(Ethnic civil war) + β12(US influence index)+
β13(US influence index* executive-parties institutions) + β14(US influence
index*federal-unitary institutions + ε

Democratic Longevity*Executive-Parties Institutions (Y2) = β0 + β1(sex) + β2(age) +
β3(education) + β4(income) + β5(political interest) + β6(institutional confidence) +
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β7(ideology) + β8(GDP per capita) + β9(Gini) + β10(ELF) + β11(Ethnic civil war) +
β12(US influence index)+ β13(US influence index* executive-parties institutions) +
β14(US influence index*federal-unitary institutions) + ε

Democratic Longevity*Federal-Unitary Institutions (Y3) = β0 + β1(sex) + β2(age) +
β3(education) + β4(income) + β5(political interest) + β6(institutional confidence) +
β7(ideology) + β8(GDP per capita) + β9(Gini) + β10(ELF) + β11(Ethnic civil war) +
β12(US influence index)+ β13(US influence index* executive-parties institutions) +
β14(US influence index*federal-unitary institutions) + ε

As these endogenous variables are continuous, I have used OLS to estimate the
equations. Subsequently, I substitute the predicted values of these variables for the
endogenous regressors in the second stage analysis. More specifically, the second stage
equation is as follows:

(Second Stage)

Interpersonal Trust (Y) = β0 + β1(sex) + β2(age) + β3(education) + β4(income) +
β5(political interest) + β6(institutional confidence) + β7(ideology) + β8(GDP per
capita) + β9(Gini) + β10(ELF) + β11(Ethnic civil war) + β12(predicted US influence
index)+ β13(predicted US influence index* executive-parties institutions) +
β14(predicted US influence index*federal-unitary institutions) + ε
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The endogenous variable of the second stage, interpersonal trust, is a dichotomous
variable. Consequently, one variable estimation strategy is to substitute the instruments
for the first stage OLS to the second stage by using a probit model. This can be done by
relying on statistical software with corrected standard errors. For instance, one of the
STATA’s commands, “ivprobit”, is designed to deal with a dichotomous endogenous
variable in the second stage. However, due to the complicated nature of the model with
three endogenous variables in the first stage, the probit models fails to converge, thus
making it impossible to rely on the ivprobit method. While the method of correcting
standard error in the second stage by using non-linear two stage analyses is available, this
method requires strong specification assumptions and it is not always realistic (Achen
1986). Considering this situation, I adopt the IV-2SLS method. This method is typically
preferred even in cases in which the dependent variable is dichotomous (see Angrist and
Kreuger 2001; Wooldridge 2002). Therefore, I estimate the model by using the IV-2SLS
model (or a linear probability IV model).46

46

Leigh (2006) encounters a similar situation in which most of the models in this study do not converge
with the ivprobit command in STATA. He consequently adopts IV-2SLS model for his analyses. He
suggests that for those models that do converge, the results are qualitatively similar to the IV-2SLS model.
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Table 6-3 Instrumental Variables 2SLS Analysis (Majority Sample)
Dependent Variable: Trust
Regressor
Coefficient (SE)
Sex
0.0072 (0.0057)
Age
0.0003 (0.0004)
Education
0.0105 (0.0050)*
Income
0.0043 (0.0083)
Political Interest
0.0259 (0.0046)***
Institutional Confidence
0.0089 (0.0012)***
Ideology
-0.0004 (0.0037)
GDP per capita
0.00001 (0.000008)
Gini
-0.0098 (0.0064)
ELF
0.2100 (0.3039)
Ethnic Civil War
-0.0081 (0.0101)
Executive-parties Institutions
0.2268 (0.2195)
Federal-unitary Institutions
-1.2959 (2.1785)
Democratic Longevity
0.0051 (0.0095)
Executive-parties*Longevity
-0.0057 (0.0065)
Federal-Unitary*Longevity
0.0468 (0.0746)
Constant
0.0350 (0.2082)
N
66068
Centered R-squared
0.0564
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors are clustered by country.
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Table 6-4 Instrumental Variable 2SLS (Minority Sample)
Dependent Variable: Trust
Regressor
Coefficient (SE)
Sex
0.0076 (0.008)
Age
0.0002 (0.0005)
Education
0.0098 (0.0046)*
Income
0.0052 (0.0029)
Political Interest
0.0340 (0.0082)***
Institutional Confidence
0.0048 (0.0013)***
Ideology
-0.0037 (0.002)
GDP per capita
0.000004 (0.000004)
Gini
-0.0073 (0.002)
ELF
-0.0309 (0.0456)
Ethnic Civil War
-0.0059 (0.0055)
Executive-parties Institutions
0.1619 (0.0468)**
Federal-unitary Institutions
-1.0387 (0.4259)*
Democratic Longevity
0.0053 (0.0026)*
Executive-parties*Longevity
-0.0057 (0.0016)**
Federal-Unitary*Longevity
0.03610 (0.0137)**
Constant
0.1522 (0.0834)
N
24458
Centered R-squared
0.0561
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors are clustered by country.
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Figure 6-5
Marginal Effect of Longevity on Trust across Executive-Parties Institutions
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I estimated the IV-2SLS model on the majority sample and the minority sample
separately. Table 6-3 shows the result for the majority sample, and Table 6-4 displays
the result for the minority sample. As the instrumental variables approach has been
adopted to correctly estimate the exogenous effect of democratic longevity on trust, the
variables of interest are the interaction terms between longevity and institutional
variables. As in the probit analyses in Chapter 5, to better interpret the interaction terms,
I plotted the marginal effect of democratic longevity across institutional dimensions.
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Figure 6-5 represents the marginal effect of longevity across executive-parties institutions
for majorities. As can be seen in Figure 6-5, democratic longevity does not have any
statistically significant effect on trust among the majority sample. This result is
consistent with the theoretical expectation. Due to their dominant status in society, I
suspect that trust among the majority plays more important roles for determining the
sustainability of democracies than trust among members of the minority. Therefore, the
problem of overestimation due to endogeneity should be more serious among the
majority sample. Therefore, after the longevity is purged of the endogenous component,
we would consequently observe a weaker relationship between longevity and social
capital. Hence, the result is the non-significant effect of longevity on trust among the
majorities.

Figure 6-6
Marginal Effect of Longevity on Trust across Executive-Parties Institutions
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However, among the minority sample, the result indicates that longevity under
consensus institutions has a positive and significant effect on trust (Figure 6-6), which is
consistent with the probit analyses in Chapter 5. According to Figure 6-6, the positive
effect of longevity on trust becomes indistinguishable from 0 around the point of 0 on the
institutional continuum. Put differently, countries that are located on the left side of 0 on
the continuum are more likely to see growing levels of trust as democracies become
older. For instance, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, and India fall within the
range of countries that have consensus institutions. What is especially noteworthy about
these countries is that they maintain relatively high levels of interpersonal trust despite
their ethnic heterogeneities. Also, it is not a coincidence that these countries are well
known for their power-sharing arrangements and the relative stability of their democratic
regimes. About 44% of the respondents of all the minority sample fall within the range
of institutional continuum over which longevity is shown to have a positive and
significant effect on trust.47 Therefore, the significant result among the minority sample
can be applied to relatively a wide range of countries.

47

The number of minority respondents that belong to the countries whose institutions are less than 0 in the
executive-parties institutional continuum is 10802.
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Figure 6-7
Marginal Effect of Longevity on Trust across Federal-Unitary Institutions
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Figure 6-8
Marginal Effect of Longevity on Trust across Federal-Unitary Institutions
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In a similar manner, I have plotted the marginal effect of democratic longevity
across the federal-unitary dimension. The plot for the majority sample is Figure 6-7. As
the figure shows, there is no statistically significant effect on trust among the majority
sample in the federal-unitary dimension. As in the analysis in the executive-parties
dimension, this result is also consistent with the theoretical expectation. Hence, the
finding that longevity after purged of its endogenous component has no effect on trust
seems to hold regardless of institutional dimension. On the other hand, among the
minority sample, the result shows that longevity has a significant effect (Figure 6-8).
Consistent with the analysis in Chapter 5, the figure indicates that longevity under highly
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federal institutions reduces trust among minorities. In Figure 6-8, longevity shows a
negative effect at points of lower than -0.25 on the federal-unitary institutional
dimension. Countries that fall in this range are following six countries: United States,
Australia, Canada, India, Mexico, and South Africa. The sample from these 6 counties
makes up about12% of the whole sample, and these countries are well known for their
wide ranges of federal arrangements.48 Considering that the area where longevity has a
negative effect is confined to the very end of the continuum, we can tell that countries
with highly decentralized political institutions are the key for driving the negative effect
of longevity on interpersonal trust. However, while the finding that longevity in highly
decentralized institutions reduces trust is consistent with the analyses in Chapter 5, we
have not been able to observe any statistically significant effect of longevity under
unitary institutions in the IV-2SLS analyses. After we have purged the endogenous
component of the longevity in the minority sample, only the negative effect of longevity
in highly decentralized institutions remains.

6-3: Summary

In this chapter, to address the problem of endogeneity, I adopted an instrumental variable
solution. I have identified instruments for democratic longevity relying on theories from
international relations about how the relationship with the United States influences the
endurance of democracies. The results of the analyses indicate that endogeneity bias

48

The number of minority respondents from these 6 countries is 2981.
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leads to some significant problems in the statistical inference in Chapter 5. Specifically,
although I have found that democratic longevity has the hypothesized effects on social
capital, the effects only apply for the minority sample. Once democratic longevity is
purged of its endogenous component, the effect of longevity on social capital reduces to
zero for citizens that are in the majority status.
This change in results is consistent with how we would expect endogeneity to
matter. Specifically, since an increase in democratic longevity boosts levels of social
capital, the effect of democratic longevity has been overestimated. Because social capital
among majorities is more important in determining the sustainability of democracies than
that among minorities, the bias tends to be more serious in the analyses of the majority
sample. As a consequence, when the endogeneity problem is addressed by the
instrumental variables approach, the effect of longevity among the majority sample
disappears. On the other hand, since the endogeneity bias is thought to be small among
the minority sample, some of the effect of longevity is still significant in the analyses of
minorities even after the endogeneity bias is corrected. Therefore, the IV-2SLS that I
have conducted in this chapter has led to a bigger correction among the majority sample
than among the minority sample. This outcome has consequently confirmed the validity
and soundness of the IV-2SLS approach conducted in this chapter.
The IV-2SLS approach has confirmed several hypotheses suggested in Chapter 3
(Table 3-1). As testable hypotheses regarding the issue of power-distribution in society, I
have presented three hypotheses: the direct-translation-learning hypothesis, the powersharing-learning hypothesis, and the dominant-learning hypothesis. Also, as hypotheses
regarding the social cleavage issues, I have suggested the fragmentation-learning
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hypothesis and the consolidation-learning hypothesis. Among these hypotheses, in the
executive-parties institutions, the results of the IV-2SLS approach have confirmed the
direct-translation-learning hypothesis and the power-sharing-learning hypotheses.
Although the effect is confined to the minority sample, analyses indicate that longevity
has a positive effect on trust under consensus institutions. The results relying on the
instrumental variables have firmly confirmed that a long period of democratic rule under
consensus institutions has a beneficial effect on trust among minorities. In the federalunitary dimension, the results indicate that longevity has a negative effect on trust in
highly decentralized institutions. As we observe that levels of trust among minorities
tend to decrease in highly decentralized systems, we can interpret this finding as support
for the fragmentation-learning hypothesis. These results suggest that high degrees of
decentralization cause the fragmentation of the political system and society and
consequently reduce levels of interpersonal trust among minorities.
In this way, the IV-2SLS approach has clarified our understanding of the
dynamics surrounding democratic longevity, political institutions, and social capital. The
IV-2SLS approach has purged the endogenous component of the longevity and revealed
that the effect of longevity on trust is confined only to the minority sample. Put
differently, the link connecting democratic longevity and social capital can be found only
in the minority sample. To understand the process through which minorities are
integrated into the political system and society, this is an important finding. In the
following chapter, I will further explore the causal mechanism through minorities
develop or lose trust in heterogeneous environments.

Copyright © Satoshi Machida 2006
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Chapter 7: Case Studies

Introduction

In previous chapters, I have examined the relationship between social capital, political
institutions, and democratic longevity through statistical analyses. The statistical
analyses have revealed that democratic longevity, interacted with political institutions,
does systematically influence levels of social capital. Furthermore, by adopting the
method of IV-2SLS, I have confirmed that this relationship still holds after we address
the potential problem of endogeneity between social capital and democratic longevity.
Thus, the statistical analyses have clearly established the causal relationship between
social capital, democratic longevity, and political institutions.
However, while statistical analyses, or large-N studies, are effective in
establishing a causal relationship, they are not adept at looking into the actual causal
mechanism. Although we may be able to know that some variables have a certain
relationship in a statistically significantly way, we still do not know exactly through what
process the independent variable affects the dependent variable. In this chapter, therefore,
I address the shortcoming of large-N studies. The main purpose of this chapter is to
demonstrate that suggested relationships between these variables hold in concrete
political settings. By examining how democratic longevity affects social capital across
institutional dimensions in concrete settings, I further verify the hypotheses. As case
studies allow us to follow transitions of political events with details regarding the causal
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mechanism, my case studies in the Baltic countries, the Canadian province of Quebec,
and Malaysia give us a better understanding of how these variables should be related to
each other. First, I explain the advantages of case studies compared with statistical
analyses. Second, in the analyses of executive-parties institutions, I look at the effects of
democratic longevity in the cases of the Baltic countries. Third, to explore the effect of
longevity in the federal-unitary institutions, I turn to the case of the Quebec separatist
movement in Canada. Fourth, I examine more complicated power-sharing arrangements
in the case of Malaysia. In the case of Malaysia, I analyze why institutions that intensify
inequality and ethnic identity would not work to build social capital in society. Finally,
by briefly summarizing the findings from these case studies, I discuss their implications
for theories and hypotheses.

7-1: Conducting Case Studies

The statistical analyses conducted in previous chapters have revealed fairly robust
relationships between political institutions, democratic longevity, and social capital
among the minority population. Specifically, in the executive-parties dimension,
democratic longevity under consensus institutions has a positive effect on trust. Hence,
the results support either the direct-translation-learning hypothesis or the power-sharinglearning hypothesis. In the federal-unitary dimension, however, longevity has a negative
effect in highly decentralized institutions. Hence, the analyses lend support to the
fragmentation-learning hypothesis. In addition, what is especially noteworthy in the
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statistical analyses is that these relationships hold only among the minority sample. We
do not find a statistically significant effect of longevity on trust among the majority
sample.
Although the IV-2SLS analyses demonstrated that these effects are absent among
majority groups, these interaction effects between longevity and political institutions on
social capital are substantively important nevertheless. There is a danger that democratic
institutions could cease to function properly when a peaceful relationship among ethnic
groups cannot be maintained. Persistent distrust among minority groups leads to social
turmoil, and the social tensions make it difficult for citizens to develop fundamental
democratic values, such as minority protection, civil liberties, or political tolerance.
Social capital among minority groups can have serious consequences for all the citizens
in the political system and society. Hence, although minorities may constitute only a
small portion of the whole population, it is still important for the minority groups to
demonstrate certain levels of trust toward other constituent members in society.
Therefore, building social capital among minority groups is one of the important tasks
that democracies have to achieve.
A case study method is highly effective in analyzing how political institutions and
democratic longevity can affect social capital among minority groups. Depending on the
goal of a study, case studies can be more useful than statistical analyses in drawing causal
inference. Advantages of case studies over statistical analyses are mainly twofold. The
first advantage is that case studies make it possible for us to look into the detailed causal
mechanism through which trust is generated. Although statistical analyses, or large-N
studies, may indicate that certain variables have statistically significant effects, they
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would not tell us how these variables are related to one another in a concrete political
setting. As a consequence, statistical analyses fail to show us the detailed causal
mechanism. Considering the shortcoming of large-N studies, therefore, I intend to show
the detailed process through which political institutions and democratic longevity affect
minorities’ trust.
The second advantage of case studies is that they allow us to analyze how
political and social phenomena go through changes over a certain period. While
statistical analyses are useful in drawing generalization, it is not the best method to
follow the transitions of a series of events. This is particularly true of the statistical
analyses in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, where the data adopted in the analyses were crosssectional. The cross-sectional data are useful in answering the counterfactual question
such as “how would social capital in country A change if it had experienced a different
length of democratic rule and different political institutions?” through comparisons with
other countries that differ on these dimensions. But we cannot compare country A with
itself in a different period or with different institutions. Therefore, to complement the
weakness of statistical analyses, I adopt the case study strategy. An in-depth examination
of specific cases helps us to trace the dynamics of how political institutions and
democratic longevity matter for social capital in a way that the statistical analyses would
not be able to analyze. In this way, the case study approach enjoys several advantages
over large-N statistical analyses to uncover the causal mechanism between social capital,
democratic longevity, and political institutions.
Conducting case studies, one of the most critical issues is how we can measure
the variable of our interest. Although we had access to survey studies in statistical
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analyses, we cannot rely on the same measure in conducting case studies. Instead, we
need to focus on a different indicator as a measure of social capital. In this study, I
choose to measure levels of social capital by tapping citizens’ actions, assuming that
citizens’ political actions are a reflection of their attitudes. The assumption that citizens’
attitudes determine their actions is not new. Actually, most studies in the field of
comparative political behavior are conducted based on the same assumption.
Discovering what citizens’ attitudes is not the only motivation for conducting
comparative studies. Rather, the reason why these studies are valuable is because they
subsequently provide insights on how citizens behave politically. For instance, Inglehart
(1997) contends that those who are called postmaterialists tend to participate in more
unconventional forms of political participation. In a similar manner, Norris (2002)
explores the sources of unconventional political actions focusing on citizens’ attitudes in
each country. Other studies investigating citizens’ attitudinal variables emphasize their
implications for citizens’ actual behavior (see Inglehart 2003; Norris 1999; Inglehart and
Norris 2003; Putnam 1995). These studies presume that there is an attitudinal dimension
underlying certain behavior. Those who agree with democratic values are more likely to
take actions supportive of a democratic regime; on the contrary, those who do not care
about democratic values are less likely to engage in actions conducive to democratic
governance. Considering these points, it is reasonable to adopt citizens’ actions as an
indicator of their attitudes. Observing actual behavior is an effective means to measure
social capital, because citizens’ behavior directly represents their attitudinal dimension in
the political system and society. Consequently, case studies in this study examine
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citizens’ behavior, assuming that their actions are the reflection of social capital in the
society.
Having specified that we follow citizens’ political actions, another challenge in
the measurement issue in my case studies is to determine what kinds of political actions
are relevant for measuring social capital. According to Putnam (1993) social capital
refers to trust, norms, and social networks that can facilitate cooperation in society.
Certainly, to measure the core concept of social capital, survey studies are one of the
most effective means as they can capture citizens’ attitudes. However, in case studies, I
look for different evidence. Specifically, I focus on actions that represent levels of social
capital. For instance, political protest by minority groups can clearly reflect racial
relations in society. Some scholars have recognized political protest as a political tool
used by those who are disenfranchised from the political system (Gurr 1970). Other
scholars have noted that for protest to have a substantial effect on public policy, it must
disrupt the normal politics (Piven and Cloward 1968; McAdam 1983). Especially, when
protest activities are directed at ethnic issues, ethnic relations can be severely disrupted.
In this way, citizens’ actions are clear indicators of their attitudes in society. Therefore,
evidence in case studies complements the findings from the statistical analyses.
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7-2: Case Study 1—Baltic Countries

7-2-1: Case Selection

The main purpose of the first case studies is to analyze the relationships between political
institutions, democratic longevity, and social capital in the executive-parties institutional
dimension. In concrete political settings, I test the validity of hypotheses that have been
confirmed in the statistical analyses. Specifically, I examine how the direct-translationlearning hypothesis or the power-sharing-learning hypothesis fare well in specific
contexts in which minorities have to struggle for their own survival in heterogeneous
environments. If the statistical analyses are correct, we should observe an increase of
social capital among minorities under consensus institutions along with a certain period
of democratic rule. On the other hand, we should not be able to see any significant effect
of democratic rule on social capital under majoritarian institutions.
To test these theories and hypotheses, I have selected the post-independence
Baltic countries: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. There are several reasons why I have
chosen these Baltic countries as the objects of the first case studies. First, we observe
significant cross-national variations in the executive-parties institutions, and these
variations make a meaningful comparison possible. Among the Baltic countries,
differences in political institutions are the most acute in their citizenship rules toward
Russian minorities. While Estonia and Latvia adopted more exclusive citizenship rules
toward Russians, Lithuania decided to adopt the citizenship rules with more inclusive
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natures. As a consequence, while Russians in Estonia and Latvia were excluded from the
decision-making system, those in Lithuania were generally allowed to participate in the
political system as legitimate citizens. Thus, because citizenship rules in the Baltic
countries clearly featured the characteristics of the political institutions in each country, I
adopt citizenship rules as a proxy of the political institutions. Consequently, variations in
citizenship policies allow us to analyze how democratic longevity leads to different
consequences under different political settings.
Second, the Baltic countries provide optimal quasi-experimental settings to test
the theories and hypotheses. Specifically, historical experiences that the Baltic countries
have shared make it possible for us to effectively operationalize key variables, while
controlling for potentially confounding factors. For instance, all of the Baltic countries
experienced a brief period of sovereignty after World War I, and all of them possessed
well consolidated national identities. They also shared the experiences of being
incorporated and controlled by the Soviet Union during the period of 1944 and 1991.
Furthermore, declaring their independence between the period of1990 and 1991, all of the
Baltic countries simultaneously began to democratize their political institutions.
Therefore, we can reasonably assume that the values of democratic longevity and other
confounding factors are constant across the Baltic countries. The only significant
difference we can observe is the difference in their political institutions, citizenship rules.
As a consequence, the similarity in their historical experiences among the Baltic
countries allows us to effectively test theories and hypotheses of this study.
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Third, related to the second point, all of the Baltic countries are unitary states with
basically no provisions of federal arrangements.49 Although we need to consider effects
of two different institutional dimensions, executive-parties and federal-unitary
institutions, it is not an easy task to examine these two dimensions in the same political
setting. Therefore, in this section, I focus on the effects of executive-parties institutions.
As institutional arrangements in the federal-unitary dimension are almost identical among
the Baltic countries, we can attribute the different outcomes in the dependent variable,
which is social capital, to the difference in the executive-parties institutions. In other
words, the fact that the all Baltic countries are the unitary states effectively controls for a
confounding factor of federal institutions.
Finally, variations in the independent variable among the Baltic countries allow us
to test the suggested hypotheses. Although the value in democratic longevity is constant
among the Baltic countries, values in institutional variables indicate some variances.
Regarding the stance toward Russian minorities, Estonia and Latvia adopted rather
majoritarian approaches with an objective of excluding them. To the contrary, Lithuania
has implemented a more consensus approach toward Russian minorities. Therefore, as
the course of a democratic rule, the variances in institutional variables should generate
different outcomes in the dependent variable among the three countries. In this way,
considering these points, I have adopted the Baltic countries as objects of case studies.
Evidence that I should be looking for in these case studies is whether or not
Russian minorities in the Baltic countries have developed interpersonal trust as they
experience a longer period of democratic rule. The findings from the statistical analyses
suggest that if minorities are placed under consensus institutions, levels of their trust tend
49

The Polity III data categorizes Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as unitary states.
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to be higher as democratic rule prolongs. Hence, we would expect that social capital
among Russian minorities in Lithuania will increase as years of democratic rule
accumulate. On the other hand, the statistical analyses indicate that minorities would not
develop interpersonal trust under majoritarian institutions which are dominated by
majorities. Therefore, we would not expect that the experience of democracy fosters trust
among the Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia. Instead, because executive-parties
institutions in Estonia and Latvia are dominated by majorities, we should observe actions
from Russian minorities expressing their distrust toward the political system and their
fellow citizens. Of course, it is hardly surprising that one would see social capital—and
interpersonal trust in particular—fail to develop among minorities who are denied
fundamental rights to participate in the political system. Yet, the question of whether
social capital would develop when such rights are bestowed and protected is far from
clear. In previous chapters, I have described and tested theories that state it should under
specific circumstances. The comparison of these three cases allows us to test the
relationship between political institutions, democratic longevity, and social capital while
controlling for other confounding factors.
As an indicator of social capital, I focus on protest activities from Russian
minorities. In this study, I measure levels of social capital by tapping citizens’ protest
actions. Especially, the kind of actions I am interested in is protest activities launched by
Russian minorities that address ethnic or cultural issues. When minorities turn to
unconventional forms of political actions such as protest, they often suffer from
significant levels of grievance (Gurr 1970). To claim their rights in the political system
in which they are disadvantages, minorities tend to rely on political protest. Therefore,
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assuming that minorities’ actions reflect their attitudes in society, I investigate minorities’
protest movements as a measure of social capital.

7-2-2: Background—History of the Soviet Control and the
Independence of the Baltic Countries

The Baltic countries share a number of historical experiences. At the end of the 18th
century, the Baltic countries were under the harsh rule of the Russian czar. Following the
Russian revolution, these three countries declared and gained independence in 1918.
However, their independence was short-lived. In 1940, as a result of the MolotovRibbentrop Pact, the Soviet troops invaded the Baltic countries. During this period,
thousands of people were arrested and sent to the Siberian labor camp. In 1941, Hitler’s
Nazi intruded the Baltic countries. During the Nazi occupation, thousands of Jews
perished. Once the Russians came back in 1944, thousands more Balts fled to the West
as refugees.
The Soviet Union came back to the Baltic countries in 1944 driving the Germans
out of the territories. During the Soviet era following the end of World War II, the Baltic
countries functioned as constituent Soviet Socialist Republics. Although Moscow
maintained ultimate power, each republic possessed its own legislative body, the local
Supreme Soviet. These legislative bodies were responsible for administrating local
issues. Voters for the local Soviet were citizens of each republic regardless of their
ethnicity. Power in each republic was yield by the local branch of the Communist Party
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(CP). However, to make sure that the CP in each republic would remain loyal to the
Soviet Union, Moscow delegated communist officials to serve the most important
positions in the republics.50
The Soviet rule imposed significant demographic changes on the Baltic countries.
A large number of Russians immigrated into the Baltic regions of the Soviet empire and
consequently changed the ratio of ethnic Balts to ethnic Russians. Especially, Estonia
and Latvia suffered from the drastic demographic changes. By the end of the 1980s, the
Estonians and Latvians barely maintained a majority status in their respective states, and
the percentage of the Russian population exceeded 30%.51 For many Russians, Estonia
and Latvia were favored sites for settlements. Russians were brought to these republics
to aid in postwar industrialization and construction, and many of them chose to stay there.
Unlike Estonia and Latvia, however, the percentage of the Russian population had never
exceeded 10% in Lithuania. Levels of industrialization in Lithuania were still low, and
Lithuania was known to be traditionally less hospitable toward Russian settlers.52
Although Moscow had maintained a firm grip on the Baltic countries since their
annexation to the Soviet Union, the policy of perestroika introduced by Michael
Gorbachev drastically changed the political landscape in the Baltic countries. Political
opening initiated by perestroika allowed the Baltic countries to enjoy certain levels of
political freedom. As a consequence, the Balts had begun to explicitly condemn forceful
annexation by the Soviet Union. Furthermore, a series of events that happened in the
50

See Petersen (2002). Whenever possible, Moscow tried to delegates “Russified” ethnic Balts who had
grown up in the Soviet Union (Petersen 2002). Although they were not accepted by local residents, those
Russified Balts assumed enormous political power especially in Estonia and Latvia (Taagepera 1993;
Dreifelds 1977). In the case of Lithuania, however, ethnic Lithuanians were better represented in the CP
(Petersen 2002).
51
These figures are taken from Harris (1993).
52
See Petersen (2002).
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Soviet Union pushed the Baltic countries toward their independence. Following the
disintegration of the Soviet Union after the failed coup by Communist hard-liners in
August 1991, a democratic force in domestic politics and the international community
quickly mobilized for the independence of the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania. Consequently, the Soviet Union recognized their independence in September
1991.
Because the Baltic countries experienced a short period of sovereignty following
World War I, these countries considered the task ahead of them as nation-restoration.
Asserting their memory of independent states, they did not even consider themselves as
“Soviet-successor” states at all (Koisto 1996). The disintegration of the Soviet Union
meant for them the restoring their own countries. As a consequence, on their
independence, symbols of statehood dating from the interwar period—flags, anthems,
insignia—were quickly reinstitutionalized. Thus, having regained their independence,
the Baltic countries were to launch their efforts of nation-restoration.
However, the task of nation-restoring did not come easily for them. For those
countries in Eastern Europe going through the process of transition from authoritarian
rule to democracies, three different projects were required: state-building, nationbuilding, and the development of autonomous civil spheres (Arter 1995; Linz and Stapan
1996). To reconstruct their nation-states, the Baltic countries had to go through these
difficult tasks simultaneously. One of the major difficulties that the Baltic countries
faced in the task of nation-restoration was the existence of ethnic minorities in each state.
Due to the massive influx of Russian settlers during the Soviet era, the Baltic countries
include a significant number of Russians within their populations. The presence of a
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formerly dominant ethnic minority can be a potential source of social conflict for all the
newly independent states from the Soviet Union. Certainly, compared with the problems
of mass exodus of ethnic Russians in Muslim republics or the violent crash in TransDniester, the situations in Baltic countries seemed to be relatively peaceful. However,
the issue of Russian minorities was one of the most difficult issues that the Baltic
countries had to solve in stabilizing their democratic regimes. This issue has been always
a focus of heated debates within each Baltic state. Furthermore, besides controversies at
the domestic level, political negotiations with the Russian federation have been strained
at times due to the sensitivity of this issue.53 In this way, following their independence,
the Baltic countries were in a position to determine their stances toward Russian
minorities. Specifically, the issue of citizenship had emerged as one of the most critical
issues to deal with. As this issue could determine the overall direction of political
landscapes in the Baltic countries, a number of actors showed a significant amount of
concerns with this issue.

7-2-3: Citizenship Rules—A Fundamental Component of
Executive-Parties Institutions

In reconstructing their nation-states, one of the most immediate issues that the Baltic
countries had to address was the issue of citizenship. Put differently, they had to decide
who would constitute the legitimate citizens in restored states. In this context, three
53
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questions emerged. Who could become citizens in the newly independent Baltic
countries? What conditions would people have to meet to become citizens? What would
happen to those who were excluded from the process? (Melvin 2000, p. 130). These
questions were critical for those ethnic minorities who resided in the Baltic countries all
their lives. Furthermore, depending on the country, minorities were even considered as
foreigners with their citizenship stripped. While Lithuania adopted citizenship laws with
more inclusive natures, Estonia and Latvia decided to exclude Russian minorities with
more exclusive citizenship policies. Consequently, Russian minorities in Estonia and
Latvia faced a number of difficulties in newly independent states.
For any nation-state, the issue of citizenship is extremely important because the
distinction between citizens and non-citizens fundamentally determines who are eligible
for receiving the benefits of political and social rights. Janoski (1998) defines citizenship
in a following manner: “Citizenship is passive and active membership of individuals in a
nation-state with certain universalistic rights and obligations at a specified level of
equality” (p. 9). Starting from this definition, he summarizes citizenship in the following
four points. The first aspect of citizenship is to determine membership in a nation-state.
Internally, citizenship establishes “personhood” within a realm of defined geographical
territory. In a territorial arena, citizens are given certain rights. Furthermore, the external
approach is concerned with rights for those who reside outside of the territorial unit.
Second, citizenship entails active and passive rights and obligations. While passive rights
are mainly concerned with citizens’ existence, active rights include present and future
capacities to influence decision-making (see Thompson 1970). Third, citizenship rights
are universalistic rights which are enacted into law and exercised for all citizens;
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therefore, they are not informal, unenacted or particularistic rights. According to this
definition, citizenship rights have to be equally enacted by the state for all citizens.
Fourth, citizenship refers to a statement of equality, in which rights and obligations are
balanced within certain limits. Equality among citizens may not always complete, but it
is often guaranteed at a procedural level. Yet, to secure the equality, citizens need to
fulfill their obligations in the forms of payment or service. As these four points show,
citizenship is a critical factor defining scope of rights that citizens can enjoy within a
territorial boundary.54 Consequently, non-citizens are in many cases deprived of various
rights. They may be denied the rights to run for office, form political parties, or even to
vote. Therefore, if an ethnic group is excluded from the eligibility for citizenship, the
status of the group in the political system tends to be extremely unstable. Obviously, the
political rights associated with citizenship provide one with opportunities to participate in
the political system, to make legitimate demands on the government institutions, and to
hold politicians accountable (Carens 1989).55
Political inequalities between citizens and non-citizens are especially acute in
Estonia and Latvia. In Estonia, a law passed in the Estonian Supreme Council states that
only citizens would be able to vote in national elections. The attempt to amend the law to
open the franchise to non-citizens permanent residents was defeated.56 What this meant
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was that non-citizens were suddenly stripped of their right to vote in March 1990.
Consequently, the citizenship rules in Estonia had a significant impact on the 1992
presidential policy (Barrington 1995). Similarly, excluding non-citizens form the
electoral process had a severe impact on the outcome of the first national election since
independence (Linz and Stepan 1996). As further restrictions on political rights, noncitizens in Estonia are not allowed to hold a national or local political office or join
political parties (Bungs, Girnius and Kionka 1992, p. 39). As a consequence, although
non-citizens are allowed to vote in local elections, their choices are limited. Those
political restrictions imposed on Russian minorities make it difficult for Russian
candidates to form their party and win seats in the legislature. Therefore, it is unlikely
that claims made by non-citizens would affect public policies in the legislature.
In the case of Latvia, restrictions for non-citizens are even harsher. Non-citizens
are not allowed to vote even in local elections. Non-citizens are prohibited from holding
state office, from serving as judges, and from working for diplomatic and consular
service. In addition, non-citizens face severe restriction in serving police force or
security related positions. Various social rights are also restricted for non-citizens. For
instance, they are not allowed to own lands and other natural resources. Although these
issues have been addressed in a series of subsequent draft laws, discriminatory policies
against non-citizens still remain (Barrington 1995). Political and social rights for noncitizens are severely limited.
Certainly, it is true that citizens and non-citizens are treated differently in any
country. However, what is particularly critical in the context of the Baltic countries is
that even Russians who resided in the states all their lives were suddenly stripped off
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their political and social rights. Consequently, Russian minorities were excluded from
the political system, and in some cases, they were denied their rights to live in the country
where they were born. Considering these points, the citizenship issue in the Baltic
countries is concerned with one of the most fundamental principles of liberal democracy
in the most acute sense: guarantee and protection of minority rights. Obviously, just
taking away citizenship without any safety measures means the violation on minorities’
rights. On the other hand, granting citizenship to minority groups means sharing some
portion of power in the political system. Therefore, the citizenship issue in the Baltic
countries has a strong and direct impact on the nature of political institutions.
Specifically, the citizenship issues can determine whether the political institutions adopt
majoritarian or consensus characteristics.
While many studies adopt electoral systems as a variable representing the nature
of political system, electoral rules are not certainly the only factor determining the nature
of a political system. According to Lijphart (1984, 1999), effects of constitutional choice
have to be judged by a broader political framework. More specifically, as elements of
democracies that distinguish political systems in the executive-parties dimension, he
raises another four points besides electoral systems: party systems, cabinet composition,
executive-legislative relations, and interest group pluralism. These factors obviously
determine the exclusive or inclusive nature of a political system. Besides these
institutional factors, however, citizenship rules sometimes can be more crucial on the
conceptual definition of majoritarian/consensus institutions. For instance, PR electoral
systems cannot be consensus institutions if only one group in a segmented society can
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vote. Acting on the fundamental aspect of a political system, citizenship rules can
significantly curtain the effect of electoral rules.

Figure 7-1
Executive-Parties Institutions and Interpersonal Trust for
Minority Groups
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Figure 7-1 indicates the relationship between executive-parties institutions and
interpersonal trust among the minority sample. Against our expectation, Lithuania is
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located at the right end of the institutional continuum, meaning that its political
institutions are more majoritarian. On the other hand, Estonia and Latvia show more
consensus features of their political institutions, located toward more left on the
continuum. What is noteworthy in this figure is that minority respondents in Estonia and
Latvia exhibit less interpersonal trust than we would expect from the statistical model,
whereas minorities in Lithuania show higher levels of trust. Why do we observe this
discrepancy? One potential reason for this discrepancy can be attributed to measurement
errors in independent variables—consensus or majoritarian institutions. While political
institutions in Estonia and Latvia appear to be more consensus types at a glance, it is
possible that exclusive citizenship rules in these countries significantly restrict the entry
of minorities into the decision making systems. Therefore, it would make more sense to
move these two countries toward more right on the institutional continuum, thus
narrowing the gap between the theoretical prediction and actual levels of trust.
Regarding Lithuania, the opposite can be done. Because Lithuania adopts fairly inclusive
citizenship rules, its political institutions should possess more consensus characteristics
than they look in the figure. As a consequence, moving Lithuania somewhat toward left
gives us a better prediction. Yet, one should note that impacts of citizenship rules in
these three countries are much stronger than in other countries. Because the proportions
of Russian minorities in the Baltic countries are significantly high, fundamental political
landscapes depend on the types of citizenship rules in these countries. This situation does
not usually hold in other countries where the definition of legitimate citizens is by large
part agreed among people.
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In this way, citizenship rules are a powerful factor to regulate the exclusive or
inclusive nature of a political system. This is especially the case in the case of the Baltic
countries, which launched the task of nation-building following the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Therefore, I adopt citizenship rules in each country as a proxy of overall
executive-parties institutions. Using citizenship rules as a measure of political
institutions, I examine how democratic rule has affected the attitudes of Russian
minorities in each country. In the following sections, I closely look at citizenship rules
that each country adopted.

7-2-4: The Case of Estonia

Estonia approached the issue of citizenship based on the concept of restored state. That
is, because the occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union was illegal, Russians and other
ethnic groups who migrated to Estonia during the Soviet era should not have any inherent
rights. According to this notion, the legal basis of citizenship can be found only in the
interwar republic. Therefore, only those Russians who came to Estonia during the
interwar period and their descendents were qualified for Estonian citizenship. This
exclusive nature of Estonian citizenship laws became a focus of intense controversies.
The argument that Estonians adopted regarding citizenship rules took on an
emotional note. The Soviet occupation of Estonia resulted in destruction and mass
killings. The Russians came to Estonia with the Soviet force and had controlled it for
several decades. Considering levels of atrocities committed by Russians, it is not
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surprising that Estonians emotionally dealt with Russian minorities. Petersen (2002)
explains the origins of exclusive citizenship rules in terms of emotions. He argues that
Estonians tried to exclude Russians from the political system because they were resented
due to the experience of forceful occupation by the Soviet Union.
At the same time, however, Russians now living in Estonia had a reason to fight
against the exclusive citizenship laws. The majority of these Russians came as economic
migrants in search of better lives, and they did not come as military, police, or
administrative officials. For them, moving to Estonia was not like moving to another
country. Russians regarded the Baltic republics as a mere extension of the “Russian
motherland” (Boeck 1993). Also, many of the Russians living in Estonia were either
born there or had lived there for decades. Therefore, the Russian minorities argued that
they should be given automatic citizenship in the former republics (Chinn and Kaiser
1996). In this way, the two sides had high emotional stakes regarding the citizenship
rules in Estonia.
In this situation, one of the first issues that the legislature of newly restored states
had to address was to establish new citizenship rules. Right after independence, Estonia
was represented by a legislature that had been elected under Soviet election rules. The
Estonian National Front, whose position concerning Estonian Nationalism and
independence was more moderate than other parties, won the most votes in the last Soviet
election in March 1990. They won 49 seats in the 105-seat Estonian Supreme Soviet.
The Free Estonia Association, whose position was more radical, won 29 seats, and the
remaining 29 seats were taken by hard-line Soviet candidates under the workers’
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collective umbrella called Intermovement.57 Following the failed Soviet coup, a special
commission on citizenship submitted Estonia’s first draft law on citizenship to the
legislature (Barrington 1995). The nature of the initial draft was inclusive and contained
the following provisions:

•

Citizens from the interwar state and their descendants would be granted automatic
citizenship

•

Permanent residents during the transition period to independence would apply for
citizenship and waive the two-year naturalization period, language exam, and tenyear residency requirement.

•

For others, the requirements listed above and an oath of loyalty would be
required.

•

Elimination of automatic citizenship for spouses of citizens, but allowed parents
to pass on citizenship to their children (Citied by Peterson 2002, p. 143).

The inclusiveness stipulated in these provisions sparked a controversy, and the legislature
was to amend the draft on the floor.
As a consequence of heated floor debates, the legislature decided to reenact the
Estonian citizenship law of 1938 with a few amendments (Kolstoe 1995). This new law
was to provide citizenship only for pre-1940 citizens and their descendants. Also, the
special waiver for permanent residents during the transition period was eliminated. As a
result, the citizenship law actually enacted in Estonia was strictly exclusive for Russian
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minorities. The citizenship law prevented about 75% of the non-Estonians from
receiving citizenship.
The implications of this citizenship law had significant impact on the political and
social conditions for Russians. Because the Estonian legislature declared that only those
with restored citizenship have a right to vote in national elections, a large number of
Russian speakers were excluded from the voting process for the referendum on the new
Estonian constitution.58 Although the new Estonian constitution allowed non-citizens
various social protections including pensions, unemployment benefits, and the right to
conduct business, they were conditional and these rights could be restricted by later
legislative acts (Kolstoe 1995). With the provisions, the citizenship rules in Estonia
rendered the political system in Estonia extremely majoritarian favoring the majority
group, ethnic Estonians. Consequently, the majoritarian nature of the political system
caused serious neglects for Russian minorities.
Facing the exclusive citizenship rules, Russian minorities in Estonia took actions.
The Russian-speaking community launched a protest in Tallinn on March 21, 1992.
Approximately 4000 people participated in the protests and demanded ethnic, linguistic,
cultural, and religious protections and rights for minorities.59 In this demonstration, the
Russian minorities expressed their dissatisfaction toward the political system and asked
for the recognition as an ethnic minority with legitimate rights.
The effect of the new citizenship legislation and constitutional changes on the
political landscape was immediate and obvious. The outcome of the first postindependence elections in September 1992 clearly reflects the intentions of the exclusive
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citizenship rules in Estonia: Estonians successfully excluded Russians from the political
system. As a result of the election, the Popular Front ceased to exist as a tangible
political force because they demanded that the legislature should adopt more inclusive
citizenship laws in the citizenship debate.60 Instead, the Fatherland Party, whose stance
was more nationalistic emerged as a dominant political force in the legislature. Despite
the large Russian population in Estonia and the 23 Russian representatives in the former
Supreme Soviet, not a single Russian representative was able to gain a seat in the new
Riigikogu.61 Russian minorities expressed their concerns that the new parliament might
strictly regulate the scope of rights for non-citizens.62 Witnessing the new political
landscape dominated by Estonians, Russian minorities feared that they would face harsh
discriminatory policies because they did not have representatives sympathetic to the
conditions for Russians (Barrington 1995). Thus, exclusive citizenship laws strictly
prevented Russian minorities from entering the decision-making process in Estonia.
Among several legislations regarding the citizenship rules, the law on alien
residents, which was agreed in the summer of 1993, had a large impact on the destiny of
Russian minorities.63 The law on aliens required that all non-citizens apply for five-year
residency permits, regardless of how long they lived in Estonia during the Soviet period.
Furthermore, former Soviet military personnel and KGB officers were excluded from the
eligibility for applying for a residency permit. This legislation severely threatened the
60
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legal status of Russian-speakers who had been born and raised in Estonia. The Russian
community perceived this legislation as a serious violation of their social and political
rights.
This legislation in 1993 outraged the Russian-speaking community in Estonia.
On June 23, 1993, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev compared Estonia’s
citizenship rules to apartheid and claimed that this stance would lead to the “ethnic
cleansing” of non-Estonians through quiet means.64 As a reaction to a harsh legislation,
predominantly Russian towns of Narva and Sillamae launched a secessionist movement
demanding immediate autonomy. On July 16 and 17, the referenda were held. Among
those who participated in the Narva plebiscite, more than 97% voted for autonomy from
Estonia, and 98.6% of the Sillamae voters supported the territorial autonomy from
Estonia.65 However, the Estonian government declared the referenda illegal, on the basis
that the constitution does not allow for autonomous territorial units. Regardless of the
outcome of these referenda, the fact that Russian minorities explicitly expressed their
desire to secede from Estonia clearly showed the failure of political and social integration
of Russian minorities. Inevitably, a bitter and awkward atmosphere lingered both among
ethnic Estonians and Russians. This incidence symbolically represents the divided civil
society in Estonia.
Although the action for autonomous regions did not achieve its end, it pressed the
government to adopt softer stances toward Russian minorities. The Estonian government
adopted the amendment on the law of resident aliens, which guaranteed that non-citizens
living in Estonia prior to July 1990 would receive residency permits. Also, instead of
64

“Russia Sharpens Rhetoric Against Estonia” Summer of Daily News Brief, Central and Eastern Europe,
RFE/RL, vol. 2, no. 27, 1993, p. 17.
65
FBIS-SOV-93-140, pp. 78-79.

181

expiring passports of the former Soviet Union, the Estonian government issued a
document called an “Alien Passport” that would allow non-citizens to travel freely and
enter Estonia with no need for a visa.
In the late 1990s, the Estonian government continued to soften its stance toward
the Russian-speaking minority. In July 1998, the Estonian Citizenship and Migration
Board agreed to accept application for permanent residence permits, which would replace
the policy of granting only five-year residence permits.66 Furthermore, on December 8,
1998, the Estonian government decided to liberalize requirements for naturalization.67
The amendment grants eligibility for Estonian citizenship to those children under fifteen
who were born after February 26, 1992. This new law stipulates the mechanisms in
which the eligible children’s parents could apply for citizenship on the child’s behalf.68
This legislation increased the Estonia’s chance of being accepted to the European Union
and settled the potential conflict with Russia over the citizenship issues for the Russian
minorities (Petersen 2002).

7-2-5: Summary (Estonia)

Despite the fact that there was an option of adopting an inclusive citizenship rules
immediately after independence, Estonia instead chose to adopt exclusive citizenship
rules. Inclusive citizenship rules could not stand democratic force that was dominated by
66
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ethnic Estonians (Petersen 2002). Ironically, it was a democratic system with popular
input that prevented Russians from entering the political system. As a result, the
citizenship rules in Estonia excluded a large portion of Russian minorities from the
political system, thus rendering the political institutions predominantly majoritarian. In
the face of the difficult situation, Russian minorities protested against the exclusive
citizenship rules by demanding autonomy from Estonia. Consequently, these social
conflicts undermined social capital in the newly independent state. Although the
principle of exclusive citizenship rules later became softened due to the pressures from
Russian minorities and the international community, the wounds the debates over
citizenship rules were deep in society.

7-2-6: The Case of Latvia

As in the case of Estonia, Latvia’s independence movement was mainly led by a popular
front party, the Latvian Popular Front (PFL). Supporting perestroika, the PFL tried to
reform the society within the existing legal framework. Therefore, they did not intend to
supplant communist rule.69 The PFL did not pose any direct threat on the Russianspeaking minorities in Latvia during the early years of its rule. In the last election during
the Soviet era in 1990, the PFL obtained 139 out of 201 seats in the Latvian Supreme
Soviet, which was a greater proportion than that of ethnic Latvians (Lievan 1993).
69
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Similarly, in Riga, a mainly Russian speaking city, the candidates from the PFL captured
31 out of 69 seats. In this way, the PFL received support not only from Latvian
nationalists but also from Russian minorities.
Due to its dominant power in the legislature, the first initiative regarding the
citizenship issue was led by the PFL. Initially, PFL leaders called for an inclusive
citizenship rules, in which all permanent residents would be granted citizenship in the
new state. For instance, Andrejs Pantelejevs, the chairman of the Human Rights
Commission in the Parliament and Anatolijs Gorbunovs, the chairman of the legislature,
demanded a five-year residence and no language requirement for the process of
naturalization (Kolstoe 1995 p. 123).
Yet, there were other politicians claiming a more exclusionary approach. For
instance, Visvaldis Lacis, the leader of the Latvian National Independence Movement,
noted that Russians in Latvia were politically “nobodies” (Petersen 2002, p. 146). He
contended that although Russians should have social rights, “they should not have no
more [political] rights than he himself would have if he were to take a trip to Sweden.”70
This kind of exclusive postures had been dominant in the Latvian debate over the
citizenship issue in the following several years (Petersen 2002). Due to the history of
Soviet control of Latvia, there was a strong atmosphere against granting a wide range of
political rights to Russian minorities.
In October 1991, the Latvian government adopted the first resolution on a law
regarding citizenship and naturalization. The proposed law stated that Latvia was a
restored state and that its August 23, 1919 law on citizenship still existed. According to
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the resolution, naturalization would require 16 years of residence for those applicants
who were neither interwar citizens nor direct descendants of a Latvian citizen.
Furthermore, applicants for citizenship were required to take an oath of loyalty to the
Latvian Constitution and pass a Latvian proficiency exam. Although the law passed the
first reading in Parliament, it eventually failed because it did not receive the second and
third readings as required in the Constitution.71 What was clear at this point, though, was
that non-citizens—those who could not trace their origins to the interwar republic—
would not be allowed to vote in the June 1992 election (Petersen 2002).
The 1993 election, the first election after Latvian independence, drastically
transformed the distribution of power in Latvia. The Latvian Popular Front disappeared
from the political scene and splintered into smaller parties. Among them, only the
moderate Democratic Center Party managed to capture some seats. The focus of the
electoral competitions was the citizenship issue for Russians. Specifically, there was a
heated debate over who would be qualified as legitimate citizens in Latvia. Parties
including the Latvian Way, the LNNK, the Latvian Farmer’s Union, the Christian
Democrats, and the Democratic Center Party demanded some kind of residence
requirements and language proficiency in the electoral campaign. As a consequence of
the 1993 election, the Latvian Way became the dominant political force with a coalition
of the Farmer’s Union. However, the election of 1993 revealed the cumulative problems
that the non-Latvian community was facing. Because of the law that allowed only
citizens to be eligible to vote, 34% of the population was disenfranchised. The
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composition of the electorates was skewed favoring ethnic Latvians, with about 78% of
the eligible voters being ethnic Latvians (Pettai and Kreuzer 1999). Due to the
restrictions imposed on non-citizens, the electoral process was highly majoritarian
favoring ethnic Latvians.
In June 1994 the Saema passed a citizenship and naturalization law that went
through the required three readings in the legislature. However, President Guntis
Ulmanis urged the reconsideration of the bill by returning it to the legislature. The main
issue in these debates was strict quotas assigned in the process of citizenship application.
These quota provisions sparked protests among the local Russian-speaking population
and Russian politicians. Also, the Council of Europe and the United States also
expressed concerns for the provisions of strict quotas and subsequently pushed President
Ulmanis to reject the bill (Petersen 2002). Following the debate, on August 11, 1994,
Ulmanis finally signed a revised version of the law that did not contain strict numerical
quotas. According to this version, residents of Latvia who meets the following
conditions can apply for naturalization:

•

Have permanently resided in Latvia for at least five years, counting from May 4,
1990 of from the date of a permanent residence permit.

•

Have a command of the Latvian language.

•

Know the basic principles of the Latvian constitution.

•

Know the national anthem and the history of Latvia.

•

Have a legal source of income.

•

Have taken an oath of loyalty to Latvia
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•

Have officially renounced any previous citizenship.

•

Individuals who served in foreign security forces or have been convicted of
serious crimes cannot become naturalized citizens. (cited by Petersen 2002, p.
148).

Additionally, the 1994 citizenship law stipulates the “window” system, limiting who may
apply for naturalization at any given time. According to this system, during the first
“window” for naturalization in 1996, only those who were born in Latvia and whose ages
were between 16 and 20 were allowed to apply for citizenship. In 1997, the window
allowed those born in Latvia after 1972. Because of this restriction imposed on the
window system, a significant number of non-citizens were not permitted to apply for
citizenship and consequently excluded from the political system.
Although the bill was approved by the OSCE and other international
organizations that were concerned with the minority issue in Latvia, the window system
sparked a series of protests from the Russian Federation and Russian-speaking minorities
in Latvia. For instance, Boris Tsilevich, a Popular Front activist and an ethnic Russian
member of Parliament, noted that Latvia’s post-independence policy on citizenship and
naturalization was a “betrayal of those Russians who campaigned for Latvia’s
independence.”72 He claimed that the law unfairly limited the opportunity for Russian
speakers to obtain naturalization, thus hindering their entry into society and the political
system (Petersen 2002). In this way, exclusive citizenship rules adopted in Latvia
resulted in serious distrust among Russian minorities.

72

From John Ginkel’s interview with Boris Tsilevich on November 30, 1998, cited by Petersen (2002. p.
148).

187

In the spring of 1998, the debate over the citizenship issue caused an even more
controversial consequence. In March, elderly Russians had two rallies over low living
standards and strict citizenship rules. The first rally took place on March 3, 1998, and the
number of demonstrators was approximately 1000. The police relied on force to disperse
the protesters, and police violence resulted in resentment among Russian speakers.73
Russian minorities organized the second rally on March 17, 1998, and more than 2000
elderly Russians participated. This time, the rally concluded peacefully. Over these
incidents, the Russian Federation Council expressed support for the Russian-speaking
population living in Latvia and called for the Russian government to freeze trade and
impose economic sanctions against Latvia if “discrimination against the Russianspeaking population” continued.74 As can be seen in these incidents, the debate over the
citizenship issue resulted in serious social tensions, and the turmoil over the issue
attracted wide attentions from international actors.
Actions from international actors pressed the Latvian government to soften its
citizenship rules against Russian minorities. On June 22, 1998, the Latvian Parliament
approved amendments to the citizenship law. The main changes were the following three
points: (1) citizenship would be extended to the children of non-citizens born after
August 21, 1991, (2) the window policy for naturalization would be abolished, and (3)
language tests for applicants of the age over 65 would be simplified.75 However, the
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opponents of these amendments were successful in delaying the promulgation of these
laws until they could determine whether the public wanted to vote on the amendments
through a referendum. For the referendum to happen, at least 10% of the eligible voters
must sign a petition in support of a referendum.76 Consequently, more than 224,000
signed the petition, which was far more than the required 131,000. As a result, the
referendum was scheduled to be held on October 3, 1998, alongside Parliamentary
elections.77
The outcome of the referendum barely confirmed the amendments on the
citizenship laws of June 22, 1998. About two-thirds of the electorates participated, and
53% voted in favor and 45% against.78 While there was some concern that this did not
reflect the actual ethnic relations in Latvia, these amendments have been passed. As a
consequence, these amendments lowered the hurdles for ethnic Russians to apply for
citizenship in Latvia.79 As a consequence, it became much easier for the Russian
minorities to apply for citizenship in Latvia.
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7-2-7: Summary (Latvia)

As in the case of Estonia, although there was an option for inclusive citizenship rules, a
heated debate over the issue eventually led to the adoption of exclusive citizenship rules
with some discriminatory provisions for Russian minorities. Ironically, the democratic
force which was overwhelmingly composed of ethnic Latvians made it impossible for the
legislature to adopt inclusive citizenship rules. In this situation, Russian minorities
reacted to the exclusive citizenship rules by expressing their dissatisfaction with and
distrust towards the political system. Consequently, protests by Russians led to the clash
with police force, and a series of protests seriously divided civil society in Latvia along
ethnic lines. In this way, as in the case of Estonia, democratic force under majoritarian
institutions dominated by ethnic Latvians excluded Russian minorities from the political
system, and the democratic rule consequently destroyed social capital among Russian
minorities.

7-2-8: The Case of Lithuania

The citizenship rules in Lithuania took on a rather different note. In November 1989
when Lithuania was still part of the USSR, the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian
Republic passed a law on citizenship. This law included a provision granting automatic
citizenship to those who had resided during the pre-Soviet Period. According to this law,
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all people who had been citizens prior to June 15, 1940 and all their descendents residing
in Lithuania were to be citizens of Lithuania automatically.80 The law also provided
automatic citizenship for permanent residents who had been born in Lithuania and those
who could prove that one of their parents or grandparents had been born in the republic.
Those residents who could not meet the criteria for automatic citizenship could become
naturalized citizens by signing a loyalty oath supporting the Lithuanian constitution and
the republic’s sovereignty (Barrington 1995, p. 733). The citizenship law in Lithuania
became even more inclusive when Lithuania signed a treaty with Russia in July
extending citizenship to those who entered Lithuania after 1989 but before the 1991
treaty. What is noteworthy in the Lithuanian case was that there was no language
requirement for non-Lithuanians in order to obtain automatic citizenship as dictated in the
1989 law and the 1991 treaty. Thus, the nature of citizenship rules in Lithuania was
fairly inclusive from the beginning.81 Therefore, most of the Russian minorities were
allowed to participate in the political system in Lithuania. In this sense, political
institutions in Lithuania after its independence possessed highly consensus
characteristics.
After the initial law on citizenship was passed, there were several changes in the
citizenship rules. The Sajudis-led Parliament that was elected in 1990 installed a new
citizenship law in December 1991 following the restoration of Lithuanian independence.
This new law dropped the automatic citizenship for permanent residents but maintained
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the criterion for citizens of the interwar republic. Therefore, residents who had not filed
for automatic citizenship between the period of 1989 and 1991 would have to go through
the naturalization procedures if they wanted to obtain Lithuanian citizenship.
Those seeking naturalization under the 1991 law had to face basically the same
processes, but several points were made more explicit in the 1991 citizenship law. For
instance, the law clearly stated that one may not hold dual citizenship with the Soviet
Union. Also, proficiency in the Lithuanian language was codified according to both a
written and spoken exam. According to Barrington (1995), the 1991 law has a provision
that that allows Lithuanian government to tighten the citizenship law at later stages. The
law states that “persons meeting the conditioned specified in this Article shall be granted
citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania taking into consideration the interests of the
Republic of Lithuania.”82
In this way, changes that have been subsequently made in citizenship rules in
Lithuania imposed somewhat strict restrictions on the criteria of obtaining citizenship.
However, there has been little tension reported since the guidelines for automatic
citizenship were fairly inclusive. During the two-year window opportunity between 1989
and 1991, more than 90% of the population in Lithuania received automatic citizenship.83
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7-2-9: Summary (Lithuania)

Although there were several twists and turns in the citizenship laws in Lithuania, the
pattern shown in this case is different from that in Estonia and Latvia. Lithuania adopted
an inclusive citizenship rules at a fairly early stage of its nation-building process.
Lithuania did not back down from the initial legislation despite the fact that there was a
chance for that in December 1991 when the Sajudis-led legislature passed its first law on
citizenship for the first time after independence (see Petersen 2002). Inclusive
citizenship laws have made it possible for Lithuanians and Russians to share some power,
attaching the political institutions with more consensus attributes. Consequently, most of
the Russian minorities who resided in Lithuania were allowed to take part in the decisionmaking process. Due to its inclusive nature, the citizenship issue did not become a main
source of conflict in Lithuania, which makes a sharp contrast with the cases of Estonia
and Latvia. The case of Lithuania has demonstrated the effectiveness of consensus
institutions in generating social capital among minorities.

7-2-10: Democratic Longevity—After 15 Years of
Democratization

In the previous sections, I have analyzed how different types of political institutions
affected social capital in the Baltic countries, using citizenship rules as a proxy of
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political institutions. In Estonia and Latvia, in which exclusive citizenship rules were
adopted, I found that social capital among Russian minorities remained low. In these
countries, Russian minorities expressed their dissatisfaction and distrust by launching
protests against strict restrictions for citizenship. The tension surrounding the citizenship
issue resulted in destabilization of the political system and consequently undermined
social capital. Thus, majoritarian institutions in Baltic countries have poor records of
generating social capital. On the other hand, however, Lithuania adopted inclusive
citizenship rules. Due to its inclusive nature, Russian minorities were allowed to take
part in the decision-making process. As a consequence, Russian minorities did not cause
any major tension in Lithuania. Unlike its northern neighbors, Lithuania’s consensus
institutions successfully managed the period of early transition by effectively addressing
the problem of Russian minorities. Differences in citizenship rules among the three
countries generated rather different attitudes among Russian minorities.
These events happened during an early stage of nation-building and
democratization. Moving on from the period of significant uncertainty, the Baltic
countries are now in a different stage of democratization. Because about 15 years have
passed since the time of their independence, we would expect that these countries are
now in an advanced phase of the learning process. To confirm the proposition that
minorities learn to trust others through their experiences with political institutions, it is
necessary to examine more recent situations surrounding Russian minorities. If the
propositions of institutional learning are correct, we should still observe different
outcomes among the three countries. Due to the learning effect, furthermore, we should
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observe larger variances among the three Baltic countries. For this purpose, I will briefly
examine more recent events concerning the issue of Russian minorities.
Recently, the issue of education reform has been the focus of heated debates.
Along with the citizenship issue, the educational issue is deeply concerned with cultural
aspects of Russian minorities. Because education is one of the most important tools
through which people pass their social and cultural values to later generations, the
educational issue can have a significant impact on Russian minorities’ identities.
Recently in Latvia, the government has been trying to implement a series of educational
reforms. The plan adopted in 1998 intended to increase the role of Latvian in secondary
education. According to the law, secondary education in state and municipal general
educational institutions must be conducted mainly in Latvian, starting in 2004. That is,
with a few exceptions, most of the curricula in Russian schools have to be taught in
Latvian.84 This plan could seriously violate the right of Russian minorities to obtain
education in their native language. Because of the strong assimilatory force from the
state, this issue poses a serious threat for the survival of Russian-speaking communities in
Latvia.
As a natural reaction to the education reform plan, Russian communities in
Latvia launched a series of mass protests. For instance, in Riga several thousand people
expressed their concern about the closure of Russian schools. Shouting slogans such as
“For free choice of language for education,” Russian speakers claimed their rights to
obtain education in their native language.85 Similarly, children in Russian schools went
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on strikes denouncing the education reform.86 Also, when Latvia formally joined the
European Union (EU) with other post-communist nations, at least 20,000 Russians
protested against the education reform.
The protest movements by Russian minorities could also have a negative impact
on ethnic relations in Latvia. For instance, President Vaira Vike-Freiberga accused
Russophone protestors of discrediting the country on the day of EU entry.87 In the radio
broadcast, defending the education reform law, Vike-Freiberga commented, “Our laws, in
every respect, from every side, have been examined and found to be compatible with
human rights. Europe is not going to reject us, whether or not our schoolchildren protest
in the streets.”88As can be seen in these struggles over the education reform,
dissatisfaction and distrust among Russian communities have significantly grown. There
is a danger that dissatisfaction and distrust could escalate into further ethnic tensions
between ethnic Latvians and Russians minorities.
Estonia has also been planning a similar education reform plan. The Estonian
government plans to switch 60 % of Russian schools (in the 10th and 12th grades) to
Estonian language as their medium of education, starting in 2007. However, Toivo
Maimets, Estonian Minister of Education, comments, “we are very similar to Latvia
concerning the issue of education of national minorities. We have come along very
similar roads on the strategic level, but our tactics are different.”89According to the
Minister, Estonian local authorities can apply for exceptions for those schools that are not
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ready for reforms.90 As this view represents, policy-makers in Estonia emphasize the
flexibility of their educational reform plan. Yet, despite the officials’ claim of the
flexibility of the law, Russian minorities have already expressed their dissatisfaction by
launching protests, denouncing education reform. Considering the similarity between
Latvia and Estonia, it is possible that Estonia will also suffer from further ethnic tensions
in society over the education reform.91
On the other hand, having experienced about 15 years of democratic rule,
Lithuania does not seem to be experiencing the problem of ethnic tensions. Along with
the fact that Lithuania adopted fairly inclusive citizenship rules at an early stage of
democratization, Russian minorities in Lithuania are well integrated into society. In
terms of education, the number of Russian schools and the number of students who
choose to learn in Russian schools decreased partly due to the re-migration of the Russian
population back to their home country or partly due to the fact that more Russian
minorities choose to study in schools that mainly use Lithuanian.92 Even so, the right to
obtain education in Russian is guaranteed by the law on the Amendment of the Law on
Education (2003). In 2003-2004 school year, 58 schools adopted Russian as the language
of instruction, and a number of mixed schools use Russian as one of the languages of
instruction (17 Lithuanian-Russian schools, 18 Russian-Polish schools, and 8 LithuanianRussian-Polish schools).93 Thus, consensus institutions, whose aim was to incorporate
Russian minorities into the political system and society, seem to be performing well.
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During 15 years of democratic rule, the consensus institutions in Lithuania have been
successful in generating trust among Russians, thus contributing to the stabilization of the
whole society.
These differences among the three Baltic countries are also reflected in recent
survey studies. For instance, a survey study conducted by Richard Rose asked
respondents whether or not the Russian minorities are treated fairly in each country.94 In
Lithuania, 77 % of ethnic Lithuanians and 74 % of Russians said that the government
treated the Russian population well. There is not much disagreement between
Lithuanians and Russians regarding the way Russian minorities are treated. However,
this trend does not hold in cases of Estonia and Latvia. In Estonia, the percentage of the
ethnic Estonians who have a positive attitude toward the government policy on the
Russian minorities is 72 %, while that of the Russian speaking population is only 29 %.
In Latvia, 59 % of ethnic Latvians and 28 % of the Russian population had a positive
view about the government treatment of Russophones. A similar finding has been
reported by a survey cited in Smith, Aasland and Mole (1994). Thus, public attitudes
toward government policies toward Russian minorities clearly reflect the differences in
the citizenship rules in these three Baltic countries.
These brief illustrations of the education reform issue have clearly indicated
variances in the dependent variable, social capital, among the three countries.
Observations suggest that Latvia and Estonia still suffer from social instability from
trying to implement strict education reform. It seems that these two countries have
alienated Russian minorities from the political system and society by majoritarian
institutions discriminating against Russian minorities. On the other hand, Lithuania
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seems to have been successful in integrating Russian minorities into society. During 15
years of democratic rule, Lithuanian society has experienced very few ethnic problems,
and it seems that majorities and minorities have been getting along fairly well as citizens
of Lithuania. In this way, as we would expect, evidence shows that while social capital
in Estonia and Latvia did not develop, trust among Russian minorities in Lithuania has
been stable or steadily growing during the period of democratic rule.

7-2-11: Conclusion—Democratic Longevity in the
Executive-Parties Institutions

As we have seen, comparative case studies in the Baltic countries have demonstrated that
democratic longevity in consensus institutions has a positive effect on trust. Using
citizenship rules as a proxy of political institutions, the analyses have shown that while
social capital in Latvia and Estonia, which adopt majoritarian institutions, has not
developed, trust in Lithuania, which adopts mainly consensus institutions, has been stable
or become stronger as the period of democratic rule extends. These findings are
consistent with some of the hypotheses I have suggested in Chapter 3.
First, evidence overwhelmingly supports the power-sharing-learning hypothesis.
As can be see in the case of Lithuania, the inclusion of Russian minorities into the
political system and society has effectively built social capital. Judging from the finding
that both majorities and minorities have positive attitude toward the government policy
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concerning the minority issue, the power-sharing-learning hypothesis seems to be hold
the best in the case of Lithuania.95 As the power-sharing-learning hypothesis suggests,
both majorities and minorities have equally developed favorable attitudes toward Russian
minorities. Therefore, evidence here suggests that it is possible that people with different
social status have learned to get along in the same political system.
From what we have observed in Lithuania, we can reject the proposition of the
direct-translation-learning hypothesis, as both majorities and minorities seemed to have
developed trust over the period of democratic rule. However, what is probably true in
this case is that minorities have developed more trust than majorities. No matter how
peaceful the relationship between ethnic Lithuanians and Russians seems to be, it is true
that Russians used to brutally rule Lithuania by force, and that a number of Lithuanians
still maintain bitter memories of the Soviet period. Therefore, it is reasonable to
speculate that Russian minorities develop more trust than majorities under consensus
institutions. What is particularly suggestive on this point is the attitudinal gap between
majorities and minorities in Estonia and Latvia. While majorities think that the
government policy toward Russian minorities is fair in these two countries, minorities
tend to have lower evaluations of the way the government deals with minorities.
Therefore, although the direct-translation based on a zero-sum game may not be
happening, evidence suggests that the same political institutions influence majorities and
minorities differently.
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Table 7-1 Comparison of Languages in Russia and the Baltic Countries
Language
Language Family
Russian

Indo-European
Baltic-Slavic
Slavic
East-Slavic

Latvian

Indo-European
Baltic
Eastern Baltic

Lithuanian

Indo-European
Baltic
Eastern Baltic

Estonian

Uralic
Finno-Ugric
Finno-Lappic
Baltic-Finnic
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There are two potential criticisms against these comparative case studies. First,
critics may argue that the different outcomes in the dependent variable (social capital) are
the function of cultural differences, not of the interaction terms between democratic
longevity and political institutions. According to this perspective, the reason why we
observe a conflictual social relationship in Latvia and Estonia is because cultural
elements in these countries are not compatible with those of Russian minorities. Put
differently, culturalist scholars may argue that cultural difference is a primary factor
accounting for the attitudinal differences of the Russian minorities. However, we can tell
that this perspective would not hold by briefly looking at language characteristics used in
the region. As we can see in Table 7-1, while Russian, Latvian, and Lithuanian belong to
the Indo-European language family, Estonian is categorized under the Uralic language
family. Certainly, the fact that Estonian does not belong to the Indo-European language
family makes it hard for Russians to learn Estonian. However, this does not explain the
variance in the dependent variable. If cultural difference is the key accounting for the
attitudinal gap of minorities in the Baltic countries, we should observe social conflict
only in Estonia not in Latvia. The fact that we have witnessed some ethnic tensions in
Latvia makes the cultural approach untenable.
Second, critics may criticize the endogeneity problem between political
institutions and social capital.96 That is, one may argue that the causal arrow between
political institutions and social capital is taken backward. Although I argue that
citizenship rules determine levels of social capital, critics may contend that social capital
should be recognized as a cause of political institutions, not vice versa. In cases of the
96
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Baltic countries, this argument may have some relevance. In Estonia and Latvia, the
proportions of the Russian minorities are quite high. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue
that Estonia and Latvia adopted exclusive citizenship rules to protect their cultural
identities from the Russian influence.97 Indeed, government officials in these countries
repeatedly defend their exclusive stances on the ground that they are just trying to protect
their own cultures. For instance, Tago Holsting, an official in the ministry of foreign
affairs in Estonia, notes, “The only thing that we have that is our own is the language.”98
However, the fear for cultural extinction is less tangible in Lithuania. The Russian
population in Lithuania has never exceeded 10 %, and Lithuanians have always
maintained its majority status in society. As a result, it may be true that the causal arrow
goes form existing social relations to political institutions (citizenship rules).99
Even thought this is true, however, one cannot deny the effects of political
institutions and democratic longevity on social capital among minorities. Due to the
exclusive citizenship rules, Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia have faced various
hardships residing in these countries. Russian minorities had to struggle to make their
ways under the majoritarian institutions whose explicit aim was to exclude them from the
political system. In this situation, it is not difficult to imagine that Russians’ experiences
with discriminatory citizenship rules have translated into distrust toward the political
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system. In this way, 15 years of democratic rule definitely had significant impacts on
citizens’ attitudes in society.
In sum, case studies in the Baltic countries have provided important insights for
the prospect of democratization and nation-state building in new multiethnic
democracies. The findings in case studies suggest it is important to try to incorporate
minorities into the political system and society. Consensus institutions aiming at powersharing will have a beneficial effect on social capital in a democratic setting, and they
will stabilize the society in a long-term. Regarding the future of democratization in the
Baltic countries, Boeck’s (1993) view is suggestive:

The success of democracy in Latvia and other Soviet republics depends on
creating a situation in which minorities and “non-native” elements will be
allowed to develop their own institutions and cultures. At the same time,
an environment must be promoted in which non-natives will voluntarily
find a niche within the native population’s imaged community. This is not
done through Soviet-style administrative diktat, nor through requiring
someone under intense pressure (and during economic collapse) to learn a
language and pas the most important exam of his/her life simply to keep a
job, apartment or residence in a given country. Democracy should
become a tool for representing minority interests, not disenfranchising
them (p. 83).
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As this view represents, it is more important to recognize the existence of ethnic
minorities and to incorporate them into the political system. In situations in which basic
rights are denied, Russian minorities are not going to develop trust toward their fellow
citizens. Although Marx and Durkheim once predicted that ethnic distinction ceases to
exit in the modern world, trust among different ethnic groups still remains a powerful
factor determining the prospect of successful democratization.100 Experiences of the
Baltic countries provide an important lesson for managing social tensions in multiethnic
democracies.

7-3: Case study 2—Canada

7-3-1: Case Selection

Following the case studies in the Baltic countries examining the effect of democratic
longevity in the executive-parties dimension, we are now in a position to analyze the
effect of democratic longevity on trust in the federal-unitary dimension. The statistical
analyses of the IV-2SLS have found that longevity in highly decentralized political
institutions has a negative effect on trust among minorities. The findings suggest that a
long period of democratic rule under decentralized institutions leads to the fragmentation
of the political system and society, thus reducing levels of social capital. The main
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purpose of this case study is to verify the mechanism of the fragmentation-learning
hypothesis.
The criteria for selecting an appropriate case are threefold. First, the country has
to have federal types of political institutions. Because the fragmentation-learning
hypothesis states that democratic longevity has a negative impact on trust in highly
decentralized institutions, it is essential that the country we look at have federal
institutions. Second, to analyze the effect of democratic longevity on trust, the country
must have some experience of democratic rule. To capture the process through which
democratic rule fragments the political system and society interacted with decentralized
political institutions, we have to be able to observe a certain period of democratic rule in
the case. Third, the case has to have one or more ethnic minorities within the country.
As the focus of this study is social capital among different ethnic group, it is important to
scrutinize how minorities’ trust is affected by political institutions and democratic
longevity. Consequently, an appropriate case has to meet all these three criteria.
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Figure 7-2
Federal-Unitary Institutions and Interpersonal Trust for
Minority Groups
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As an object of a case study, I have selected Canada. Regarding the first criterion,
Canada has traditionally adopted highly decentralized federal institutions. The type of
federalism in Canada has been categorized as a confederation in which each state or
province wields a significant degree of power, not restricted by the central control.
Figure 7-2 indicates the relationship between federal unitary institutions and levels of
interpersonal trust in each country. In this figure, we can tell that federal institutions in
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Canada are highly decentralized. Therefore, federal institutions of Canada provide an
appropriate setting for the case study. Second, Canada has a long history of democratic
rule. Canada established a democratic political system at a fairly early stage of its nationstate building, and Canada has been continuously democratic since then. As a
consequence, the case of Canada makes it possible to examine the role of democratic
longevity on social capital. Finally, regarding the third criterion, Canada is a multiethnic
country. Since the time of its settlement, Canada has been featured with conflict between
two ethnic communities: the Anglophones and the Francophones. While these two
different communities have coexisted peacefully for a certain period, their relationship
has occasionally encountered serious crises. Although Figure 7-2 indicates that
minorities in Canada enjoy higher levels of trust than the prediction, the WVS shows a
huge gap in levels of trust between majorities and minorities. While levels of trust
among majorities is 0.585, that among minorities is only 0.344. Considering the high
levels of trust among majorities, levels of trust among minorities are significantly low.
Considering these points, the multiethnic setting in Canada provides a useful case in
which we can examine ethnic relations. Canada meets all the requirements for an
appropriate case to test the fragmentation-learning hypothesis.
In the case of Canada, if the findings from the statistical analyses are correct, we
should be able to observe the scenario that the fragmentation-learning hypothesis
suggests. Specifically, democratic longevity under highly decentralized institutions
should decrease trust among the Francophones in Quebec. As the hypothesis envisages,
we should observe that the Francophones express their distrust toward the political
system and to the majority group, as they experience democratic rule. In the case of
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Canada, all the conditions required for the story of the fragmentation-learning hypothesis
are present: highly decentralized institutions, a long history of democracy, and the
existence of ethnic minorities. Therefore, the Canadian case should provide us with
evidence which is fairly consistent with what we would expect from the fragmentationlearning hypothesis.
In this case study, I measure levels of social capital by tapping the trend of the
Quebec independence movement. As I will show below, Quebec nationalism is in large
party based on the Francophones’ dissatisfaction with the political system. Because the
political system in Canada has been largely dominated by the Anglophones, the surge of
Quebec nationalism also reflects the Francophones’ distrust toward the majority group.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a trend toward Quebec separatism represents
the lack of trust among the Francophones. By following a series of events surrounding
Quebec nationalism, I will show how democratic experience in highly decentralized
institutions has undermined trust between Francophones and Anglophones.

7-3-2: Background—Two Distinct Communities in Canada

The Francophones in Quebec occupy a unique position in Canada. In Quebec, they are
the largest linguistic group. Over 80% of Quebec’s citizens consider French to be their
mother tongue.101 Therefore, the Francophones are the majority group in Quebec.
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However, the population of French-speaking people comprises only about 24.3%of the
overall Canadian population.102 Hence, the Francophones are also a minority group in
Canada. Thus, the Francophones are both the majority and minority, depending on the
context.
Unlike the rest of Canada, Quebec society developed within the framework of the
French Empire. The fact that Quebec society was born as the colony of New France
fostered the sense of distinctiveness among the French-speaking population. The sense
of distinctiveness as the Francophones in Quebec endured long after Quebec ceased to be
a French colony. The French-speaking people acquired a sense of collective identity
through their struggles against harsh climates and threats from the native people and the
British colonies. They called themselves “Canadiens” or “habitants” to distinguish
themselves from the metropolitan French and also from English-speaking people
(McRoberts 1995, p. 83).
In 1759, Quebec fell under British control and lost its formal link with France.
Since then, administrative and military structures have been dominated by the power of
the British. As a consequence, the British domination over Canada severely threatened
the cultural distinctiveness of the Francophones. Initially, the British authorities intended
to destroy all forms of cultural distinctiveness of Quebec, and the Royal Proclamation of
1763 was specifically designed for that purpose. However, from the consideration that
the imperial interest would be better served by gaining collaboration of the
Francophones, the British administration never implemented the Proclamation. Instead,
the British installed the Quebec Act of 1774, and this had the effect of formalizing a
“cultural division of labor” (McRoberts 1995, p. 84). The act officially recognized the
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distinctiveness of the Francophone culture in Quebec.103 Furthermore, the French
speaking population in Quebec enjoyed some degrees of autonomy. The Constitutional
Act of 1791 realized a superficial recognition of the two communities. It divided the
Province of Canada into Lower and Upper Canada and granted control of Lower Canada
to the Francophones in Quebec (Gagnon 2000). These arrangements helped the
Francophones to consolidate and preserve the sense of cultural distinctiveness.
Despite the institutional arrangements of dividing powers, however, the British
authorities virtually monopolized political and economic power. As a consequence, the
Francophones were forced to live under poverty and deprivation. These grievances,
along with the economic crisis in the 1830s, led to the French-Canadian rebellion of
1837-38. The uprising failed, and the British authorities reacted to this rebellion by
adopting assimilatory measures toward the French-speaking population. For instance,
under the Act of Union, Lower Canada and Upper Canada were merged in order to
assimilate the Francophone population. Also, English became the sole official language
of the province of Canada. However, as reformists from Canada East allied with Canada
West to establish a government, which was more responsive to the needs of the
Francophones, these assimilatory measures were never implemented (Gagnon 2000).
Instead, the new government embedded duality in the new institutions of the United
Canadas: French became an official language along with English, and voting was
conducted based on a double-majority principle to some extent (McRoberts 1995).
However, this type of arrangement based on a balance of power proved to be
unworkable and ran into a political deadlock (Smiley 1987). The system of equal
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representation was becoming more and more unbearable for the Anglophones who
already outnumbered the Francophones. Therefore, as the pressure for change became
eminent, new political institutions were installed. The Confederation Agreement of 1867
reflected the situation in Canada at that time. While there was a growing fragmentation
of identity on the one side, what Canada needed was unity (Gagnon 2000). Put
differently, the Confederation Agreement of 1867 was a compromise between these two
competing forces.
The dilemma between these competing forces can be seen in positions of
prominent politicians at that time. On one hand, John A. MacDonald attempted to
establish a stronger unitary state to create an indivisible Canadian nation. In his view,
provincial governments would be always subordinated to the central authority of Ottawa.
On the other hand, however, there were those politicians who interpreted the
Confederation Act as a “treaty” or “compact” between communities with different
ethnolinguistic backgrounds. For them, confederation was primarily a means to preserve
the member communities within the larger framework (Vipond 1991). For instance,
Olivar Mowat, who was a premier in Ontario, claimed stronger provincial rights in the
1870s and 1880s (Waite 1962). These competing visions about confederation led to
significant disaccord within Canada regarding the interpretation of the agreement. For
instance, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland did not support the compromise, and
persistent resistance went on in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Quebec (Waite 1962).
Nonetheless, the distinctiveness of Quebec culture was taken into account in the
agreement. Along with other provincial governments, Quebec was also granted
jurisdiction over the issues that were vital to its cultural survival, such as education.
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Furthermore, regarding the issues of Church and its institutions, autonomy was
guaranteed.
Yet, the conflict between the federal government and provinces continued. The
latter half of the nineteenth century was characterized with the resistance of provincial
governments against the federal government’s efforts to take away more power from
provinces. Especially, the Francophones in Quebec faced several discriminatory
provisions. Among them, the language issue was one of the harshest for the Frenchspeaking population. For instance, the provision of the British North America Act lacked
the protection of the French language. In the act, the guarantee of bilingualism was
limited only in parliaments and the central Quebec judiciary. Hence, French-speaking
people living outside Quebec had little recourse for their linguistic rights. In addition,
violations of Francophones’ rights were observed in the education issue. Education
rights for the Francophone minorities were abolished in New Brunswick (1871), the
Northwest Territories (1892), and Ontario (1912) (Waddell 1986). In this way, in
provinces where the population of English-speaking was dominant, the British
imperialism spread at the cost of minorities rights.104
The tension between the Anglophones and the Francophones intensified at times.
Especially, the greatest crisis between these two communities can be seen in the
imposition of conscription on the Francophones during the World War I and II. Whitaker
(1984) noted that when an issue is divided between these two communities, Anglophones
would always win. Being dominated by the Anglophones, the Francophones in Quebec
accumulated dissatisfaction and distrust toward federal government. Consequently, the
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frustration on the side of Quebec became the future causes of nationalist movement in the
1960s (Gagnon 2000).
In sum, the Francophones in Quebec maintained their distinct cultural heritages
within the federal arrangements. However, the distinctiveness of Quebec had repeatedly
faced threats from the federal government which was dominated by the influence of
Anglophones. Against the assimilatory force to create a unitary state, French-speaking
people had shown persistent resistance, trying to preserve their cultural uniqueness.
Since its inception, the Canadian federation had been characterized with recurrent
conflicts between the Francophones and the Anglophones. Even before the aspiration for
sovereignty became an imminent political issue in Quebec in the 1960s, the soil for the
independence movement was already nurtured in Quebec.

7-3-3: Federal Accommodation of Quebec Prior to the 1960s

Although the federal arrangements did not completely solve ethnic tensions between the
Francophones and the Anglophones, the federal arrangements of Canada were quite
successful. Scholars have noted that Canada is one of the most stable Western nations
(Smiley 1987). To properly understand the source of stability in Canada between the
period of 1867 and 1960, it is necessary to scrutinize the institutional accommodation of
ethnic conflict in Quebec then. The rural and traditional natures of Quebec society
during that time greatly contributed to the stability of Canada.
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Until 1960, Quebec was a traditional society in which the Catholic Church had
significant influence. As is often the case with French political culture, distrust toward
the state was quite high, and people expected the state to play only minimal roles
(McRoberts 1988). Therefore, the Francophones tended to consider that social issues
were outside of state jurisdiction and that the Church should deal with social issues. In
Quebec, therefore, education or social services were mainly controlled by the Church,
and even the labor unions were linked to the Church. The Church was primarily
concerned with preserving traditions and social harmony. As a result, in the 1950s, the
dominant ideology in Quebec was conservative, which was based on the concept of la
survivance (survival). With this ideology, the French speaking population tried to
preserve the religions and linguistic heritages of French Canada in the face of
assimilatory pressures from the Anglophones.
Based on the principle of la survivance, the Union Nationale (UN), a political
party in Quebec, had dominated the politics in Quebec between 1944 and 1960. The
political figure that controlled the UN during that period was Maurice Duplessis, whose
grip came to be known as Duplessisme. Taking advantage of the rural and traditional
characteristics of Quebec society, Duplessis had developed a patronage system that
insured the political dominance of the UN. Under the ideology of la survivance, he
argued that French-Canadians had to preserve their agricultural economy so that Quebec
would be free from the Anglophone influences of urbanization and secularization
(Newman 1996). In this political atmosphere, political life in Quebec was dominated by
autocratic politicians, widespread patronage, social institutions such as the Church, and
conservative newspapers reinforcing the established authority (Trudeau 1968).
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Consequently, people remained relatively indifferent to politics despite the formal
institutions of political democracy. In rural and religious settings, the option of an
independent Quebec did not receive enough political attention.
Besides indifference at the mass level, factors that contributed to the stability of
the Canadian federation until 1960 were the conflict management mechanisms based on
consociational principles. As one of the most powerful mechanisms of conflict
management, the federal arrangements functioned well to preserve peace in Quebec.
After World War II, the federal government attempted to increase its spending powers in
jurisdictions that were constitutionally the realm of provinces such as postsecondary
education, income transfers, and health care. However, the provincial governments were
strongly against this motion of the federal government, trying to exercise increased
powers and increased tax resources to strengthen provincial powers.105 This was
especially the case in Quebec, in which autonomy in cultural and economic issues was
critical. In a number of issue areas, provincial demands were accommodated so that
provinces would be able to opt out from federal programs and run their own programs
with compensations from Ottawa. In practice, Quebec was the only province to take this
opportunity to extend its power in most programs (Weaver 1992).
Besides federal arrangements, various accommodation mechanisms at the elite
level had developed based largely on the system of consociationalism. Informal
bargaining between Anglophone and Francophone elites within the federal cabinet is one
of the mechanisms.106 In Ottawa, the principal agent of the elite accommodation was the
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federal Liberal Party. The Liberal Party was a dominant force in federal elections during
the period of 1896-1957, thus forming the government for all period except fifteen years.
As the Liberals were dependent for their success on their electoral dominance in Quebec,
they developed an informal process of accommodation. That is, Francophone Québécois
and Anglophones from other provinces alternated the party leadership.107 Through this
mechanism, Francophone elites took advantage of their strong influence in the cabinet to
attain their political purposes.108
Also, one of the most important elements of the conflict management in Canada is
the system of executive federalism. Specifically, this system allows negotiations between
federal and provincial executives. In this system, either the “first ministers” or federal
and provincial ministers responsible for a particular policy area meet each other to jointly
address policy challenges. The system of executive federalism certainly provides an
important mechanism through which elites at both federal and provincial levels work out
solutions for the common problems.109
These mechanisms of conflict management performed relatively well in
containing the nationalist sentiment in Quebec. In the case of Quebec, as theory of
consociationalism dictates, the role that Duplessis played at the elite level in Quebec was
important. His political strategies made it possible for the consociational process to work
without major ethnic tensions. While Duplessis considered himself as a French-Canadian
nationalist, he did not support the independence of Quebec. To keep the Canadian
patterns of conflict resolution based on consociationalism were observed up to 1960 in Canada. Lijphart
(1999) contends that the Canadian case lies between the centrifugal and consociational types. McRae
(1974) suggests that Canada is a very imperfect case of consociationalism.
107
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federation peaceful, he believed, the Francophones had to remain committed to rural and
religious culture while allowing Anglo-Canadians to lead industry and finance (Clift
1982). For Duplessis and many of the Francophones, national economic policy or
decision-making at the federal level did not have essential importance. Therefore, the
Duplessis administration simply refused to participate in many of the shared-cost
programs with the federal government (McRoberts 1988). Also, the Duplessis
government cooperated with American and English-Canadian firms dominating the
Quebec economy (Levine 1990, Quinn 1979). In a similar manner, the Duplessis
government did not interfere with autonomous Anglophone institutions such as schools,
universities, or hospitals.
Until the 1970s, a dominant attitude among the Francophones toward federal
politics was indifference. As Quebec society was mainly concerned with their traditions
and religions, the Francophones in Quebec, especially at the mass level, had little
communication with the Anglophones. As a consequence, Quebec remained highly
isolated from the rest of Canada. Indeed, the isolation of Quebec was an intended
outcome of the institutional arrangements. The federal arrangement in 1867 was based
on the premise that the interaction between these two communities at the federal level
would be significantly limited. Each community was free to pursue its own concerns
independent of the other. Richard Simeon (1972) notes, “such a solution works only so
long as the actions of one party do not spill over to affect the other, and so long as the
goals of one side do not imply demands on the other” (p. 289). In this way, for most of
the period up to 1960, patterns of conflict management based on a kind of consociational
mechanism had functioned reasonably well, in which federal arrangements and elite
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accommodations on both sides played important roles. Consequently, two major ethnic
communities in Canada, the Anglophones and the Francophones, had coexisted in
Canada without experiencing major ethnic violence.

Democratic Longevity

The findings from the statistical analyses in federal-unitary political institutions suggest
that democratic longevity in highly decentralized institutions reduces levels of social
capital. The theory accounting for this relationship is that political and social learning
under highly decentralized institutions fragments the political system and society and
consequently hinders the development of trust. Therefore, having identified the
institutional elements of federal arrangements in Canada, we are now in a position to
move on to the aspect of democratic longevity. Specifically, it is important to specify
how the experience of democratic rule, interacted with federal institutions, resulted in the
loss of social capital among the Francophones in Canada. For this goal, I will examine
the role of democratic longevity by following several stages of democratic development
in Canada. First, I will explain how social changes induced by the Quiet Revolution led
to democratic rule in a real sense. Second, I will look at how the Parti Québécois (PQ)
emerged as a powerful political force representing the pro-independence stance in
Quebec. Third, I will analyze how the PQ’s struggle for power over years of democratic
rule led to the fragmentation of the political system and society, thus undermining social
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capital mainly among the Francophones. By following these processes, I will
demonstrate how the variable of democratic longevity in highly decentralized institutions
causes the loss of social capital in Canada.

7-3-4: Democratic Longevity (1)—The Quiet Revolution and
the Emergence of Democratic Force

In the 1960s, the dominance of the UN began to be challenged. The principle source of
the challenge came from massive social changes in Quebec. Despite the basic stance of
the UN to preserve rural and agrarian economy, Quebec had gone through rapid and
extensive industrialization. During the period between 1946 and 1966, the value of
production in the secondary sector jumped by 300%, by 8% annually in construction and
public utilities sectors, and by 7.5% annually in the manufacturing sector.110 Similar
changes occurred in the primary and tertiary sectors. Also, there was a tremendous
expansion of the labor force in the service sector, which led to the growth of such
industries as commerce, communications, finance, and entertainment. Consequently, the
percentage of people working in the agricultural sector in Quebec dropped from 22.4% to
7.6%, and those working in tertiary sector rose from 38.4% in 51.1% during the period
between 1941 and 1961. The industrialization simultaneously resulted in rapid
urbanization in Quebec. Although 41% of the people lived on farms in 1961, the number
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had dropped to 6% by 1971. Accordingly, the population in the urban area rose from
55% in 1941 to 78% in 1971.111
In the trend of rapid industrialization and urbanization, the ideology of the UN, la
survivance, which encouraged people to remain in the agrarian economy, became rather
anachronistic. Political leaders began to realize that the Church would not be able to
provide enough social welfares and educational programs for the Francophones. As an
inevitable trend, in 1960 the UN lost its first provincial election since World War II.
Survey data show that voters were drifting away from the UN. Only 38.3% of the voters
in Quebec considered themselves as partners of a provincial party.112 In 1965, only 1.8%
of Quebec’s voters identified themselves with the ideology of the UN.113 Due to its
inability to cope with social changes, the UN lost its support base and eventually
disappeared form the political scene in Quebec.
The death of Duplessis in 1959 and the election of the Parti Liberal du Quebec
(PLQ) under Jean Lesage in 1960 initiated a series of political reforms and social changes
that are typically referred to as the Quiet Revolution. At the heart of the reforms, there
was a widening demand from the Francophones for bigger roles for the Quebec state.
Although the state in Quebec was mainly viewed as second class institutions before the
1960s, the Quiet Revolution changed people’s perceptions of the state. Due to massive
levels of social changes, the Francophones expected that the state would replace the
traditional roles of the Catholic Church in the areas of social services and education. Put
differently, the Quebec state was to assume the functions of the Keynesian state (Bakker
1995). With its roles drastically expanded, the Quebec state was seen as the moteur
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principal of modernization. To deal with problems of modernization and urbanization, it
was imperative to modernize social and political institutions. Hence, the rapid
modernization and urbanization marked a sharp break with the past and promoted the
expansion of the modernized state to address newly emerging issues.
During this period, another important change was taking place in Quebec. Due to
the dramatic expansion of the public sector, there was an upward trend in the labor force
market among the white collar workers (Boily, Dubuc, Gagnon, and Rioux 1974). Those
workers who benefited from industrialization constituted the newly created middle class
in Quebec and became the major supporters of the Quiet Revolution. However, the social
mobility created by industrialization and urbanization consequently resulted in challenges
toward the Anglophones. Even though those workers in Quebec advanced into the
middle class, they realized that the economic system was still dominated by the
Anglophones. The sense of distrust and dissatisfaction was also shared by organized
labor, which basically supported the measures taken by the PLQ. Hence, in the process
of the Quiet Revolution, the Francophones quickly formed and shared feelings of distrust
toward the Anglophones. Consequently, these social changes induced by the Quiet
Revolution nurtured a soil for Quebec nationalism. Involving a portion of the
Francophones in Quebec, Quebec nationalism obtained a certain degree of hegemony in
Quebec.
The process through which the Quiet Revolution led to Quebec nationalism
provides us with two important insights. First, the case of Quebec demonstrates that it is
erroneous to assume that modernization would automatically eliminate ethnic distinctions
and lead to social integration. Although it is true that the force of modernization can
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bring people closer and more similar to one another in certain points, the same process
can also activate forces for ethnolinguistic claims. Regarding this point, Karl Deutsch
has convincingly shown that social mobilization, as it progresses more rapidly than
assimilation, tends to encourage nationalism and reinforce linguistic entities (Deutsch
1966, 1979). Consistent with the argument, modernization in Quebec failed to integrate
the Francophones with the rest of Canada. On the contrary, the modernization force
created an atmosphere of rivalry with the Anglophones. Second, related with the first
point, we have observed that the modernization force created a democratic force in a real
sense. If democratic rule means a system in which citizens actively participate in the
political process with strong interest in politics, what was happening during the period of
the Quiet Revolution was nothing but a beginning of democratic rule in the real sense
(Almond and Verba 1963). Also, consistent with studies suggesting the relationship
between economic development and democracy, industrialization and urbanization made
people politically more active and transformed the rural and traditional society into a
more modern society in which the large middle class could make their voice heard in the
political system. In short, the Quiet Revolution in Quebec marked the beginning of
active democracy in Quebec. In this way, a series of social changes had created a solid
foundation of Quebec nationalism.
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7-3-5: Democratic Longevity (2)—The Emergence of the Parti
Québécois

The Quiet Revolution drastically transformed the rationale of the provincial government.
From being secondary institutions next to the Catholic Church before the Quiet
Revolution, the state attained a status of dominant force in Quebec. The role of the PLQ
was to make the Québécois “masters in our own house.”114 The Quiet Revolution granted
two new roles to the Quebec states. The first one is to expand and improve education and
social welfare programs. Furthermore, the second role was to develop the economy and
open up more occupational opportunities for the Francophones.
Despite the dramatic social changes caused by the Quiet Revolution, the
Francophones were still denied access to higher positions in the private sector in Quebec.
In competitions with the Anglophones, the Francophones found that managerial positions
were dominated by the Anglophones, and the language used at work was usually English
(Hughs 1943). However, the provincial government did not have the political power to
change the situation. Therefore, voters in Quebec increasingly realized that the
provincial government needed to gain more autonomy to improve the situation for the
Francophones. As a consequence, the Francophones had begun to demand the creation of
independent Quebec. It was in this context in which the Parti Québécois (PQ) had gained
momentum for its electoral success.
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The PQ was established in 1968 under the leadership of René Lévesque. In the
situation in which the demand for independent Quebec became increasingly stronger, the
PQ attempted to portray itself as a strong party supporting and promoting the cause of
achieving Quebec sovereignty. The PQ proposed a program of “sovereignty-association”
–political independence for Quebec maintaining close economic links between Quebec
and English Canada. Also, to address the demands of the Francophones in the economic
issue, the PQ proposed to repatriate the economic system through state enterprises and
regulation of non-Quebec ownership in the financial sector. At the same time, the PQ
also promised to take populist measures to address the needs of a variety of socially
disadvantaged groups. Although the PQ leadership was dominated by the members of
the new middle class, the PQ emerged as a broad-based coalition of social forces whose
goal was to achieve Quebec sovereignty.115 In 1966, only 8% of voters in Quebec
supported independence of Quebec. Between 1966 and 1970 support for independence
doubled. Furthermore, by 1976 support for independence had grown up to 24%.116 In
1973, the PQ became the second largest party in Quebec winning 30% of the votes. As
can be seen in these figures, the PQ had emerged along with the increasing demand for
Quebec sovereignty.
According to Newman (1996), the success of the PQ in persuading voters for
sovereignty-association or independence was a function of the cultural division of labor
in Quebec. The Francophones had been constantly underpaid, underemployed, and
undereducated compared with Anglophones. By politicizing the cultural division of
labor, or emphasizing the inequality that the Francophones had to face, the PQ skillfully
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presented the issue of sovereignty and independence as a pressing political issue to be
addressed. Consequently, the PQ was highly successful in garnering strong support from
the Francophones in Quebec. On the other hand, the PLQ was not ready to address the
issue of cultural division of labor. The PLQ focused its attention on the provincial
government as a provider of social service and basic infrastructures. However, the
Francophones, who became politically aware during the Quiet Revolution, were not
satisfied with a limited role of the provincial government. They wanted the provincial
government to pry open the political, economic, and cultural barriers installed by
Anglophones. It was the PQ, not the PLQ, that was ready to commit itself to this issue
(Newman 1996). Backed by strong demand for a bigger role for the state, the PQ had
emerged as an important political force in Quebec with a strong stance for Quebec
sovereignty.

7-3-6: Democratic Longevity (3)—The PQ’s Struggle for
Power through the Sovereignty Issue

The PQ’s struggle for power had always revolved around the issue of Quebec
sovereignty. While there had been slight policy changes, the sovereignty issue had been
at the center of the PQ’s policy platform. In an attempt to expand the PQ’s support base,
the PQ has adopted several strategies. One of them was étapisme (gradualist).117
According to Claude Morin, the architect of étapisme policy, the creation of a PQ
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government would not mean the immediate establishment of a sovereign Quebec.
Instead, the étapisme policy suggested that the party would take a step by step approach
to achieve sovereignty association. The leadership in the PQ explicitly noted that the PQ
would not initiate negotiations for achieving sovereignty until the PQ became successful
in getting a mandate to negotiate in a Quebec referendum.118 Lévesque hoped that
étapisme would help the PQ win the majority status and allow a PQ government to
slowly create a majority base for sovereignty-association (Newman 1996). In the 1976
election, the PQ won the provincial election with 41.4% of the vote. The PLQ gained
30.3% of the vote, and the UN won 18.2%. As the strategy of étapisme envisaged, the
PQ was successful getting support even from those who were against independence
(Newman 1996).
One of the most important legislations that the PQ government implemented
during its rule was Bill 101, the Charte de la langue francaise. This bill required that
French be used for all communications in provincial or local governments. Also, the law
limited English use for schoolchildren whose parents or older siblings were educated in
English in Quebec. As a consequence, Bill 101 increased the percentage of children who
were educated in French. Also, a series of policies intended to increase the upward
mobility of Francophones were implemented. Consequently, these legislations helped the
PQ to gain more solidified support from all social classes. In addition, these policies,
focusing on the roles of French language, had the effect of enhancing cultural pride for
almost all the Francophones in Quebec (Newman 1996).
After nearly three years had passed since the victory in the 1976 election, the PQ
had begun to move for a referendum on the sovereignty-association. However, results of
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surveys at that time were not favorable for the PQ. The survey indicated that the policy
of étapisme had not created a majority support for the sovereignty-association (Newman
1996). Considering this situation, the PQ chose to formulate a question in such a way as
to postpone the final decision. Quebecois were asked whether they would give the
government of Quebec a mandate to negotiate on the sovereignty-association. The
referendum was held in May 1980, and only 40% of the voters supported “yes.” The
defeat in the referendum left the PQ in a difficult situation. Levesque said that the PQ
would not hold another referendum during the second mandate. As a reaction to the
defeat in the referendum, surveys suggested that the influence of the PQ became weaker,
and that the party membership also declined.119 In this way, the defeat in the referendum
and consequential removal of the independence option weakened the support base for the
PQ.
However, the issue surrounding sovereignty became once again a focus of heated
debates for the Quebecois soon after the referendum in 1980. The event that intensified
the sovereignty issue was the debate over the Canadian Constitution. Canada did not
really have its own constitution, and the British North America Act of 1867 virtually
played as the supreme law. In this situation, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, the Canadian Prime
Minister, intended to create a Canadian constitution that would grant a strong power to
the federal government. Also, Trudeau insisted on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
against which most provinces had always resisted as an infringement on provincial rights.
On October 1980, Trudeau declared that he would unilaterally repatriate the constitution,
ignoring the provincial objections. Trudeau’s posture on this issue posed a serious threat
toward provincial autonomy.
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The PQ recognized this situation as a political opportunity. In the electoral effort
to gain support in the election in April, 1981, the PQ attempted to present itself as the
only legitimate actor that could stand up for the interests of Quebec against the federal
government. Along this line, the PQ criticized that the PLQ was only concerned with the
interests of the Anglophones.120 Even without relying on the use of the sovereignty card,
the PQ was able to mobilize the core constituents in Quebec. The PQ’s slogan “We got
to stay strong in Quebec” represents its strong stance against the federal government, and
the distrust toward the federal government had created strong momentum for the PQ in
the electoral campaign. Consequently, the campaign turned out to be a big success for
the PQ. The PQ won 49.2% of the votes whereas the PLQ 46.1%, thus granting the PQ
80 out of 122 seats in the Assemblée Nationale. The support of the PQ mainly came from
those who voted “yes” in the referendum.121
Following the provincial election, Trudeau soon resumed negotiations on the
Canadian constitution. Against this move, provinces formed an anti-Trudeau coalition,
and Levesque of the PQ agreed to compromise in Quebec’s traditional constitutional veto
to solidify the coalition. However, Trudeau adopted a strategy to break the coalition, and
he successfully managed to gain provinces’ endorsements of a new constitution. Quebec
was the only province that rejected the Constitution. The new constitution intended to
reduce a significant amount of provincial power and to take away Quebec’s veto on
constitutional matters. A series of actions taken by Trudeau provoked bitter resentment
within the PQ. At the December 1981 PQ National Congress, the PQ passed a series of
resolutions that would delete all references to economic associations from the party
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program. Also, the National Congress passed a resolution declaring that the next
elections would be run on the issue of sovereignty. According to the resolutions, if the
PQ won a parliamentary majority, it would be entitled to declare independence. At the
same time, the National Congress declared that they would through away the étapisme
strategy, which had developed over thirteen years. Consequently, a series of actions
taken by the National Congress led to serious internal divisions within the PQ.122 After
Levesque resigned both his party and leadership, the PQ fought the provincial election in
1985 under the leadership of Pierre Marc Johnson, the PQ was badly defeated winning
only 38.7% of the vote and 23 out of 120 seats in the Assemblée Nationale, which
rendered the PQ once again an opposition party.
After the defeat of the PQ, the issue surrounding the constitution had an important
effect on the destiny of the PQ. In 1987, the PLO’s Robert Bourassa and Prime Minister
Mulroney completed negotiations for the Meech Lake Accord. The Meech Lake Accord
was intended to bring Quebec into the Canadian Constitution. The Meech Lake Accord
guaranteed the status of Quebec as a “distinct society,” disproportionate representation in
the Supreme Court and Senate, the right to be exempt from some national programs, and
a limited veto over constitutional amendments. Many Quebecois initially welcomed the
concessions that Bourassa was able to achieve but Levesque and the PQ could not. As a
result, the issue of independence became somewhat irrelevant for Quebecois.
However, the Meech Lake Accord failed to realize. The Accord stipulated that it
had to be endorsed by all the provincial legislatures and the federal government within
three years by June 24, 1990. Between 1987 and 1990, the PQ and other actors built
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against the Accord including provincial governments that were elected after the accord
was signed, aboriginal leaders. Newfoundland and Manitoba could not ratify the Accord
by deadline, and consequently the Accord died on June 23, 1990. The failure of the
Accord generated a significant dissatisfaction in Quebec, leaving a strong sense of
skepticism among the Quebecois toward the Anglophone Canadian behavior (Newman
1996; Gagnon 2000). As the debate over the constitution carried a heavy symbolic
content over the future of the political community in Canada, the discourse had been
replete with fear, distrust, betrayal and casting of blame, as well as themes of honor, pride,
and recognition (Cairns 1991a, 1991b).
In August 1992, under the leadership of Mulroney, the federal government and
provinces reached a new agreement known as the Charlottetown Accord. This accord
also granted distinct status to Quebec as well as suggesting reforms of the Canadian
Senate and the House of Commons, grating greater consultative powers to the provinces,
and addressing aboriginal concerns. Although this accord required approvals from all
provinces and territories, it was passed only in three provinces, Newfoundland, New
Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island. Consequently, the Charlottetown Accord was to
be abandoned.
The Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown Accord sought to reintegrate
Quebec into the constitutional agreement, but in both cases the Trudeau forces intervened
vigorously to keep the tenets of the 1982 package intact (Gagnon 2000). The defeats of
these accords led to more support for sovereignty association. The dissatisfaction of the
electorates in Quebec united the PQ and boosted its support base (Newman 1996).
Especially, the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord convinced many voters that it was
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time to support the PQ (Pinard 1992). In the election of September 1994, under Jacques
Parizeau, the PQ won 44.7% of the vote and 77 seats out of 125 seats in the Assemblée
Nationale, which brought the PQ back into the government again.123
As can be represented by the electoral success of the PQ, support for sovereignty
association exceeded 60% for the first time. Although the PQ traditionally hesitated to
move too dramatically toward independence due to the fear of alienating those who were
concerned with economic consequences of sovereignty, Parizeau’s strong commitment to
sovereignty association no longer posed a serious threat for a party union. By 1995,
voters in Quebec recognized the much stronger need to commit themselves to sovereignty
association (Newman 1996). Also, comprehension for the economic situation associated
with sovereignty declined as the support for independence increased.
Parizeau called for a referendum in the fall of 1995. Although opponents of
sovereignty argued that the question in the referendum was ambiguous, it was much
stronger than the question in the 1980 referendum (Newman 1996). The question in 1995
gave the PQ government the right to declare sovereignty “after having made a formal
offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership” (Newman 1996, p. 133).
On referendum day, about 94% of the registered voters went to the polls, and the “no”
side gained 49.7% of the votes, while the “yes” side 48.5%. More than 60% of the
Francophones of all origins voted for “yes.” While the “no’ side won in the referendum
in 1995, the small margin of barely 1% indicates persistent support for sovereignty
among Francophones in Quebec. Parizeau’s speech after the defeat of the referendum
reinforced the impression that Quebec nationalism was mainly based on ethnic issues.
On the night of the referendum, he blamed the failure on “money and some ethnic votes”,
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thus leaving a bitter atmosphere on both Anglophone and Francophone sides. Also,
Parizeau expressed his intention that Quebec would continue to demand sovereignty and
urged future revenge on this issue.
Although Canadian federalists took a sigh of relief, the possibility of Quebec
being independent had not totally disappeared. The result of the referendum showed that
there had been a tremendous increase in support for sovereignty since 1980. Also,
Lucien Bouchard, the new PQ leader and premier, made it clear that he would call
another referendum in the near future. The PQ won re-election in 1998, though it lost the
popular vote to the Quebec Liberals. In terms of the number of the seats gained by both
parties, the result was identical to that of the previous 1994 election. However, public
support for sovereignty remained too low for the PQ to consider the second referendum
in the second term. Quebec citizens seem to have grown weary of the debate over its
independence. The PQ’s defeat by the Liberals in the April 2003 election was interpreted
by many observers as a sign that Quebecois were dissatisfied with the separatist policy of
the PQ.
However, one needs to be cautious about this trend. Although it was common to
say that Quebec separatism was dead or harmless until the mid-1980s, the aspiration for
independence surged again after the failure of the Meech Lake Accord. Even in a current
situation, it is not difficult to envisage circumstances in which the divide between the
federal government and Quebec would turn into an open conflict. There is always a
possibility that Quebec nationalism could become dramatically active. Indeed, a recent
survey as of November 2004 has shown that voting intentions in support of a sovereign
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Quebec in partnership with Canada have risen to 49%.124 Although the support for
Quebec sovereignty had declined since the 1995 referendum until 2001 down to an
average of 40%, the support for sovereignty has kept on rising: 41% in 2002; 44% in
2003.125 Furthermore, another survey has shown even higher support for sovereignty,
which exceeds 50%.126 In this way, these surveys clearly indicate that Quebec
Francophones still remain skeptical of the federal government and maintain their distinct
identity as Québécois. Considering the lingering but consistent support for Quebec
sovereignty, it is very likely that Canada in the future will suffer from the problem of
Quebec separatism.

7-3-7: Conclusion—Democratic Longevity in the FederalUnitary Institutions in Canada

The purpose of this section is to verify the hypothesis that democratic longevity in highly
decentralized institutions hinders the development of social capital among minorities.
For this purpose, I have applied the fragmentation-learning hypothesis to the case of
Canada. Specifically, this section has surveyed the events surrounding the issues of the
Quebec separatism through the rise of the PQ as a principal actor in the movement. If the
fragmentation-learning hypothesis is correct, we should be observing that a long period
of democratic experience in Canada with highly decentralized institutions has had a
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negative effect on social capital among the Francophones. Regarding the hypothesis, the
analyses in this section suggest three important implications.
First, the analyses in the case of Canada show that territorial federalism and high
degrees of decentralization have fragmented the political system and society.
Traditionally, Canada has been featured with the tension between two major ethnic
communities: the Anglophones and Francophones. To accommodate these two distinct
communities within the framework of a nation-state, federal arrangements with high
degrees of political decentralization were adopted. Within the federal arrangements, the
Anglophones and the Francophones coexisted without any major tension due to
institutional management at the elite level. Also, at the mass level, as the Francophones
wished to avoid cultural contamination from the Anglophones, levels of social
interactions between these two communities were kept at a minimum. However, while
the institutional mechanisms were successful in maintaining peace between the
Anglophones and Francophones, institutional arrangements based on the assumption of
mutual isolation reinforced the social cleavage between these two groups. As a result, the
Francophones in Quebec have fostered a strong sense of Quebec identity separate from
that of the Anglophones.
Second, one cannot emphasize too much the effect of democratic force and its
longevity as an exacerbating factor on social capital. Although the tension between the
Anglophones and Francophones was relatively low prior to 1960 due to the political
indifference at the mass level in Quebec, social changes induced by the Quiet Revolution
drastically changed the situation. Industrialization and urbanization increased the contact
between these two communities, and Francophones realized their disadvantages in the
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economic system that was dominated by the Anglophones. In this situation, the
Francophones claimed more power vis-à-vis the Anglophones, and they expected that the
Quebec provincial state to fulfill the goal. In this way, the Francophones finally began to
express their own demands against the Anglophone dominance. In the sense that the
Francophones were political aware and show their interest in politics, this marked the
beginning of real democratic rule in Quebec. Behind this democratic force which was
emerging in the 1960s, the PQ had developed as a major proponent of Quebec
sovereignty. Emphasizing that the Francophones in Quebec had been exploited by the
Anglophones, the PQ aggressively politicized the issue of sovereignty. In other words,
the sovereignty issue was the main recourse for the PQ to mobilize Quebecois in a
democratic setting. Although the PQ’s strategy was highly successful in gaining support
from the public, it had the cost of hurting social capital in Canada both among majorities
and minorities. The PQ’s appeal rendered the Francophones more skeptical of the
Anglophones, and the Anglophones also felt uncomfortable observing the separatist
movement. In this way, backed by the Francophones’ desire for more power in a
democratic setting, the PQ emerged as one of the most powerful competitors in the
political scene. However, the PQ’s tactics in politicizing the issue of sovereignty
consequently hurt social capital between the Anglophones and the Francophones.
Third, as the learning component of the integrative model suggests, a long period
of democratic rule has actually decreased social capital among Québécois. In Quebec,
democratic rule in a real sense had emerged in 1960, and the democratic force has been
continuously present in Canada since then. Against the conventional view that a longer
period of democratic rule will increase the levels of social capital, analyses here have
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revealed that democratic longevity has had a negative effect on social capital. For
instance, in every provincial election in Quebec, the PQ has presented Quebec
sovereignty as the main political issue, emphasizing the negative aspects of relationships
between the Anglophones and the Francophones. Consequently, the victimization and
political independence from the exploitation by the Anglophones have dominated the
political dialogue in Quebec for several decades. As learning theory suggests, continuous
exposure to these politicized issues have solidified Francophone distrust toward the
Anglophones. Furthermore, continuous exposures to these negative messages in highly
decentralized institutions can lead to separate regional identity. As most of these
messages were formulated along ethnic issues and identity in a regional context, it is
reasonable to think that the Francophones have developed a separate regional or ethnic
identity. Indeed, persistent support for Quebec sovereignty to date certainly indicates that
a long period of democratic rule does not automatically promote social integration
between different groups.
In sum, the case of Quebec is clearly consistent with the proposition of the
fragmentation-learning hypothesis. A long period of democratic rule, combined with
highly decentralized political institutions, has definitely led to the loss of social capital
among minorities. As the fragmentation-learning hypothesis suggests, in the case of
Canada, socialization through a long period of institutional learning resulted in the
fragmentation of the political system and society, thus hurting social capital. In this way,
the case study in this section has demonstrated the validity of the fragmentation-learning
hypothesis.
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One of the possible criticisms against this case study is that a distinct identity in
Quebec had already existed even before the democratic force emerged and the PQ
became a dominant political force. Therefore, critics may argue that federal
arrangements were the outcome of the political fragmentation rather than vice versa. Put
differently, there is a potential problem of endogeneity between social capital and federal
arrangements. Certainly, it may be true that the Francophones in Quebec have always
possessed a distinct identity in Canada, and the distinctiveness of the group pressed the
federal government to adopt the highly decentralized political system. I would not deny
this causal direction. However, there is evidence showing that the link connecting social
cleavages to federal arrangements is not inevitable. Brancati (2005) argues that the
existence of ethnic conflict or a strong identity group does not necessarily lead to the
installment of decentralized political systems. According to her, Sri Lanka, Madagascar
and Uganda are all examples of countries that are reluctant to adopt a decentralized
system due to its potential danger of exacerbating ethnic conflict. Thus, the link
connecting social cleavages to federal arrangements is not necessarily automatic.
Furthermore, even admitting that the effect of cleavages is a critical factor determining
federal structures, it is also true that decades of democratic learning under highly
decentralized institutions will lead to further fragmentation of the political system and
society. Especially when the process of political and social learning revolves around the
issue of ethnic identity, the proposition of fragmentation-learning is expected to hold well.
In this way, along with other scholars, it is possible to argue that federal arrangements
have the effect of intensifying ethnic conflict rather than mediating it.127 Counterfactually,
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the relationship between the Anglophones and the Francophones in Quebec would have
taken a rather different shape than it did for the past several decades without those factors
such as highly decentralized institutions, a long period of democratic rule, and the
interaction effects between these two variables.

7-4: Case study 3—Malaysia

7-4-1: Case selection

In previous sections, I have examined the effects of democratic longevity on social
capital in two different institutional settings. In the executive-parties dimension,
examining cases of the Baltic countries, I have shown that longevity has a positive impact
on social capital under consensus institutions. The analyses have also demonstrated that
that the same effect of longevity is lacking under majoritarian institutions. In the federalunitary dimension, in the case of Canada, I have demonstrated that democratic longevity
has a negative effect on trust in highly decentralized institutions. Therefore, in the
executive-parties dimension, case studies have confirmed the power-sharing-learning or

conflict. The case of the Canadian federation and the PQ can be considered one of the examples. Other
scholars have also explored negative effects that regional parties can have on ethnic conflict (Bhatnagar and
Kumar 1998, Gassah 1992, Kumar 1986). Some of them have even recognized how regional parties can
reinforce ethnic identities (de Winter and Tursan 1998, Keating 1998). Also, in the case of Canada, Cairns
(1977) notes that Canadian political institutions have shaped and reinforced social divisions.
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the direct-translation-learning hypothesis. In the federal-unitary dimension, the analyses
support the fragmentation-learning hypothesis.
Building on these findings, I further explore the applicability of the integrative
model of political and social learning in a more complicated situation. While political
institutions can be largely divided into majoritarian or consensus institutions depending
on the degrees of power-sharing in the political system, its institutional devices vary from
one country to another. In the analyses of the executive-parties dimension, the emphasis
was on the effects of citizenship policy as a proxy representing the nature of political
institutions in each country. In the federal-unitary dimension, the focus of the analyses
was placed on the federal decentralization as a mechanism of power-sharing. In this
section, I look into the substantive content of power-sharing arrangements. Specifically,
I demonstrated how power-sharing arrangements that tend to institutionalize ethnic
differences fail to generate social capital. I argue that institutional devices that are
designed to legitimize inequality among ethnic groups prevent people from learning to
trust others.
I test these propositions in the case of Malaysia. Although Malaysia is not a part
of the WVS, it severs as an important test case for studying the effects of political
institutions on ethnic relations for two reasons. First, political institutions in Malaysia
during are featured with a unique power-sharing. Scholars generally agree that the
political system of Malaysia during the period of 1957-1969 had been consociational
based on the ethnic division of labor. While the Malays dominated the political power in
Malaysia, the Chinese were allowed to retain their dominant influence in the economic
sphere. Second, ethnic tensions in Malaysia have escalated at times. Although the
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consociational arrangements during this period effectively contained the breakout of
ethnic violence, the system faced serious challenges when the election of 1969 revealed
the changing power relations between the Malays and non-Malays. After the election of
1969, ethnic riot broke up in Kuala Lumpur and revealed ethnic schism in society.
Although a reliable survey data is not available in Malaysia, the levels of social capital
among ethnic groups are significantly low. The ethnic tension between Malay and nonMalay remain strong, and we still witness ethnic riots occasionally.
In this case study, I show that power-sharing arrangements that legitimize
inequality among ethnic groups are more likely to fail in generating social capital. For
that objective, I scrutinize how the process of successful elite accommodation collapsed
in Malaysia in 1969. Furthermore, analyses in this cases study suggest that powersharing arrangements that tend to intensify ethnic identity are not conducive to making
peaceful ethnic relations. Hence, I suggest that power-sharing between different ethnic
groups has to be designed so that every group perceives it as fair. Institutional
arrangements that create and accumulate grievance along ethnic lines tend to fail in
fostering trust in the long-term.
I measure levels of social capital by tapping riots. Especially, the focus in this
case study is placed on the riot that took place in 1969. The ethnic clash in 1969 clearly
reflects the short supply of trust between Malay and Chinese communities. Also, the riot
can be considered as the failed outcome of institutional learning based on consociational
arrangements. Assuming that ethnic riots represent the lack of trust among ethnic groups,
I investigate the relationship between social capital, political institutions, and democratic
longevity.
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7-4-2: Background

One of the most important dynamics underlying Malaysian politics is the issue of
ethnicity. The three major ethnic groups in the country are the Malays (42% of the
country in the 1970s), the Chinese (38%) and the Indians (10%), with other ethnic groups
accounting for the remaining 10%.128 The Chinese are mainly settled in the states on the
west coast of the Malay Peninsula, particularly in the urban and industrial areas such as
Kuala Lumpur. Malays are a majority group on the rest of the peninsula.
Malays who speak Malay believe in Muslim. Malays are portrayed as the
bumiputera (literally, “sons of the soil), or the original inhabitants of the land.129 This
unique indigenous status means, to the Malays, that they should enjoy privileges over
other ethnic groups, such as the Chinese and Indians, and that their political dominance,
bureaucratic control, and economic opportunity should be guaranteed. Furthermore,
Malays regard the Chinese and Indians as aliens or possibly a necessary evil. For
instance, the 1970 government report articulates, “The multi-racial character of the
country is the result of British economic policy before World War II. Malaya’s vast
economic potential and the liberal, tolerant attitude of the Malays, exploited by the
colonial government, caused an influx of Chinese and Indian immigrants, and mass
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immigration continued until the thirties.”130 In other words, Malays argued that the large
number of Chinese and Indian newcomers destroyed the peaceful life of the Malays by
dominating the Malay economy.
The Chinese speak a variety of dialectics and hold various religions such as
Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism. Most of the Indians are Hindu Tamils. There are
also small portions of Muslims, Sikhs, and Sinhalese in Malaysia as well. While the
Malays consider themselves bumiputera, the Chinese and Indians, needless to say, do not
consider themselves as intruders. For example, from the Chinese perspective, it was the
Chinese who resisted the invaders during the anti-Japanese war. Therefore, the Chinese
think of themselves as defenders of Malaysian independence. Furthermore, during the
counterinsurgency war of the 1950s, more Chinese were killed fighting the communists
than any other racial group, including the British and Commonwealth solders—a fact
often overlooked by the Malays.131 Consequently, Malays and Chinese over the years
have developed negative stereotypes of each other.132
Several factors contributed to the ethnic tensions between the Malays and Chinese
in Malaysia. One of the most important factors was the British colonial rule. During the
colonial period, the British invariably took the side of the Malay community. As a
practice of “divide and rule” the colonial power adopted preferential and protectionist
policies toward the Malays. For instance, British labor recruitment policies in colonial
Malaya were ethnically segmented to weaken the bargaining power of a group (Abraham
See National Operations Council, The May 13 Tragedy: A Report (Kuala Lumpur: The Council, 1969),
p. 1.
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1997). Abraham (1983) argues that it was colonial practice that intensified pre-existing
ethnic stereotypes. Subsequently, these practices were carried over to post-colonial
Malaysia. With an attempt to maximize its own benefits, the British reinforced ethnic
tensions in Malaysia.
The experience of World War II also significantly worsened ethnic relations in
Malaysia.133 The Japanese occupation considered the Chinese in Malaya as enemies
because the Japanese were simultaneously fighting in China. A number of Chinese
joined the Communist-led guerrillas and fought the Japanese. Toward the end of the war,
before the British arrived in the country, the guerrillas took over some towns and
proclaimed that Malaysia would become part of China. Against this threat, Malays dealt
with the Chinese rather violently. These events, during the interregnum period before the
British arrived, installed in the minds of Malays strong fears against the potential threat
from the Chinese.
Because of the animosity and distrust between the Malays and Chinese, the
process toward independent Malaya featured struggles among different ethnic groups.
Political elites had to solve the issues regarding ethnicity before they could achieve
independence. Therefore, negotiations over the independence were to take place not only
between Malaysia and its colonial master, but also between the major ethnic groups of
the new state (Lee and Heng 2000). Because the course toward independence was going
to determine the basic principles of the new states, different groups severely competed for
their own positions over such issues as religions, languages, citizenship rights, and
privileged positions for the Malays.
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In 1945, the British proposed the so-called Malayan Union, which would have
stripped the Malay monarchs of all but ceremonial powers and granted broad citizenship
rights to non-Malays. The Malays protested against this plan, and this protest movement
consequently formed the United Malays National Organizations (UMNO), which would
have significant impacts on the later ethnic politics in Malaysia (Stockwell 1977, 1979).
The protest by Malays succeeded, and the Union Plan was withdrawn in 1947. Instead,
the Federation of Malaya was presented. Under the Federation, the government would
preserve the decentralized structure and the sultan’s power and symbolic role were left
more or less intact. Furthermore, stringent requirements for citizenship were imposed on
non-Malays. Perceiving the suggested federation as a threat from the Malay community,
non-Malays launched a series of protest campaigns. Eventually, however, the protests
failed, and the federation was imposed.
Malaysia gained independence from the British in 1957. Six years later, in 1963,
Malaysia was created by the union of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak, though
Singapore seceded two years later. As inevitable aspects of multiethnic states, different
ethnic groups with solid ethnic identities had to compete with each other within the
framework of the nation-state. Therefore, the most critical factor in stabilizing the
political system in Malaysia was whether the political system would be able to manage
ethnic tensions in the political system and society. As the divisions between ethnic
groups are so deep, “Every political issue tends to be transformed into a communal one”
(Zakaria 1993, p. 145). In this situation, the most imperative task that Malaysia faced
was to develop a system of conflict management in mediating ethnic relations.
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7-4-3: Consociational System of Malaysia

Due to its multiethnic nature, Malaysia has always suffered from certain degrees of ethnic
tensions within the political system and society. In preparing for independence of
Malaysia, the most important task that political elites in Malaysia had to attain was to
develop a system of ethnic conflict management. In establishing the system, the British
played a pivotal role. The British brought together Malay and non-Malay leaders as
members of state councils, and in the final years of British rule they formed the
Communities Liaison Committee (CLC) in which groups of each ethnic community met
in private to discuss communal relations in an independent Malaya (Case 1996). The
CLC served as the foundation of elite accommodation that intended to reduce the stress
and pressure of nation-state building.
The most crucial decision made through the process of elite accommodation was
the inter-communal bargain of 1957. The bargaining was concluded by the elites from
each ethnic community including the United Malays National Organizations (UMNO),
the Malaysian Chinese Associations (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress
(MIC).134 While the bargain accorded “special rights” to the Malays, it guaranteed
citizenship for the non-Malays (Crouch 1996; Means 1976; Milne and Mauzy 1980).
Simply speaking, the bargain explicitly stipulated the ethnic division of labor. While the
Malay community was provided with special rights, which granted dominant power in
the political arena, the Chinese were allowed to retain their economic influence. As is
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represented by the phrase “Politics for the Malays, economy for the Chinese,” the intercommunal bargain in 1957 was based on the ethnic division of labor within the political
system and society (Case 1996). Accordingly, trespassing beyond the demarcation line
would result in severe ethnic tensions. In this way, power-sharing arrangements in
Malaysia attempted to impose the ethnic division of labor in order to preserve the Malay
dominance in the political system.
This kind of bargaining was advantageous to both parties. According to Esman
(1972), “the Malays gained political independence, control of government, and a polity
which was to be Malay in style and in its system of symbols. In return, the Chinese
gained more than oversea Chinese in Southeast Asia had dreamed of—equal citizenship,
political participation and officeholding, unimpaired economic opportunity, and tolerance
for their language, religion, and cultural institutions” (p. 25, cited by Lijphart 1977, p.
151). Consequently, a series of bargaining was struck between the Malay and non-Malay
communities in setting rules of the new nation-state. Islam became the official religion in
Malaysia, but Malaya would not be an Islamic state. Sultans were granted essentially
ceremonial powers, but they were given roles as defenders of Islam. Both Malay and
English would be the official language for ten years, but after that period only Malay
would be used as official languages. Islamic laws and syariah courts would be
established, but they would apply only to Muslims.
The most important institutional arrangement that made this bargaining possible
was the multiethnic coalition called the Alliance. The Alliance included the UMNO, the
MCA, and the MIC, and it ran electoral campaigns as a single slate.135 In the Malaysian
political system, the UMNO controls the post of prime minister and a majority in the
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cabinet. While the Malays have always exerted dominant power in the Alliance Party,
Chinese and Indian communities also have access to power through the alliance.
Malaysia’s relative stability owed much to the system of elite accommodation through
the multiethnic coalition of the Alliance. The principles of elite accommodation were as
follows:

1. Each ethnic community was unified under a leadership that was authorized to
bargain for that community;
2. Leaders from each community were be able to guarantee that their followers
would accept the outcome of negotiations;
3. Elites from different ethnic communities trusted each other;
4. Parliament and other representative institutions accepted their diminished roles of
simply ratifying the outcomes of elite bargaining.136

The system of elite accommodation worked reasonably well from 1957 to 1969.
Members of this conservative coalition supported candidates from other communities,
thereby guaranteeing victory in elections. The Alliance based on the above principle
functioned as intended as long as each ethnic community felt that its interests were well
served. Focusing on the aspects of segmental autonomy and grand coalition, Lijphart
(1977) concludes that the political system of Malaysia during this period of is perhaps
consociational. The electoral system in Malaysia helped the dominance of the Alliance.
The federal electoral system was broadly modeled on the Westminster system, with an
elected lower house based on single-member district and an appointed upper house.
136
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Greatly benefiting from the single-member district, the Alliance Party overwhelmingly
won every election until 1969.
However, despite the claim of consociationalism, the share of state positions was
not fully proportional or democratic (Case 1996). Chinese elites accepted significant
levels of under-representation in the government, bureaucracy, and military in exchange
for economic benefits and citizenship. Furthermore, in the Alliance Council and cabinet
meetings—the uppermost decision making committees—UMNO elites never conceded
any power of “mutual veto” to the Chinese community over what they considered to be
vital Malay interests.137 In a similar manner, some evidence suggests that UMNO elites
were not willing to grant the Chinese with “segmental autonomy” in a real sense over
their own community’s cultural policies, especially in linguistic and educational issues.138
Therefore, we can conclude that while meaningful negotiations took place within the
Alliance, the Chinese elites did not have clear vetoes or issue-area autonomy. Lijphart
(1977) himself is aware of the weak position of the Chinese elites in the Alliance and
notes:

It is extremely difficult to evaluate…whether the economic
superiority of the non-Malays adequately balanced Malay political
hegemony…[T]he political dominant role of the Malays in the
Alliance in the Malaysian government…throws some doubt of the
consociational character of the Malaysian regime even in the 19551969 period (p. 152-154).
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However, while it is true that the power-sharing arrangements in Malaysia lacked
proportional allocation of power and segmental autonomy as Lijphart defines them,
Malaysian elites did interact with elites from other ethnic communities in a consensual
way. Commenting on this situation, R.S. Milne (1967) notes “a kind of short-term rough
justice between the claims of the communities [was] in fact…attained” (p. 41).
Furthermore, other observers note that bargaining that incorporated non-Malay interests
persisted in later period even after the 1969 riot.139 Thus, although evidence suggests that
while the internal dynamics in the Alliance were rather disadvantageous to the side of
non-Malay communities, the conflict management mechanism within the Alliance
definitely incorporated the interests of non-Malay communities.
Although Lijphart (1977) points out that federalism is one of the most important
elements of the consociational system, the federal system in Malaysia played only a
marginal role. At the time of independence in 1957, Malaysia adopted a federal system
which consisted of 11 states. In 1963, two more states, Sabah and Sawawak joined
Malaysia. The constitutional framework provided Sabah and Sawawak with considerably
more autonomy than the other states. Although the city of Singapore was part of the
federation during the period of 1963-1965, it seceded when invited to leave by Malaysian
Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman due to communal tensions between the Malays and
the Chinese. After the secession of Singapore, the federal system in Malaysia has not
been a source of ethnic tensions. With no large territory identified with a non-Malay or
Chinese population, the threat for secession did not exist. The closest to such a situation
is the island state of Penang where the majority population is Chinese. However, most of
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the people in the state realize that an independent Penang is not viable, and no serious
secessionist attempt has been made since independence (Sopiee 1974). Therefore, while
the Alliance has been the main arena of ethnic accommodation, the roles of federalism in
Malaysia as a device of ethnic accommodation were of secondary importance.

7-4-4: The Breakdown of Consociational Accommodation

After its independence, the elite interaction in the decision-making system in the Alliance
took place in a rather consensual way. Leaders from different ethnic communities were
bound by personal friendships, always observing informal bans on violating secrecy of
the elite interaction. Furthermore, while the intense bargaining over ethnic issues was
permitted within the decision-making system, the interactions between elites were
tempered by a “spirit of accommodation” and “mutual restraint.”140Thus, elites in the
Alliance hoped that the sub-elites and the masses would also accept their assigned roles
in the political system.
However, the system of elite accommodation began to unravel toward the end of
the 1960s. One of the most important factors that contributed to the breakdown of the
system of elite accommodation was the economic growth during the 1960s. As the
economy continued to grow during the 1960s, the Malays became gradually aware that
they were not gaining enough benefits from the economic growth. They felt that the
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economic growth was only benefiting the non-Malay communities.141 As a consequence,
the dissatisfaction within the Malay community had significantly grown, undermining
their willingness to accept the status quo.142 Representing this dissatisfaction, the Malays
began to demand that only the Malay language be used in state transactions and
schools.143 They expected that if Malay became the sole official language, their positions
in society and their economic situation would be improved.
While the Malays claimed their privileged positions, the Alliance attempted to
accommodate the non-Malay feelings by passing a law admitting the continual use of
English while recognizing the official status of Malay. Against this law, the Malays
expressed their feeling of dissatisfaction by launching protests. At the same time, both
Malay and non-Malay sub-elites were being frustrated toward the Alliance.144 For those
who were only concerned with the interest of their own ethnic community, the stance of
the Alliance was too conceding toward other ethnic communities. Accordingly, the eliteaccommodation through the decision-making system in the Alliance began to suffer from
the loss of mass support. In this situation, communal leaders had a difficult time
controlling their populations. For instance, Chinese youths born in Malaya demanded
full equality instead of the unsatisfying arrangements negotiated between MCA leaders
with UMNO. As consociational arrangements did not equally benefit all of the sections
within the Chinese community, those Chinese who were left out of the benefits from the
consociational arrangements accumulated their frustration. Even Malays expressed their
dissatisfaction toward the Alliance Party. As a consequence, opposition groups were
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established. The Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PAS) emphasized traditional Malay rights.
The Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the Malaysian People’s Movement Party
(Gerakan) attempted to represent the rights of Chinese citizens. Being critical of the
stances of the Alliance, these parties challenged the tradition of elite-accommodation.
Therefore, new parties began to explicitly speak on issues that would offend the Malays.
Consequently, with leaders appealing to ethnic issues, communal tensions mounted
significantly. Leu Teik Soon (1969) notes, “the unwritten law regarding communal
issues was violated by both Alliance and opposition parties when they indulged in open
public and heated debate.”145
The election of 1969 showed an unexpected, mass-level reciprocity to the
oppositions’ ethnic appeals. A lot of voters drifted from the UMNO support toward the
PAS especially in the state elections in Kedah, and Trengganu. Also, the Chinese voters
shifted their support from the MCA to the DAP and Gerakan in state assembly elections.
In the parliamentary elections, the Alliance won a plurality (48%) of votes that were
barely enough to retain control of the federal government, but it lost control of several
state assemblies.146 These electoral outcomes impressed people in Malaysia with the
shifting power relations among ethnic groups. The result was the massive social turmoil.
While the Chinese were hailing their victory in the election, the Malay community felt
that it would be able to control neither the economy nor politics in their own country.
Reacting to chauvinist mobilization by Malay elites, civil disorder followed and hundreds
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of Chinese were killed.147 Consequently, Malaysia was placed under marital law for the
period of twenty-one months.
The 1969 riot had a significant impact on the political system of Malaysia,
especially during the period from 1969 to 1971. During the period, Malaysia was
governed by the National Operations Council (NOC). The NOC and subsequent
administrations amended the Constitutions so that the government could contain future
riots while maintaining Malay privileges. The inter-communal bargain of 1957 was reevaluated. The emergency rule from 1969 to 1971 and constitutional amendments in
1971 clearly emphasized Malay predominance in Malaysian politics (Means 1991). The
political system after the 1969 riot has placed high emphasis on “the primacy of Malay
political power, in contrast to the more multiracial leadership that had been a
characteristic of the 1957-1969 period” (Zakaria 1993, p. 153). Newly passed laws
explicitly banned the discussion of “sensitive issues” such as the advantages of declaring
Malay the national language, the privilege position of Malays, or the status of the sultans.
Furthermore, not only securing the Malay position in politics, the UMNO also
attempted to project its power to the economic sphere, which was traditionally dominated
by the Chinese. By introducing the New Economic Policy (NEP), the UMNO tried to
redress the relative poverty in the Malay community. The fact that the UMNO-led
government began to encroach on economic issues clearly suggests that the spirit of the
bargain of 1957 was fading away, opening a way for a more Malay dominant ideology.
The effect of the NEP was drastic. The Malay community’s sense of relative deprivation
gradually declined as the state became more assertive in the economic realm as a result of
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the NEP.148 The incidence of poverty among Malays also declined significantly from
64.8% in 1970 to 23.8% in 1988.149
As we have seen, when the Alliance’s inability to accommodate mass desires
from each ethnic community became obvious in the 1969 election, ethnic tensions
between the Malays and the Chinese escalated into ethnic violence. The communal
violence in 1969 indicates that the system of ethnic conflict management through the
Alliance failed to produce social capital among ethnic groups. While political elites at
the summit level within the UMNO were closely connected with the spirit of elite
accommodation, the system of conflict management was basically incapable of
improving ethnic tensions at the lower levels.150 When the frustrations of the masses were
clearly demonstrated through the election of 1969, the consociational arrangements could
not absorb the tensions and pressures from ethnic communities. As a result, the
consociational democracy in Malaysia collapsed, and the political system in Malays went
through significant transformation toward more restrictive semi-democracy.

7-4-5: Conclusion: Malaysia’s Consociational Learning

In this section, I have looked at the content of the power-sharing arrangements in
Malaysia. Specifically, I have analyzed how the power-sharing arrangements based on
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the ethnic division of labor affected ethnic relations in Malaysia. While scholars
generally agree that the political system of Malaysia during the period of 1957-69 was
consociational, the power-sharing arrangements included significant ethnic inequality;
whereas the Malays enjoyed dominant political power, the Chinese were allowed to
retain their influence in the economic sphere. Although the multiethnic coalition of the
Alliance was successful in mediating ethnic tensions at the initial stage following the
independence of Malaysia, the consociational arrangements began to unravel as Malaysia
went through significant economic growth in the 1960s. While the Malays began to be
frustrated over their relative economic grievance, the Chinese community demanded
more equal power within the government. Finally, as the 1969 riot clearly shows, the
consociational power-sharing arrangements came to an end in face of rising ethnic
tensions. Although the Alliance attempted to assign each ethnic community with a
different role within the political system and society, the arrangements failed to maintain
peace among different ethnic communities.
Surveying the period of the consociational accommodation in Malaysia, the main
findings in this section are twofold. First, power-sharing arrangements that reinforce
inequality among ethnic groups are more likely to fail. As several scholars suggested, the
major principle of consociational arrangements in Malaysia was to differentiate Malays
and non-Malays. While Malays were granted political power, the Chinese were allowed
to maintain their dominance in the economic sphere. However, although these
arrangements were initially effective in stabilizing the political system during the postindependent period, the arrangements that were designed to maintain the inequality
between ethnic groups eventually exacerbated the grievances on both ethnic communities.
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In this way, the case study in Malaysia suggests that elements of inequality in powersharing arrangements were highly detrimental in fostering social capital.
Second, as is related to the first point, analyses here suggest that power-sharing
arrangements in Malaysia intensified ethnic identities and consequently worsened ethnic
relations. As consociational arrangements in Malaysia have explicitly legitimated the
discrimination of ethnic groups in the political system and society, potential gains and
losses involving ethnic issues tend to be large. Therefore, consociationalism in Malaysia
has magnified the significance of ethnic identity. Combined with accumulated
grievances on both ethnic communities, strong ethnic identity embedded within the
political institutions badly eroded social capital.
These findings provide significant implications for suggested hypotheses.
Although I have found support for the direct-translation-learning hypothesis and the
power-sharing-learning hypothesis in previous case studies, the case of Malaysia only
partially supports these hypotheses. While they were effective in the transitional period
following the independence in Malaysia, institutional arrangements that emphasized and
reinforced the inequality among ethnic groups did not improve ethnic relations. On the
contrary, the power-sharing arrangements between the Malays and non-Malays within the
Alliance resulted in further institutionalization of ethnic identity and subsequent ethnic
tensions. Therefore, the power-sharing-learning hypothesis does not completely hold in
Malaysia. Also, as power-sharing arrangements in Malaysia cannot be categorized as a
majoritarian or consensus type in the ideal sense, it is difficult to apply the directtranslation-learning hypothesis. However, as the direct-translation-learning hypothesis
assumes, the rules of the game in the Malaysian political system seem to be zero-sum
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based on the ethnic division of labor. While the Malays gain more in the economic
sphere, the Chinese tend to be dissatisfied with the relative gain on the Malay side. In
that sense, the direct-translation-learning hypothesis can capture fundamental dynamics
surrounding social capital in Malaysia.
What happened in Malaysia during the period of 1957-1969 was that
consociationalism based on the ethnic division of labor fragmented the political system
and society, thus undermining trust among ethnic groups. Although federal systems did
not play a major role in Malaysia, we have found that consociational arrangements
designed to preserve the dominance of a particular ethnic group had a fragmenting effect
on the political system and the society. By reinforcing the ethnic division in society, both
groups consequently accumulated their frustration toward other group, the situation
consistent with the fragmentation-learning hypothesis. In this way, the upshot of this
case study is that we need to be sensitive to the content of power-sharing arrangements if
we wish to foster social capital in multiethnic settings.
The experience of Malaysia suggests the extreme difficulty of introducing and
maintaining democratic principles in multiethnic societies. Later, the Prime Minister,
Tunku Abdul Raham, who could not contain the ethnic violence noted that he should
have suspended the election and declare a state of Emergency in 1969 to cool down the
ethnic tension.151 Depending on the situation, democratic force in multiethnic societies
could be disturbing for a harmonious relationship among ethnic groups. If full
democracy was to develop in Malaysia in the future, it is essential that political elites
garner enough support for the political system. Also, for the democratic system to work

151

See Milne and Mauzy (1980), p. 80.

258

in multiethnic states such as Malaysia, it is critical that the majority and minority both
foster trust in society.
As it may be inevitable, Malaysia’s democracy has gone through a serious setback
since the 1969 riot with various restrictions newly imposed. While elections are held
fairly and freely, the UMNO has always taken a dominant position in the political system
of Malaysia. As the UMNO controls the media, it enjoys greater advantages in electoral
campaigns. Also, the leadership at the UMNO would not tolerate dissidents, and it has
arrested a number of competitors who seriously challenge the dominance of the UMNO.
Along with these, civil rights and liberties were also severely restricted. Citizens were
not allowed to organize freely or to express their opinions regarding sensitive issues. In
this way, the government has imposed severe restrictions on democratic principles.152
Although the Malay society may look peaceful with less ethnic tensions, that may be due
to the lack of genuine democratic force.153 With the government forcefully guaranteeing
the dominance of the Malays in the political system, non-ethnic communities would not
dare to challenge the dominance. The real challenge for Malaysia is how it can introduce
genuine democratic force without resulting in social turmoil.
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7-5: Conclusion (Case Studies)

In this chapter, I have conducted case studies to show the detailed causal mechanisms
identified by the statistical analyses. To analyze the effect of democratic longevity in the
executive-parties institutions, I have examined the situations in the Baltic countries
focusing on citizenship rules and their democratic experiences. Consistent with the
findings from the statistical analyses, I found that democratic longevity in consensus
institutions in Lithuania boosts trust among minorities, while longevity in majoritarian
institutions in Estonia and Latvia has not been effective in fostering trust. Consequently,
we can conclude that the hypothesized mechanism in the power-sharing-learning
hypothesis reasonably holds. In the analysis on the federal-unitary institutions, I have
examined the Quebec separatist movement in Canada. The Quebec case study has
proved that a long period of democratic rule in highly decentralized institutions
undermines social capital by fragmenting the political system and society. As a
consequence, I have verified the proposition of the fragmentation-learning hypothesis.
Furthermore, I have looked at the case of Malaysia during the period from 1957-1969
during which consociational power-sharing arrangements were installed. In this case
study, I have demonstrated that while consociational power-sharing arrangements were
initially effective containing ethnic tensions, they could not regulate ethnic violence. The
consociational arrangements in Malaysia institutionalized ethnic inequalities and
identities and consequently intensified ethnic conflict. Hence, the case study in Malaysia
advances our understanding of the causal mechanisms through which political and social
learning generates trust. Finally, the dynamics which is common in these cases is that
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ethnic groups tend to evaluate their power or positions in the political system vis-à-vis
their opponents in the political system. Case studies have clearly demonstrated that the
mechanism through which citizens learn to trust others largely depends on their zero-sum
perceptions compared with other groups in society. In this sense, the findings support the
direct-translation-learning hypothesis. In this way, these case studies in three regions
overall support the findings from the statistical analyses.
In addition, one of the most important implications from these case studies is that
social capital among minorities is important for securing the stability of democracies.
While the statistical analyses suggest the effect of democratic longevity is confined only
among minorities, case studies conducted indicate that social capital among minorities
does matter determining the stability of democratic regimes. When minorities express
their dissatisfaction with the political systems or to their fellow citizens, it becomes very
difficult for them to engage in the task of stable nation-state building. In building a new
nation-state, therefore, it is imperative that policy-makers be sensitive to minority issues
so that they can develop trust among minority groups. Is it better to include minorities
into the decision-making process? How much power are policy-makers supposed to
grant to minorities? Or what kind of power-sharing or autonomy should policy-makers
design to stabilize the political system? We have learned important implications for these
questions in case studies. Finally, these questions are deeply concerned with important
principles of liberal democracy. The implications from these case studies are critical in
formulating a democratic regime that maintains sensitive balance between the majority
principle and guarantee of minority rights.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion

Scholars have documented the essential roles of social capital for liberal democracy.
Putnam (1993) argues that social capital is a prerequisite for functioning democracy.
Without social capital, the hope for successful democratization and its consolidation is
slim. Recognizing the importance of social capital, one of the fundamental questions
underlying this study is whether or not it is possible to generate social capital in the
context of multiethnic states in which scholars argue social capital tends to be
substantially poor. Two different approaches to social capital offer different answers to
this question. The exogenous approach recognizes social capital as culturally inherent.
According to this perspective, it is impossible to generate social capital in a short time
because its levels are culturally predetermined. On the other hand, the endogenous
approach argues that social capital is subject to change depending on certain factors.
According to this approach, it is possible to build social capital even in an environment in
which it is inherently in short supply. The debate over these two competing perspectives
has important implications for the future of multiethnic democracies. If the exogenous
approach is correct, multiethnic democracies with a low endowment of social capital are
doomed in consolidating their democratic regimes. However, if the endogenous
approach is valid, any country should have a chance of successfully consolidating
democracy by fostering social capital.
I address the debate by integrating insights from different existing research
programs. Specifically, relying on the theory of institutional management of ethnic
conflict and the theory of institutional learning, I have constructed an integrated theory of
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political and social learning. The model consists of two main components. The first
component is concerned with institutional effects on social capital. Based on findings
from previous studies on institutional management of ethnic conflict, it theorizes the
different effects of majoritarian or consensus institutions. Regarding this component, I
argue that exclusive or inclusive principles of political institutions determine levels of
social capital. In other words, I hypothesize that the way a political system deals with
minorities makes a significant difference in generating social capital in heterogeneous
environments. As a consequence, the first component of the integrative model captures
the critical characteristics of political institutions—whether the political institutions are
established based on majoritarian or consensus principles.
The second component of the model focuses on the learning effect of democratic
longevity. Relying on the theory of institutional learning, this component is formulated
based on the assumption that people learn certain values through their experiences with
political institutions. Put differently, I hypothesize that when people are exposed to
certain political institutions, they tend to take on values that the institutions attempt to
realize. Furthermore, the learning theory suggests that the period during which citizens
are exposed to certain institutions is critical in determining their learning effects. In other
words, the longer citizens experience certain institutions, the more strongly they tend to
learn the institutions’ values. Therefore, the second component of the model
operationalizes democratic longevity as a measure of a learning effect.
To fully understand the mechanism through which social capital is generated by
democratic institutions, I argue that it is essential to integrate these two components into
a single theoretical model. The integrative model makes it possible for us to analyze how
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people learn to trust others through their experiences with political institutions. In other
words, the integrative model dissects the process through which citizens’ experiences
with political institutions translate into social capital over time.
I have examined the applicability of the integrative model by using two different
approaches: statistical analyses and case studies. In the statistical analyses, I have tested
the model by adopting a probit analysis. Then, to address the potential problem of
endogeneity between social capital and democratic longevity, I have further examined my
hypotheses relying on the instrumental variables approach (IV-2SLS). In addition to the
statistical analyses, I have conducted case studies to dissect a detailed causal mechanism
through which social capital can be generated by political institutions. In the first part of
the case studies, I have analyzed the roles of longevity in the executive-parties
institutional dimension in cases examining Baltic countries. Adopting citizenship rules in
each country as a proxy of political institutions, I have conducted comparative analyses
among three countries. In the second part, I have closely looked at the interaction
between democratic longevity and federal-unitary institutions in the context of the
Quebec separatist movement. The Quebec case study investigated how democratic
longevity affects trust among the Francophones in highly decentralized institutions. In
the third part, I have applied the integrative model to the case of consociational Malaysia.
By doing so, I have analyzed why institutional learning during the period of
consociationalism failed in generating trust among ethnic groups. Thus, this study has
tested the applicability of the integrative model, relying on statistical analyses and case
studies.
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The main findings from these analyses are threefold. First, in the executiveparties institutional dimension, I have found that democratic longevity under consensus
types of institutions generates more trust. Power-sharing arrangements between different
segments in society foster trust over time. Therefore, this finding indicates that
consensus institutions are more conducive to generating trust in the long term. Second, I
have shown that democratic longevity under highly decentralized institutions undermines
trust. The analyses suggest that political and social learning in decentralized states tends
to fragment the political system and society, thus undermining trust. Therefore, a longer
period of democratic rule under decentralized political institutions has a negative effect
on trust. Third, the analyses have indicated these effects are generally confined to
minorities. Once we address the problem of endogeneity between democratic longevity
and social capital by adopting an IV-2SLS method, the statistical significance among the
majority sample disappears. Considering that the problem of endogeneity is more serious
in the majority sample than in the minority samples, this result conforms to our
theoretical expectation. Hence, only minorities are susceptible to the effects of
institutions and democratic longevity. However, this does not undermine the importance
of social capital among the minority. Case studies in the Baltic countries, Canada, and
Malaysia clearly show that ethnic groups develop or lose trust by evaluating their relative
positions in society vis-à-vis other groups. The question of how a political system can
incorporate minority groups can have significant impacts on the stability and
sustainability of democracy. In this way, the analyses have demonstrated that the
integrative model of political and social learning is applicable; I have shown that citizens’
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experience with political institutions subsequently translate into social capital through
democratic rule.
As we have seen, this study has successfully dissected the mechanisms through
which social capital is produced or hindered by political institutions and democratic
longevity. By conducting analyses through various methods, I have been able to specify
detailed dynamics surrounding social capital in heterogeneous environments.
Consequently, I have revealed novel relationships between social capital, political
institutions, and democratic longevity, thus making an important contribution to the
literature. Besides the accounts of the causal mechanism, this study provides a fairly
optimistic view regarding the future of new democracies. Since the early 90s, democracy
has become more and more popular in the world. In the global trend, a number of
countries with heterogeneous environments have launched their efforts toward nationstate building and democratization. While some studies suggest that ethnic diversities
and social capital are never compatible, this study suggests that they can be. Even in
states with low endowments of social capital, we can generate trust over time by carefully
formulating political institutions. Thus, the integrative model of political and social
learning provides hope for successful consolidation of multiethnic democracies.
Based on the findings from this study, it is possible to present several policy
implications. First, regarding the institutional arrangements in the executive-parties
dimension, this study suggests the beneficial effects of power-sharing arrangements
among different ethnic groups. For instance, one of the most typical power-sharing
arrangements in the executive-parties dimension is PR electoral systems. Since PR
systems promote the inclusion of smaller parties into the decision-making system, these
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arrangements are thought to generate more trust in multiethnic states. Consistent with the
theoretical expectation, the analyses in this study have confirmed the proposition. In a
similar manner, it is important that other institutional arrangements are also formulated
with some kinds of power-sharing provisions among ethnic groups. By carefully
establishing systems of power-sharing through cabinets, executive-legislative balances,
party systems, and electoral systems, it becomes possible for citizens to learn to trust
others. Thus, this study emphasizes the importance of power-sharing arrangements.
Second, regarding the federal-unitary dimension, this study warns of the danger of
excessive decentralization. As the statistical analyses and the case study on Quebec show,
the combination of highly decentralized institutions and democratic force can
dramatically destabilize the political system. Under highly decentralized institutions, a
regional party inevitably has an incentive to adopt an anti-system appeal toward the
public. As a consequence, citizens dissatisfied with the economic and political situation
tend to respond to the anti-system appeal, accelerating the trend toward the separatism.
Considering the dynamics between these two variables, I cannot emphasize too much the
potential danger of excessive degrees of decentralization. Certainly, decentralization may
be a necessary arrangement to address the issue of regional distinctiveness. By granting
more power to regional government, it becomes possible for the central government to
maintain a distinct region within the federal framework. Yet, policy makers need to be
careful regarding the way they devolve power. According to the findings from this study,
it is important that the decentralization process be implemented so that it would not
promote the establishment of regional parties with separatist desires. However, as
Brancati (2004) argues, banning identity-based parties outright is not the best way
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because it can jeopardize the democratic system as a whole. Instead, what is important is
to establish a political system which encourages political parties to widen their support
bases across ethnic groups. In this way, one of the policy implications from this study is
that policy makers need to combine federal arrangements with other institutional devices
that may hinder political and social fragmentations.
Third, I suggest it is important for policy makers to implement institutional
arrangements based on fairness and equality. As the case of Malaysia shows,
institutional managements based on the system of unequal representation among ethnic
groups are more likely to fail in generating trust. Since ethnic groups tend to perceive
their interests vis-à-vis those of other ethnic groups, even the slightest gap among them
may destabilize the social harmony. Another caveat concerning institutional
management of ethnic tensions is that political institutions should not further freeze
ethnic differences. One of the major reasons why consociationalism in Malaysia failed is
because the system intentionally institutionalized ethnic differences by stipulating
incentives and restrictions among ethnic groups. As a result, consociational
arrangements in Malaysia exacerbated the ethnic tension rather than reducing it.
Certainly, at an initial transitional phase, it may be necessary to adopt institutional
arrangements that may protect and reward certain ethnic groups more than others.
According to the findings of this study, however, it is essential that the arrangements
promote the sense of fairness and equality among ethnic groups. Otherwise, it is likely
that the system will eventually collapse due to the frustration among them.
In this way, this study provides three policy implications concerning the
institutional arrangements in multiethnic countries. Each of them is critical in generating
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trust among different ethnic groups. One of the most important points of these
implications is that they incorporate a long-term perspective into institutional
management of ethnic conflict. As the overall findings of this study show, it is critical
that policy makers be aware of the possible long-term consequences of institutional
arrangements. Therefore, these three points are keys to successful consolidation of
multiethnic democracies.
One of the main limitations of this study is the data availability. Although the
dependent variable in this study is trust across different ethnic groups, the WVS does not
allow us to explicitly ask respondents how they may or may not trust certain ethnic
groups in society. Therefore, there is a possibility that levels of trust measured in the
WVS may not travel across ethnic groups. Considering the limitation in data, it will be
beneficial to compile a new dataset that directly addresses the issue of ethnicity. With
that kind of dataset, we may be able to find more detailed causal mechanisms through
which social capital is generated in heterogeneous environments. Future studies need to
address the issue.
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Appendix A

Expanding Lijphart Index of Democracies

Lijphart (1999) has compiled the index of different types of democracies for 36 countries.
More specifically, he chooses 36 democracies (with a population of at least a quarter of a
million) that were democratic in the middle of 1996 and that had been continuously so
since 1977 or earlier. According to Lijphart (1999), there are two reasons for his
selections of 36 democracies. The substantive reason is to make sure that democracies in
the analyses are not ephemeral entities but reasonably stable and consolidated democratic
systems. The other reason he claims is procedural; in order to study the effects of
democratic institutions, he argues that it is necessary to measure more than a few
elections or cabinets. According to Lijphart, observing the functions of democratic
institutions for a short period of time would not be enough to assess the effects of
political institutions.
While these two criteria seem to be appropriate for studying mature democracies,
they have little to say about new democracies. Certainly, studying the effects of mature
democratic institutions is suggestive, but it is also necessary to devise a way to evaluate
political institutions in fledging democracies. Considering the fact that the number of
democratic countries has been dramatically increasing all over the world, inventing a way
to study new democracies is an imperative task. Furthermore, it is also possible that
political institutions in new democracies have significant effects on their societies.
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Especially, for instance, after a period of harsh authoritarian rule or devastating civil war,
the direction of a political transition can have a significant impact on people’s political
and social attitudes. Therefore, it is possible that only one or a few years of democratic
rule can affect people’s mindsets toward the political system and their fellow citizens.
For these reasons, I extend the Lijphart’s index to include new democracies as well as
authoritarian states that were excluded from the original index. Doing so allows us to
further compare the effects of different political institutions at different stages of
democratization.

Executive-parties Dimensions

Party Systems

According to Lijphart (1999), the first of the ten variables that features the majoritarianconsensus contrast is the difference between single-party majority governments and
broad multiparty coalitions. This difference can also be seen as the most important and
typical difference between the two types of democracies, because it clearly indicates the
contrast between concentration of power on one hand and power-sharing on the other.
Two-party systems epitomize the majoritarian model of democracies and
multiparty systems of the consensus model. Scholars contend that two-party systems
have both direct and indirect advantages over multiparty systems. According to Lijphart
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(1999), the first advantage is that they offer a clear choice between two alternative sets of
public policies, thus making it easier for voters to make decisions. Second, Lijphart
(1999) notes that they have a moderating influence because the two principal parties have
to compete for swing voters in the center of the political spectrum, and hence need to
advocate moderate policies. The effect of this mechanism is especially strong when large
numbers of voters are located in the political center. Third, two-party systems have an
important indirect advantage: they are essential for the formation of a single-party cabinet
that is stable and competent in making effective policy (Lijphart 1999).
Scholars have suggested that there exists a strong relationship between party
systems and the stability of the cabinet. Claiming that it is an “axiom in politics,”
Lawrence Lowell (1896) asserts, “the larger the number of discordant groups that form
the majority, the harder the task of pleasing them all, and the more feeble and unstable
the position of the cabinet” (p. 73-74, cited by Lijphart (1999), p. 64). This proposition
has important implications for two types of democracies. The majoritarians’ preference
for two-party systems is logically linked to their preference for powerful and dominant
one-party cabinets.
Having suggested that there is a relationship between the number of parties and
the cabinet, a critical question is how we should measure the number of parties in a party
system: whether to count small parties, and if not, how large a party has to be in order to
be counted in the system. Giovanni Sartori (1976) proposed one solution for this
problem. He suggests that parties that fail to win seats in parliament be ignored, and that
the relative strength of other parties be measured in terms of parliamentary seats.
Furthermore, as rules for counting parties in a party system, Sartori suggests two points:
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“coalition potential” or “blackmail potential.” A party has coalition potential if it has
participated in a governing coalition or if the major parties consider it as a possible
coalition partner. Parties that are ideologically unacceptable to other coalition partners,
and that lack coalition potential, also have to be counted if their size is large enough.154
Although Sartori’s criteria are very useful for distinguishing between the parties
that are significant in the political system and those that play only a minor role, they do
not work well for counting the number of parties in a political system. First, while
Sartori’s criteria are based on two factors, size and ideological compatibility, size is the
crucial factor. Only sufficiently large parties can have blackmail potential, but
sufficiently large size is also the chief determinant of coalition potential; small parties
with only a few seats may be moderate ideologically and hence acceptable to other
parties, but they rarely have coalition potential. Whether or not they are ideologically
compatible, therefore, parties that are counted are larger ones. Second, although size is
an important factor for Sartori’s criteria, he does not use this factor to make further
distinction among the relevant parties. For instance, the Christian Democratic party that
dominated Italian politics until the 1990s and its frequent coalition partner, the
Republican party, which has never won more than 5% of the entire seats in the lower
house, are counted equally.155
To overcome this defect, Jean Blondel (1968) suggested a method to classify
party systems that takes into account both their number and their relative sizes. In his
classification, he has four categories. The first one, two-party systems are dominated by
two large parties, although some other small parties may exist in parliament. The second
154

As an example of this case, Lijphart (1999) suggests the French and Italian Communist parties until the
1970s.
155
For the discussion, See Lijphart (1999).
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model is a “two-and-a-half” party system in which there is a considerably smaller party
but one that may have coalition potential and that plays a significant political role. For
instance, German and Luxembourg Liberals, the Irish Labor party, and the Canadian New
Democrats can be raised as the example. Third, systems with more than two-and-a-half
significant parties are multiparty systems. These systems can be further divided into
multiparty systems with or without a dominant party. Examples of systems with a
dominant party are pre-1990 Italy, dominated by the Christian Democratic Party, and the
three Scandinavian countries with their strong Socialist parties.
Although the concepts of a “dominant” or “half” party are useful, they are
obviously imprecise. Therefore, what we need is an index that tells us the number of
parties in a party system, taking their relative sizes into consideration. This method was
developed by Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera (1979) and is now widely adopted in
political science: the effective number of political parties [EFNP]. This is calculated as
follows:

EFNP =

1
∑ Si 2

in which Si is the proportional seats of the i-th party.156
In a two-party system with two equally strong parties, according to this formula,
the effective number of parties is exactly 2.0. If one party is stronger than the other, with
156

Although it is possible to calculate the effective number of parties based on their votes shares instead of
their seat shares, Lijphart (1999) consistently uses seat shares. This is because the focus of Lijphart’s study
is placed on the strength and patterns of parties in parliaments and on their effects on the formation of
cabinets. Also, the effective number of parties (N) carries the same information as the index of
fragmentation (Rae and Taylor 1970).
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respective seat shares of 70% and 30%, for instance, the effective number of parties is
1.7. In a similar manner, in a system with three equal parties, the effective number of
parties is 3.0. If the share of one of those parties is weaker, the number will vary
depending on the relative power of parties in a party system. In this way, the index of the
effective number of parties is an extremely useful tool to measure the characteristics of a
party system.
Regarding new democracies, I calculated the ENPV during the period of
democratic rule. For example, Argentina has received a score of at least 1 in the Polity
IV score since 1983. Because the survey in Argentina was conducted in 1995, I
calculated the ENPV for Argentina using data available from 1983 to 1995. I
consistently applied the same method to new democracies and calculated the ENPV for
each country.157 For authoritarian states, I calculated the ENPV with the data available
until the year of survey. However, due to the nature of the political systems, not many
years of data are actually available for authoritarian states. Table A-1 shows the ENPV
of each country included in this study.
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Table A-1 Effective Number of Parties (ENPV)
Country
(democracies)
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh158
Belgium
Brazil
Britain
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Denmark
Dominican Rep.
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Hungary
Iceland
India
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithuania

ENPV

Country

ENPV

3.24
2.22
2.22
2.79
4.32
7.78
2.11
2.52
2.37
6.89
4
4.51
2.47
5.03
5.03
3.43
12.44
3.8
3.72
4.11
2.84
4.91
3.71
6.33
3.65

Macedonia
Mexico
Moldova
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea161
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan162
Turkey
Ukraine
Uruguay
USA
Venezuela

3.28
2.88
2.62
4.65
3.35
3.7
3.3
4.79
7.41
3.33
3.5
7.9
6.61
2.22
3.15
2.76
3.33
5,24
2.22
3.35
21.86
3.35
2.4
3.38

Country
(authoritarian)
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
China159
Croatia
Ghana
Yugoslavia
Nigeria160

ENPV
2.48
5.28
22.44
1
2.32
1.12
4.37
1

Sources: Lijphart (1999), Lijphart Elections Archive (http://dodgson.ucsd.edu/lij/),
Election Results Archive(http://cdp.binghamton.edu/era/index.html) by the Center of
Democratic Performance, Political Transformation and the Electoral System in the PostCommunist Europe (http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/), Political Database of the
Americas (http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/english.html) by the Center for Latin
American Studies at the Georgetown University

158

1996 election has been included.
No reliable data exist in the case of China. However, the Communist Party has been
dominant in China. Therefore, a value of 1 has been assigned to these countries.
160
No reliable data exist in the case of Nigeria. Because of the country was under
military rule at the time of the survey, a value of 1 has been assigned.
161
1996 election has been included.
162
Only 1992 election has been included.
159
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Cabinets

The second variable that characterizes the difference between majoritarian and consensus
types of democracies concerns the degree of participation by the people’s representatives
in the executive branch of the government. This variable is important in contrasting
majoritarian and consensus types of democracies: the difference between one-party
majority governments and broad multiparty coalitions epitomizes the contrast between
the majoritarian principle of concentrating power in the hands of the majority and the
consensus principle of broad power-sharing.
Lijphart (1999) adopted the percentage of minimal-winning cabinets and oneparty cabinets as indicators of cabinets representing types of democracies. William H.
Riker’s (1962) “size principle” predicts that minimal-winning coalitions will be formed,
meaning that it is “winning” in the sense that the party or parties in the cabinet control a
majority or seats in parliament but “minimal” in the sense that the cabinet does not
include any party that is not required to reach a majority in parliament. The basic
assumption of minimal winning coalition theory is quite simple and reasonable: political
parties are interested in maximizing their power. In parliamentary systems, power means
having cabinet posts, and maximizing power means holding as many positions as
possible. To hold posts in cabinets, a minority party will have to be coalesced with one
or more other parties, but it is reluctant to include unnecessary parties in the coalition
because this would reduce the share of ministers in the cabinets. Where there is a
majority party in parliament, minimum-winning coalition theory makes a single
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prediction: a one-party, noncoalition cabinet formed by the majority party. Thus, the
most majoritarian type of cabinet is one that is single-party and minimal winning.
On the other hand, the most consensus type of government is multiparty and
oversized.163 When a party cannot gain majority in parliament, it has to form a coalition
with other parties. In other words, a party has to make arrangements of power-sharing to
enter cabinets. Therefore, multiparty governments can be classified as one of the features
of the consensus types of democracies. Also, parties sometimes make oversized cabinets,
which contain more parties than are necessary for majority support in the legislature; due
to strategic political considerations, parties sometimes include extra coalition partners.
For instance, parties may not want to have cabinet posts at all times. Sometimes, it is
more advantageous to stay away from government responsibility for the future gain
(Storm 1990). Also, Riker (1962) notes that parties could use a oversized coalition as a
kind of insurance for policy-making because they are not always sure how loyal their
coalition partners are. In addition, policy consideration can lead to oversized coalitions.
When internal or external security threats are emerging, it is more beneficial for parties to
work together for the common goal.164
While it is clear that minimal-winning and one-party cabinets represent
majoritarian characteristics, and that the oversized and coalition cabinets express
consensus traits, it is less clear at what point minority cabinets fit in the continuum.
According to Lijphart (1999), there are two kinds of minority cabinets. One is a genuine
minority cabinet that has to negotiate continuously with one or more non-cabinet parties

163

Among Lijphart’s (1999) thirty-two parliamentary democracies from 1945-1996, 37.1% is minimal
winning, one party, 24.7% is minimal winning coalition, 11.4%is minority, one party, 5.8% is minority
coalition, and 21.0% is oversize coalition.
164
Regarding more theoretical discussions, see Lijphart (1999).
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to stay in power in the legislature. This relationship, based on negotiation and
bargaining, makes such minority governments more like oversized coalitions. The other
kind of minority cabinets have been described by Strom (1997) as “majority government
in disguise”(p. 56)—minority cabinets that are more like majority cabinets because they
receive a reliable support from one or more parties in the legislature. Yet, his earlier
analysis has concluded that such disguised majorities are relatively rare, noting that “the
typical minority cabinet is a single-party government…which may have to look for
legislative support from issue to issue on an ad hoc basis” (p. 95). Also, Lijphart (1999)
notes that the commitment of a support party is never as solid as that of a party actually in
the cabinet and that it is in many cases difficult to determine whether a party qualifies as
a support party. Considering these points, it makes more sense to deal with minority
cabinets like oversized ones. As a result, it follows that the contrast will be between
minimal-winning coalition on the one hand and oversized and minority cabinets on the
other.
In this study, I follow the method adopted by Lijphart (1999). Lijphart (1999)
calculated the percentage of minimal-winning cabinets and that of one-party cabinets.
Then, he takes the mean of those two as the value showing the characteristics of the
cabinets. Unfortunately, regarding the percentage of one-party cabinets in presidential
systems for new democracies, no reliable data exists. Therefore, I instead rely on the
index of political cohesion, originally devised and coded by Roubini and Sachs (1989).
They record whether the same or different parties control the executive and legislature in
presidential systems. Because president and its cabinet power largely depend on the
legislative support, the index of political cohesion can be substituted as a measure of the

279

concentration of power in cabinets. For instance, according to Almond, Dalton, and
Powell (2001), three situations can be conceived regarding the relationship between
presidents and legislative support: (1) a president leading a party that controls the
assembly can control politics; (2) even when a president lacks such control, a clever
president with substantial support can dominate policymaking in cases where the
opposition is divided; (3) if the legislature is controlled by a united opposition, however,
the influence that a president enjoys will be much less and the center of policy-making
can shift to the parties controlling the assembly and their prime minister. Considering
these situations, whether the president can exert strong influence or not is dependent on
his/her control of the legislature. Therefore, I substitute the index of political cohesion
can be substituted as an indicator of one-party cabinets. Then, I averaged those two
indicators.165 The descriptive statistics are shown in Table A-2.

165

In parliamentary systems, the executive depends on majority support in the legislature both to stay in
office and to get its legislative proposals approved. On the other hand, in presidential systems, the
executive needs legislative majority support only for the president’s legislative proposals; presidents are
elected for a fixed term of office, and they are not dependent on the confidence of the legislature for their
survival in office. Therefore, according to Lijphart (1999), presidents and presidential cabinets are minimal
winning by definition. Presidential cabinets may be minimal winning, oversized, or minority cabinets
depending on the party affiliations of the presidents and of their cabinet members and the sizes of the
respective parties in the legislature. What this means is that whereas cabinets in parliamentary systems can
vary between 0 and 100% in the mean score of the cabinets’ concentration of power, those values in
presidential systems vary only between 50 and 100%. See Lijphart (1999).
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Table A-2 Percentage of Minimal-winning Cabinet and Single Party Cabinet
Country
(democracies)
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Brazil
Britain
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Denmark
Dominican Rep.
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Hungary
Iceland
India
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Mexico
Moldova
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sweden

Minimal Winning

Single Party

Overall

1

0.4615

1

0.8333

1

0

1

0

1

0.1429

1
0.8

0.5
0.2

1
0

0
0

0.25
1
0
1
1

0.25
1
0
1
0.25

0.5833
1
1
0.2727

0.5833
1
0.2222
0

0
1
0
0
1

0.6667
0.5
0
1
0

73.08
81.9
81.9
91.67
37.5
50
96.9
100
91
57.15
58.9
30.2
75
50
12.8
62.5
50
0
44.1
52.5
58.9
10.9
48.1
25
100
0
100
0.625
25.3
63.1
58.33
100
61.11
13.64
40.2
33.5
75
0
50
50
73
47.5
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Switzerland
Taiwan
Turkey
Ukraine
Uruguay
USA
Venezuela
(authoritarian)
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
China
Croatia
Ghana
Yugoslavia
Nigeria

1
0.8824
1
1

1
0.4706
0
0

63.6

83.1

4.1
100
67.65
50
50
81.2
73.4

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.2
0.75
0
1
1
1
0.8095
0.8095

60
87.5
50
100
100
100
90.48
90.48

Sources: Lijphart (1999), Lundell and Karvone (2003), Beck et al (2000)

Executive-Legislative Relations

The third difference that distinguishes majoritarian democracies from consensus ones has
to do with the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government.
According to Lijphart (1999), in majoritarian models of democracies, the executive
branch tends to dominate the legislature, whereas in consensus types of democracies, the
relationship tends to be characterized with a balance between the two branches. Focusing
on how these branches interact with each other, it is possible to distinguish types of
democracies.
To measure the relative power of the executive and legislative branches of
government, Lijphart (1999) relied on cabinet durability. The basic assumption of this
measure is that a cabinet that stays in power for a long time is likely to be dominant vis-à-
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vis the legislature, and a short-lived cabinet is likely to be relatively weak.166 In
measuring this concept, a critical point is what can be considered as the end of one
cabinet and the beginning of new one. There are mainly two methods regarding this
point. One is to focus exclusively on the partisan composition of cabinets and to count a
cabinet as one cabinet if its party composition does not change (Dodd 1976). The other
approach, which is much more common, regards several additional events as indicating
the end of one cabinet and the beginning of the next one: a parliamentary election, a
change in the prime ministership, and a change in the minimal winning, oversized, or
minority status of the cabinet.167 The advantage of Dodd’s broad definition is that it
measures cabinet durability that can be interpreted as indicators of executive dominance.
Particularly, cabinets winning several successive elections—and which Dodd therefore
counts as the same cabinet—are less and less likely to encounter serious challenges from
their parliament. Considering the advantages of each approach, Lijphart (1999)
combined both approaches. He averaged the sum of values calculated by two different
methods, and used the value as the index of executive dominance.
However, the method taken by Lijphart (1999) is problematic for several reasons.
For one thing, as Lijphart (1999) himself admits, the measure of cabinet durability only

166

According to Lijphart (1999), this interpretation is supported by the contrast between democracies and
nondemocratic political systems. In nondemocracies, executive branches tend to strongly dominate the
legislative branches, or legislature does not exist at all.
167
Such interelection changes in coalitional status were observed in Britain in 1976 and in India in 1993
(Lijphart 1999, ch.3, 4). Instead of this criterion, Warwick (1994) adopts formal cabinet resignation as one
of the events that marks the end of the cabinet. According to Lijphart (1999), this criterion is not
satisfactory because it relies too much on particular rules and customs in different parliamentary systems:
in otherwise similar circumstances, cabinets in some countries take actions of tendering their resignations
more quickly than in other countries. Furthermore, if a cabinet resignation leads to the formation of a new
cabinet with a different party composition or a different prime minister, or if it leads to new elections, the
cabinet will be considered as having terminated anyway. However, if a cabinet resigns and a new one is
formed under the same prime minister and with the same partisan make-up, it is hard to argue that cabinet
has “changed” in any significant way.
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applies to parliamentary systems.168 In presidential systems in which presidents maintain
certain levels of autonomy, cabinet durability is irrelevant as a measure of executivedominance over the legislature. Considering the differences between parliamentary and
presidential systems, Lijphart (1999) assigns the values of executive dominance
somewhat subjectively to presidential systems. For example, he assigned the value of
one to Costa Rica, the United States, and Switzerland, a value of two to Venezuela, and a
value of three to Colombia. However, although he claims that these values are based on
the opinions of regional experts, he does not seem to be able to fully justify his claim.

Figure A-1 Criteria for Presidential Power over the Legislative Branch
(1) Cabinet Formation
0—President can not name ministers on own initiatives
1—President nominates prime minister, who requires parliamentary confidence
2—President appoints prime minister with the consent of parliament
3—Presidential appointments of prime minister does not require parliamentary approval
(2) Cabinet Dismissal
0—Government may only be removed by parliament
1—Government may be removed by the president under certain stipulated conditions
2—Government may be removed by the president with the approval of parliament
3—Government may be removed by the president without parliamentary approval
(3) Assembly Survival
0—President can not call for pre-term elections
1—President can call for Pre-term elections during a specified term frame
2—President can call for pre-term elections upon a vote of no confidence in the government
3—President can call for pre-term elections at any time
(4) Presidential survival
0—Assembly can call for pre-term presidential elections at any time
1—If the assembly calls for pre-term presidential elections, the assembly must also stand for re-election
2—Assembly can call for pre-term presidential elections in special cases
3—Assembly can not call for pre-term presidential elections

Source: Those criteria are originally developed by Shugart (1996). Clark and Wittrock
(2005) slightly modified them. This study adopted the modified version by Clark and
Wittrock.

168

See Mainwaring (2001).

284

Therefore, for the values of presidential systems, I rely on a different method.
More specifically, I measure the strength of executive dominance based on the criteria
constructed by Shugart (1996) and modified by Clark and Wittrock (2005). According to
them, the criteria for presidential strength have four points: (1) cabinet formation, (2)
cabinet dismissal, (3) assembly survival, and (4) presidential survival. The details of the
criteria and the descriptive statistics are shown in Figure A-1. In presidential systems,
whether or not some kind of prime minister exists, these criteria make it possible for us to
measure and compare the strength of presidents compared to the legislature across
countries. Furthermore, it is necessary to adjust those values to be able to compare them
with the values assigned by Lijphart (1999). Lijphart has assigned France with the value
of 5.52 as the strength of executive dominance, which is the highest value among
presidential systems. Therefore, I adjust the score of executive dominance so that the
value of one becomes equal to the value of one-twelfth of 5.52. For example, according
to the criteria of Shugart (1996), Brazil has received the score of 9. Because a value of 1
in the criteria can be considered as a value of 0.46 in the Lijphart index, the value of 9 is
equal to 4.14. According to this rule, I assigned scores to each country. Table A-3 shows
the details of these values.
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Table A-3 Presidential Strength over the Legislative Branch
Country
(democracies)
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Brazil
Britain
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Denmark
Dominican Rep
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Hungary
Iceland
India
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Mexico
Moldova
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines

Cabinet
Formation

Cabinet
Dismissal

Assembly
Survival

Presidential
Survival

Total

3

3

0

3

9

Cabinet
Duration169

2
3

3

0

3

9

1

0

1

3

5

3

3

1

3

10

3
1

3
0

0
1

3
3

9
5

2
1

3
0

1
2

3
3

9
6

1
2
1
3
1

0
1
0
3
1

1
2
0
0
1

0
2
0
3
0

2
7
1
9
3

3
2

3
3

1
0

3
3

10
8

2

0.91

169

Overall
Score
4.14
5.47
5.47
2
1.98
4.14
5.52
2.3
4.9
4.6
3
2.28
4.14
2.3
1.14
5.52
4.14
2.76
2.48
2.08
3.07
1.14
2.57
0.92
3.22
0.46
4.14
1.38
2.72
3.17
0.91
4.6
3.68

Regarding the way cabinet durability is measured, this study exclusively relies on the
method adopted by (Dodd 1976) due to the limitation of data availability.
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Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Turkey
Ukraine
Uruguay
USA
Venezuela
(authoritarian)
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
China
Croatia
Ghana
Yugoslavia
Nigeria

1

0

0

3

4

1
2
0
3
1

0
3
0
3
3

2
3
1
0
0

2
3
2
0
0

5
11
3
6
4

2

0

0

3

5

2
3

3
3

1
2

3
3

9
11

3
3
2
2
3
2
2
2

3
3
2
2
3
0
0
3

0
3
3
0
2
0
1
0

0
3
3
3
0
3
3
3

6
12
10
7
8
5
6
8

1.5

1.75

1.84
2.09
2.3
5.06
1.38
2.76
1.84
4.36
3.42
1
2.3
1.75
4.14
5.06
1
2.82

2.76
5.52
4.6
3.22
3.68
2.3
2.76
3.68

Note: Hhigher values represent more dominant power of an executive branch.
Sources: Lijphart (1999), Shugart (1996) and Shugart and Carey (1992), Lundell and
Karovnen (2003), and Clark and Wittrock (2005)

Electoral Systems

The fourth difference between the majoritarian and consensus types of democracies is the
difference in electoral systems. The typical electoral system of majoritarian democracies
is the single-member district plurality or majoritarian system; consensus democracies
typically adopt proportional representation (PR) systems. The plurality and majority
single-member district methods are basically winner-take-all systems, and therefore the
candidate supported by the largest number of voters win and all others are not
represented, thus making them majoritarian institutions. Furthermore, the party that has
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gained nationwide majority votes will tend to be overrepresented in the parliamentary
seats. On the other hand, the basic goal of PR systems is to represent both majorities and
minorities in the parliament. Furthermore, unlike majoritarian systems, PR systems
translate votes into parliamentary seats proportionally. Therefore, PR systems match the
philosophy of consensus type of democracies.
As measures of electoral systems, Lijphart (1999) relies on degrees of
disproportionality. Lijphart (1999) suggests that many attributes of electoral systems
influence the degree of disproportionality and therefore the number of parties in the party
system. Scholars have suggested that plurality and majority forms of electoral systems
tend to produce more disproportionate results between the percentage of votes a party
gets and the seats it consequently obtains. On the other hand, PR systems are likely to
produce more proportional results, meaning that the vote share will be exactly translated
into the seat share.170
How can the overall disproportionality of elections be measured? It is not
difficult to determine the disproportionality for each party in an election: this is simply
the difference between its vote share and its seat share. The more difficult question in
this context is how we can aggregate the vote-seat share deviation of all the parties.
Summing the (absolute) differences is not satisfactory because it does not distinguish
between a few large and serious deviations and a lot of smaller and relatively
insignificant deviations.171 The approach suggested by Michael Gallagher (1991), which
170

Note that electoral thresholds are in some cases institutionalized. In order not to make it too easy for
small parties to win election, many of countries that use large or nationwide districts have instituted
minimum thresholds for representation. There percentages are relatively low and hence will not cause
serious problems for the representation of minor parties. See Lijphart (1999) on further discussion of this
issue.
171
One of the consequences of this problem is that the Loosemore-Hanby (1971) index, which uses the
additive approach, tends to underestimate the proportionality of PR systems. An alternative approach,
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is adopted by Lijphart’s (1999) analyses, solves this problem by weighting the deviations
by their own values—making large deviations account for a great deal more in the
summary index than small ones. The computation of the Gallagher index (G) is as
follows: the differences between the vote percentages (Vi) and seat percentages (Si) for
each party are squared and then added; this total is divided by 2; and the square root of
this value is taken.172
In several political systems, two sets of votes could be used for calculating voteseat share differences. In these cases, we have to make decisions on which of the two
should be used. In a “mixed member proportional” (MMP) electoral system, a variant of
PR, the choice is between the party list votes and the district votes. The scholarly
consensus on this point is that the party list votes express the party preferences of the
electorate most accurately. In alternative vote and the single transferable vote (STV)
systems, also a variant of PR, the choice is between first preference votes and final-count
votes, which is the votes after the transfer of preferences has been made; only first
preference votes are usually reported, and scholars agree that the differences between the
two are not significantly important.173
Considering these points, I computed disproportionality for new democracies.
More specifically, I computed the Gallagher Index for each country using available data.
suggested by the Rae (1967) index, is to average the absolute vote-seat share differences. However, it
distorts the results in overstating the proportionality of PR systems (see Lijphart 1994, pp. 58-60).
172
In the calculation process, any small parties that are lumped together as “other” parties in election
statistics have to be disregarded.
173
Several minor methodological issues need to be discussed. Liphart (1999, p. 159) raises several points.
First, as in the calculation of the effective number of parliamentary parties, the seats are those in the lower
or only house of parliaments. Second, unlike in the calculation of the effective number of parties, the seats
won by parties in the election are used and not those gained from legislators who join parties after the
election, as in Japan and Papua New Guinea. Third, any uncontested seats, mainly occurring in plural
systems, are excluded. Fourth, the two boycotted elections in Trinidad in 1971 and Jamaica 1983 are not
included in the analyses. Fifth, factionalized and closely allied parties are again counted as one-and-a halfparties.
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Regarding presidential elections, Lijphart (1999) suggests that some adjustments are
necessary. He suggests that disproportionality in presidential elections tend to be larger
than legislative elections. He also notes that disproportionality in presidential elections
can have much more significant impacts on the political system. Therefore, it is
necessary to take the disproportionality in presidential elections into consideration. To
address this issue, I followed the method taken by Lijphart (1999). According to him, if
arithmetic averages were used between presidential elections and legislative ones, the
disproportionality in presidential elections would overwhelm that in legislative elections.
Therefore, Lijphart (1999) adopts the geometric mean to combine both presidential and
legislative disproportionality. He suggests that geometric mean is generally more
appropriate when values of greatly different numbers are averaged.174 Table A-4 shows
the disproportionality of each country included in this study.

174

The geometric mean of two numbers is simply the square root of the product of these two numbers.
However, Mainwaring (2001) is critical of this method, noting that disproportionality between presidential
systems and parliamentary systems tend to be asymmetrical. According to Mainwaring, this discrepancy
can favor the results of parliamentary systems.
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Table A-4 Disproportionality and Electoral Systems
Country
(democracies)
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Brazil
Britain
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Denmark
Dominican Rep
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Hungary
Iceland
India
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Mexico
Moldova
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
175

Disproportionality

Electoral System175

17.77
9.26
2.47
11.44
3.24
14.84
10.33
18.26
11.72
18.71
10.62
1.83
17.11
17.44
2.93
21.08
21.5
13.69
4.25
11.38
3.45
3.25
5.03
3.29
18.67
18.85
15.32
19.31
1.3
4.93
9.6
10.29
15
18.83
4.04
9.16
17.94
10.96
0.38
21.88
8.15
2.09

PR
Majority
PR
Plurality
PR
PR
Plurality
PR
Plurality
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
Majority
Semi-PR
PR
PR
Plurality
PR
PR
Semi-PR
PR
Semi-PR
Majority
PR
Majority
PR
PR
Plurality
PR
Plurality
PR
PR
PR
Semi-PR
PR
PR
Semi-PR
PR
PR

Electoral systems shown here were categorized by Reynolds and Reilly (1997)
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Switzerland
Taiwan
Turkey
Ukraine
Uruguay
USA
Venezuela

2.53
4.17
11.7
15.81
7.92
14.91
14.41

PR
Semi-PR
Pr
Majority
PR
Plurality
PR

(authoritarian)
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
China
Croatia
Ghana
Yugoslavia
Nigeria

33.37
18.23176
13.97177
17.79178
23.25
24.28
8.88179
2.55

Semi-PR
Semi-PR
Majority
N/A
Semi-PR
Plurality
PR
Plurality

Sources: Lijphart (1999), Lundell and Karvonen (2003). Regarding the countries that are
not covered by these datasets, values were calculated by the author based on election data
of each country.

Federal-Unitary Dimension

Division of Power

As has been repeatedly suggested, the prime characteristic of the majoritarian model of
democracy is concentration of power in the hands of the majority. On the other hand, the
consensus model is featured by the non-concentration of power. Regarding the issue of
separation of powers, according to Lijphart (1999, p. 185), the crucial point is whether in

176

Due to the lack of reliable data, the average of the countries with semi-PR systems has been assigned.
Due to the lack of reliable data, the average of the countries with the majority political systems has been
assigned.
178
Because there is no election in the national level, the average of authoritarian states in the WVS has
been assigned.
179
Due to the lack of reliable data, the average of the countries with PR electoral systems has been
assigned.
177
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consensus democracy power is dispersed to political actors operating together within the
same political institutions or dispersed to separate political institutions. As the first
critical point of federal-unitary dimension, federalism and decentralization versus unitary
and centralized government is significantly important. This dichotomy can be considered
as the most typical and drastic method of dividing power; it divides power between entire
levels of government.
In fact, in all democracies, power is more or less divided between central and
noncentral governments, but it is highly concentrated in the center in majoritarian
democracies. To maintain majority rule in majoritarian model of democracy, it is
necessary for the central government to control not only itself but also all noncentral,
potentially competing governments. Consequently, majority governments tend to be both
unitary and central. On the other hand, consensus models of democracies operate at the
opposite aim. Through federalism and decentralization, the consensus model attempts to
divide power between the center and noncenter. For this goal, federalism and
decentralization secure the division of power between the central and noncentral levels of
government.
Lijphart (1999) divides democracies according to two criteria. The first criterion
is whether states have formally federal constitutions. As Elazar (1987) notes, “the first
test of the existence of federalism is the desire or will to be federal on the part of the
polity involved. Adopting and maintaining a federal constitution is…the first and
foremost means of expressing that will” (p. 42, cited by Lijphart (1999), p. 188). This
criterion allows us to draw distinction between federal and unitary systems. In addition,
each of these categories can be divided into centralized and decentralized categories.
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Centralization and decentralization are matter of degree, but it is not too difficult in
practice to classify countries into a simple centralized-decentralized dichotomy. Finally,
Lijphart’s analyses have a category of semi-federal state for those countries that cannot
be clearly classified as either federal or unitary. Consequently, countries are classified
into five categories: federal and decentralized=(5), federal and centralized=(4), semifederal=(3), unitary and decentralized (2), and unitary and centralized (1).
For coding new democracies and authoritarian states, I relied on the Polity III
dataset (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). Polity III categorizes the centralization of decisionmaking authority. More specifically, Polity III has three categories: unitary = (1),
intermediate category = (2), and federal = (3). To make the data consistent across all
countries, I assigned the values in the Polity III dataset to all countries, not relying on the
data originally collected by Lijphart (1999). The data are shown in Table A-5.
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Table A-5 Federal System
Country
(democracies)
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Brazil
Britain
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Denmark
Dominican Rep.
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Hungary
Iceland
India
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithuania

Federalism
2
3
2
1
3
3
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1

Country

Federalism

Macedonia
Mexico
Moldova
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Turkey
Ukraine
Uruguay
USA
Venezuela

1
3
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
2
1
3
1
1
2
1
3
3

Country
(authoritarian)
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
China
Croatia
Ghana
Yugoslavia
Nigeria

Federalism
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1

Note: Higher values represent higher levels of decentralization.
Sources: Jaggers and Gurr (1995)

Parliaments and Congress

According to Lijphart (1999), the second component of the federal-unitary dimension
focuses on the distribution—concentration versus division—of power in the legislature.
The pure majoritarian type of democracy demands the concentration of power in a single
chamber; the pure consensus type is featured by a bicameral legislature in which power is
divided equally between two differentiated chambers. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue
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that unicameralism is an institutional feature of the majoritarian model, whereas
bicameralism is of the consensus model.180
The two chambers of bicameral legislatures tend to differ in several ways in their
functions and structures. Originally, the most important function of second chambers, or
“upper” houses, which were elected on the basis of a limited franchise, was to play the
role of a conservative brake on the more democratically elected “lower” houses (Lijphart
1999, p. 203). As relatively less important differences between upper and lower houses,
Lijphart (1999) raises three points. First, second chambers tend to be smaller than the
first chambers. Second, legislative terms of office tend to be longer in second chambers
than the first ones. Third, a common feature of second chambers is the aspect of
staggered election.181 Lijphart (1999) notes these differences affect how the two
chambers of legislatures operate,182 but that they do not affect the question of whether a
country’s bicameralism is a truly strong and meaningful institution.
More importantly, according to Lijphart (1999), three features of bicameral
parliaments determine the strength or weakness of bicameralism. The first important
feature is the formal constitutional power that the two chambers have. Generally
speaking, second chambers tend to be subordinated to first chambers. For example,
negative votes on proposed legislation can be frequently overridden by the first

180

Tsebelis and Money (1997, p.1) report that about one-third of countries in the world have bicameral and
about two-thirds have unicameral legislatures.
181
For instance, one-half of the membership of the Australia and Japanese second chambers is renewed
every three years. Also, one-third of the American and Indian second chamber is elected every other year,
and one-third of the French second chamber is renewed every three years.
182
For instance, Lijphart (1999, p. 205) suggests that the smaller second chambers can conduct their
business in a more informal and relaxed fashion than the usually much larger first chambers.
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chambers, and in most parliamentary systems, the cabinet is responsible only to the first
chambers.183
Second, the actual political influence of second chambers depends not only on
their formal powers but also on their selection method (Lijphart 1999). Among the
bicameral legislatures of democracies analyzed by Lijphart (1999), all first chambers are
directly elected by the voters, but the members of most second chambers are elected
indirectly by the legislatures at levels below national government. Or in some
democracies, they are appointed. Second chambers that are not directly elected fail to
obtain the democratic legitimacy. Conversely, the direct election of a second chamber
can compensate for its limited political power.
According to the above two criteria—the relative formal powers of the two
chambers and the democratic legitimacy of the second chambers—bicameral legislatures
can be classified as either symmetrical or asymmetrical (Lijphart 1999). Symmetrical
chambers mean those bicameral systems with equal or only moderately unequal
constitutional powers and the democratic legitimacy. On the other hand, asymmetrical
legislatures are those democracies whose bicameral legislatures show significant
inequality in these points. Consequently, these two types of bicameral systems produce
different democratic performances.
The third crucial difference between the two chambers of bicameral legislatures is
that second chambers may have different electoral systems or institutional designs so that
they overrepresent certain minorities (Lijphart 1999). In such cases, the two chambers
differ in their composition, and they are called incongruent. The most striking examples

183

Among Lijphart’s thirty-six democracies, the only example of bicameral legislatures with formally equal
power is the legislature of Colombia.
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are shown in most of the second chambers that serve as federal chambers and that
overrepresent smaller units of the federation. Significant levels of overrepresentation can
occur when there is equality of state or cantonal representation in spite of inequality of
the state’s or canton’s population.184
Based on these categories of legislatures, Lijphart (1999) compiled an index. To
construct the index, he relies on the distinctions between bicameralism and
unicameralism, between symmetrical and asymmetrical bicameralism, and between
congruent and incongruent bicameralism. Accordingly, he established four principle
categories: strong, medium-strength, and weak bicameralism, and unicameralism. Strong
bicameralism is featured by both symmetry and incongruence. In medium-strength
bicameralism, one of these two elements is missing; this category is divided into two
subclasses depending on whether symmetry or incongruence exists, but both are ranked
equally and have the some index of bicameralism. The third category is weak
bicameralism in which the chambers are both asymmetrical and congruent. Finally, the
fourth principle is unicameral legislatures.185
In this study, as a measure of the divisions of legislative power, I rely on the
Comparative Data Set on Political Institutions compiled by Lundell and Karvonen
(2003). Based on the data collected by Tsebelis and Money (1997), they constructed five
categories: unicameralism=0, very weak bicameralism=1, weak bicameralism=2,
moderate bicameralism=3, and strong bicameralism=4. This dataset allows us to
184

Such parity can be found in the federal chambers of Switzerland, the United States, and Venezuela (two
representatives per state or canton) and Australia (twelve from each state). Partial exceptions to parity are
the half cantons in Switzerland, which have only one representative each in the federal chamber, and the
Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory, which have two senators each. In Venezuela, former
presidents are also members of the Senate (see Lijphart 1999).
185
Concerning the doubt that weak bicameralism has some effect on the separation of power, Tsebelis and
Money (1997, 211) argues that all second chambers do have some influence even if they are considered
weak or insignificant.
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compare the division of legislative power across countries. The data are shown in Table
A-6.

Table A-6 Parliament and Congress
Country
(democracies)
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Brazil
Britain
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Denmark
Dominican Rep.
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Hungary
Iceland
India
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithuania

Bicameralism
4
4
1
0
3
4
3
0
3
4
4
0
4
0
0
3
0
0
0
4
2
3
3
0
0

Country

Bicameralism

Macedonia
Mexico
Moldova
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Turkey
Ukraine
Uruguay
USA
Venezuela

0
4
0
2
0
4
0
3
2
0
3
2
0.5
4
0
2
0
4
0
0
0
3
4
4

Country
(authoritarian)
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
China
Croatia
Ghana
Yugoslavia
Nigeria

Bicameralism
0
0
0
0
2
0
4
4

Note: Higher values represent stronger checks between different chambers.
Sources: Lijphart (1999), Lundell and Karvone (2003). Regarding the countries that are
not covered by these datasets, the author estimated the values based on the constitutions
of each country.
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Constitutions—Constitutional Rigidity and Judicial Review

As one of factors in the unitary-federal dimension, Lijphart (1999) suggests the presence
of explicit restraint on the legislative power of parliamentary majorities. More
specifically, Lijphart (1999) is concerned about the relationship between the constitutions
and legislative power, asking “Is there a constitution serving as a “higher law” that is
binding on parliament and that cannot be changed by a regular parliamentary majority, or
is parliament—that is, the majority in parliament—the supreme and sovereign
lawmaker?” (p. 216). Regarding this point, he suggests two variables determining the
constraining power over legislative branches. The first variable is the degree of difficulty
of amending constitutions. Conventionally, the distinction is made between flexible
constitutions that can be changed by regular majorities on the one hand, and rigid
constitutions that require supermajorities in order to be amended. Because flexible
constitutions allow majorities to grab power by easily amending constitutions for their
own benefits, they represent the majoritarian view of democracies.
The second variable focuses on judicial review as a restraint on legislature. When
a constitution and ordinary laws conflict, it becomes necessary to interpret the
constitution to solve the conflict. In such cases, some democracies confer the role of
constitutional interpretation to a legislative branch, thus making the legislative body more
powerful than others. Yet, other democracies leave the role to a special constitutional
council, which is independent of parliament. Regarding these two functions of
restraining majority’s power, while the pure majoritarian model is characterized by a
flexible constitution and the absence of judicial review, on the one hard, the consensus
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model should be characterized with rigid constitution and the institutions of judicial
review.
With regard to constitutional rigidity, democracies adopt a variety of devices to
regulate how easily constitutions should be amended: special legislative majorities,
approved by both houses of bicameral legislatures, approval by ordinary or special
majorities of state or provincial legislatures, and approval by referendum, and approval
by special majorities in a referendum (Lijphart 1999). In addition, to make these
processes more complicated, some constitutions have different methods of amendment
for different provisions (Maddex 1995). Nevertheless, according to Lijphart (1999), it is
possible to reduce these differences into four basic types. The first type is distinguished
by whether a constitution can be amended by ordinary majorities. If this is the case, this
means that the democracy has complete flexibility. Besides that, three categories of
rigidity can be distinguished: (1) approval by two-thirds majority—a common rule, based
on the notion that supporters of a change in the constitution should outnumber the
opponents by a ratio of at least two to one; (2) approval by less than two-thirds majority
(but more than an ordinary majority)—for instance, three-fifths parliamentary majority or
an ordinary majority plus referendum; and (3) approval by more than a two-thirds
majority, such as a three-fourths majority or a two-thirds majority plus approval by state
legislatures. Considering these differences, Lijphart (1999) assigned values to
amendment rules according to following rules: ordinary majorities=1; between two-thirds
and ordinary majorities=2; two-thirds majorities or equivalent=3; and super-majorities
greater than two-thirds=4. The descriptive statistics are shown in table A-7.
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Table A-7 Rigidity of Constitutional Amendment Rule
Country
(democracies)
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Brazil
Britain
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Denmark
Dominican Rep.
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Hungary
Iceland
India
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithuania

Constitutional
Rigidity
3
4
4
4
3
2
1
4
4
3
1.1
2
3
2
3
1.6
3
3
1
3
2
2
4
4
4

Constitutional
Rigidity

Country
Macedonia
Mexico
Moldova
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Turkey
Ukraine
Uruguay
USA
Venezuela

3
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
3
3
4
3
4
3
4
3
1.3
4
4
3
3
4
4
2

Country
(authoritarian)
Armenia
Azerbaijan186
Belarus
China
Croatia
Ghana
Yugoslavia
Nigeria

Constitutional
Rigidity
4
0
4
1
3
4
3
3

Note: Higher values represent more difficult rules to amend constitution.
Sources: Lijphart (1999), supplemented by the author’s calculations based on
constitutions of each country.

As another critical aspect in the relationship between constitutions and legislature,
the existence of judicial review should be considered. In democracies, written and rigid
186

There is no provision of constitutional amendment in the constitution of Azerbaijan. Therefore, it can
be assumed that political elites can manipulate the constitutions relatively easily. Therefore, a value of 0
has been assigned.
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constitution may not be enough to restrain majority’s power in parliament. Unless there
is an independent body that determines whether laws conform to the constitution,
arbitrary rule by majority can be established. By granting a court or a special
constitutional tribunal the power to test the constitutionality of specific laws, it becomes
possible to keep parliamentary majorities in check.
Lijphart (1999) classifies the institutions of judicial review based on two criteria.
The first one is whether judicial review exists or not in a democracy. While some
countries have institutions and solid rules of judicial review, others do not have the
system of judicial review. As a result, the presence or absence of judicial review is an
important distinction to be made. The second criterion is the degree of assertiveness of
judicial review. Lijphart (1999) argues that the impact of judicial review depends not
only on its formal existence but also on the assertiveness and frequency of judicial review
executed by supreme and constitutional court. Therefore, Lijphart divides the degree of
judicial review activism into three subclasses: strong, medium, and weak. Judicial
review in some democracies shows strong activism in its exercise. For instance, the
German Constitutional Court invalidated almost 5% of all federal laws from 1951 to
1990 (Landfried 1995). In a similar manner, depending on the degree of the activism,
democracies are classified into categories of medium or weak judicial review. For
instance, Cappelletti (1989, 141) writes that judges in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden
exercise their decentralized power of judicial review “with extreme caution and
moderation.” In this way, somewhat subjectively based on the country experts’
evaluations, Lijphart (1999) classified systems of judicial review in democracies.
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In my dataset, I relied on several datasets other than the data compiled by Lijphart
(1999). For most parts, I adopted A Comparative Data Set on Political Institutions
compiled by Lundell and Karvonen (2003). To make it consistent with new democracies,
I adopted the data by Lundell and Karvonen for all countries covered in my study. For
countries that are not covered by Lundell and Karvonen, I turn to the dataset by Feld and
Voigt (2002) and Smithey and Ishiyama (2000). Feld and Voigt (2002) present two
indicators of judicial independence. One is a de iure indicator focusing on the legal
foundation of judicial independence, measuring the degree of judicial independence in
terms of its formal institutions. The other is a de facto indicator. This focuses on the
“factually ascertainable degree of judicial independence” (p. 1). Similarly, Smithey and
Ishiyama (2000) try to capture the degree of judicial independence in transitional
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. They construct a “judicial power score” that
focuses on formal institutions of the courts. In assigning values of judicial independence
for countries that are not covered by Lundell and Karvonen (2003), I first tried to rely on
the data by Feld and Voigt (2002). If this is not possible, I relied on the data by Smithey
and Ishiyama (2000). The reason why I turned to Feld and Voigt (2002) first rather than
Smithey and Ishiyama (2000) is that Feld and Voigt’s data capture the degrees of actual
independence of courts while Smithey and Ishiyama data exclusively measure the legal
independence of the courts. Finally, I adjusted these values so that they fit the
measurement of the Lundell and Karvonen dataset. More specifically, if the data score
more than 0.5, it is coded as 2, and if it is less than 0.5, it is recoded as 1. The data is
shown in Table A-8.
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Table A-8 Strength of Judicial Review
Country
(democracies)
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Brazil
Britain
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Denmark
Dominican Rep.
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Hungary
Iceland
India
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithuania

Judicial
Review
2
2
2
2
2
2
0
1
2
2
2.0
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1

Judicial
Review

Country
Macedonia
Mexico
Moldova
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Turkey
Ukraine
Uruguay
USA
Venezuela

2
2
2
0
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
0
2
1
1
2
2
1

Country
(authoritarian)
Armenia
Azerbaijan187
Belarus
China
Croatia
Ghana
Yugoslavia
Nigeria

Judicial
Review
2
0
1
1
3
2
1
2

Note: Higher values show represent more assertive judicial branches
Sources: Lijphart (1999), Lundell and Karvonen (2003), Feld and Voigt (2002), Smithey
and Ishiyama (2000)

Copyright © Satoshi Machida 2006
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There is no provision of judicial review in the constitution of Azerbaijan.
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Appendix B
Hierarchical Non-Linear Model (HLM) Analyses
Table B-1 HLM Analysis: (Majority and Minority Sample)
Dependent Variable: Trust
Predictors
Intercept

Model 1
-0.063 (0.249)

Model 2
-0.386 (0.231)

0.052(0.016)**
0.00009 (0.00009)
0.051 (0.008)***
0.043 (0.005)***
0.109 (0.012)***
0.037 (0.003)***
-0.024 (0.005)***
-0.019 (0.044)

0.050 (0.016)**
0.001 (0.0009)
0.053 (0.008)***
0.045 (0.006)***
0.112 (0.012)***
0.038 (0.003)***
-0.024 (0.005)***
-0.012 (0.045)

0.000003 (0.00001)
-0.027 (0.006)***
-0.381 (0.212)
-0.011 (0.024)
0.255 (0.134)
- 0.047 (0.844)
0.013 (0.003)***

0.000001 (0.000009)
-0.035 (0.007)***
-0.316 (0.191)
-0.019 (0.024)
0.663 (0.154)***
-3.831 (1.356)**
0.029 (0.007)***
-0.016 (0.004)**
0.115 (0.031)**

Individual level:
Sex
Age
Education
Income
Political Interest
Institutional Confidence
Ideology
Major
Country-level Intercept Effects:
GDP per capita
Gini
ELF
Ethnic Civil War
Executive-parties Institutions
Federal-unitary Institutions
Democratic Longevity
Executive-parties*Longevity
Federal-Unitary*Longevity
Variance Component: (Remaining
between-country variance)
Percent Explained

0.269***

0.187
30%

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, N=90526. These models are estimated by the HLM,
5.05. Bold letters signify that those variables are grand-centered mean.
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Table B-2 HLM Analysis (Majority Sample)
Dependent Variable: Trust
Predictors
Intercept

Model 1
-0.03 (0.317)

Model 2
-0.252 (0.308)

0.050 (0.018)**
0.002 (0.001)
0.050 (0.008)***
0.045 (0.006)***
0.109 (0.013)***
0.040 (0.003)***
-0.022 (0.005)***

0.048 (0.019)*
0.002 (0.001)
0.052 (0.009)***
0.045 (0.006)***
0.110 (0.014)***
0.040 (0.003)***
-0.022 (0.005)***

0.00001 (0.00001)
-0.033 (0.007)***
- 0.177 (0.292)
-0.013 (0.028)
0.313 (0.162)
0.285 (0.858)
0.016 (0.004)**

0.000008 (0.00001)
-0.041 (0.008)***
0.065 (0.304)
-0.029 (0.03)
0.677 (0.239)**
-2.531 (1.457)
0.030 (0.007)***
-0.014 (0.006)*
0.088 (0.036)*

Individual level:
Sex
Age
Education
Income
Political Interest
Institutional Confidence
Ideology
Country-level Intercept Effects:
GDP per capita
Gini
ELF
Ethnic Civil War
Executive-parties Institutions
Federal-unitary Institutions
Democratic Longevity
Executive-parties*Longevity
Federal-Unitary*Longevity
Variance Component: (Remaining
between-country variance)
Percent Explained

0.317***

0.289
8.5%

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, N=66068. These models are estimated by the HLM,
5.05. Bold letters signify that those variables are grand-centered mean.
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Table B-3 HLM Analyses (Minority Sample)
Dependent Variable: Trust
Predictors
Intercept

Model 1
-0.232 (0.234)

Model 2
-0.562 (0.223)

0.059 (0.029)*
0.0003 (0.001)
0.039 (0.012)**
0.039 (0.008)***
0.103 (0.02)***
0.032 (0.004)***
-0.031 (0.009)**

0.054 (0.032)
0.0004 (0.001)
0.045 (0.013)**
0.040 (0.009)***
0.111 (0.02)***
0.032 (0.004)***
-0.032 (0.009)**

0.00001 (0.00001)
-0.023 (0.006)**
-0.764 (0.25)**
-0.009 (0.029)
0.309 (0.146)*
-0.625 (1.146)
0.009 (0.004)*

0.00001 (0.000009)
-0.042 (0.007)***
-0.181 (0.199)
-0.027 (0.025)
0.907 (0.186)***
-6.37 (1.35)***
0.032 (0.007)***
-0.022 (0.004)***
0.181 (0.031)***

Individual level:
Sex
Age
Education
Income
Political Interest
Institutional Confidence
Ideology
Country-level Intercept Effects:
GDP per capita
Gini
ELF
Ethnic Civil War
Executive-parties Institutions
Federal-unitary Institutions
Democratic Longevity
Executive-parties*Longevity
Federal-Unitary*Longevity
Variance Component: (Remaining
between-country variance)
Percent Explained

0.265***

0.187***
29.4%

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, N=24458. These models are estimated by the HLM,
5.05. Bold letters signify that those variables are grand-centered mean.
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